LINES OF CONTROL

partition as a productive space

Iftikhar Dadi
Hammad Nasar

Artists: Bani Abidi Francis Alÿs Sarnath Banerjee Farida Batool Adam Broomberg & Oliver Chanarin Muhanned Cader Duncan Campbell Iftikhar Dadi DAAR Anita Dube Taghreed Elsanhouri Sophie Ernst Gauri Gill Shilpa Gupta Zarina Hashmi Emily Jacir Ahsan Jamal Nadia Kaabi-Linke Amar Kanwar Noa Lidor Mario Mabor Nalini Malani Naeem Mohaiemen Tom Molloy Rashid Rana Raqs Media Collective Jolene Rickard Hrair Sarkissian Seher Shah Surekha Hajra Waheed Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries Muhammad Zeeshan

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Brian Dunn & Nadia Kaabi-Linke working on
her *All Along the Watchtower*
Photography: Bernard Yenelouis

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Herbert F. Johnson Museum of Art, Cornell University

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Herbert F. Johnson Museum of Art

FOREWORD
Ellen Avril

In its first showing in the US, *Lines of Control* presents videos, photographs, prints, paintings, sculptures, and installations by thirty-three international artists and groups that grapple with the issues that arise when territories are divided and borders are drawn to create new nations. At its core, the exhibition investigates the historic upheaval of the 1947 partition of India that created the nations of Pakistan and later Bangladesh, and is part of an ongoing project initiated by Green Cardamom, a London-based nonprofit arts organization, in 2005. Expanding on the significance of partition in South Asia, *Lines of Control* at the Johnson Museum also addresses other partitioned areas: North and South Korea, Sudan and South Sudan, Israel and Palestine, Ireland and Northern Ireland, Armenia and its diaspora, as well as questions of indigenous sovereignty in the United States. The artists presented here expose in profoundly evocative ways what often cannot be expressed through conventional channels. Some draw upon deeply personal histories, experiences, and memories in their works, poignantly touching upon universal human concerns of home and belonging. Others confront the idiosyncracies, absurdities, and unintended consequences of collective actions—such as when governments and policymakers assert new boundaries and ideologies, or global networks blur the lines between nations and cultures.

Realizing this exhibition has been a collaborative effort, involving the creativity, talents, and support of many. Co-curators Hammad Nasar, Iftikhar Dadi, and Nada Raza brought their considerable intellectual and curatorial acumen to the content development of the exhibition. Their enthusiasm and passion have been infectious and easily convinced us to join this important project. It has been a privilege to work with Anita Dawood and all the dedicated and nimble staff of Green Cardamom, in particular Liza Kenrick who oversaw shipping and logistics, and Anna Dannemann who gathered images and artists' CVs. They overcame many logistical challenges to bring the works of these important international artists to Ithaca. We thank all the artists and lenders to the exhibition for entrusting us with the presentation of their compelling works.

As one of the largest and most technically complex exhibitions ever presented at the Johnson Museum, this project relied upon the specialized abilities of staff and graduate students in the College of Architecture, Art, and Planning. Dean Kent Kleinman committed funds, labor, and the use of equipment that made it possible to fabricate numerous works of art according to the artists' specifications. We especially thank AAP staff Aaron Goldweber, Chris Oliver, and Frank Parish, and MFA students Daren Kendall, Peter Chizinski, Brian Dunn, Baseera Khan, Christina Leung, Gabrielle (Gaby) Wolodarski, and Bernard Yenelouis. We are grateful for the curatorial assistance of Cornell Professor Salah Hassan and History of Art graduate student Reem Fadda. Professor Shirley Samuels provided support and assistance along the way. For help with realizing Nadia Kaabi-Linke's work, we were fortunate to be able to call upon the skills and expertise of airbrush artist Mickey Harris.

For the catalog, we thank all the authors whose insightful essays and writings deepen and enrich our understanding of the history and context within which the artists' works were created. Carole Stone copyedited the text with precision and aplomb under very tight deadlines. Ramez Elias' sophisticated design presents the content of the exhibition with style and sensitivity. Intern Karina Parikh assisted behind the scenes in the early stages of catalog production.

At the Johnson Museum, I am privileged to work with a very dedicated and hard-working team. Special thanks go to Chief Preparator Wil Millard and Preparator David Ryan for tackling the many technical challenges of the installation process with diligence, professionalism, and attention to detail. Ken Carrier, Elizabeth Emrich, David Brown, intern Sarah Simpson, and volunteer Amy Somogy all helped in critical ways. Matt Conway, registrar, ably assisted by Meghan Reiff, was responsible for the logistical aspects of gathering the loans and seeing them safely to Ithaca. In addition, Matt deployed his considerable skills to many aspects of the installation. Andrea Potochniak coordinated publicity and printing, and applied her experience and expertise to details of the catalog production. Stephanie Wiles, the Richard J. Schwartz Director, and deputy director Peter Gould, assisted by

Brenda Stocum and Nancy Dickinson, provided moral and administrative support to this project. Al Miller and the receptionists made it possible for us to work late hours. In the education department, Cathy Kilmaszewski, Elizabeth Saggese, and Hannah Dunn Ryan implemented the public programming and attended to the myriad details of organizing the exhibition symposium. Many staff members committed extra time and efforts beyond the usual scope of their duties. They have my deepest appreciation.

No exhibition this ambitious could happen without significant financial underwriting, and we are profoundly grateful for major funding from the E. Rhodes and Leona B. Carpenter Foundation, the Jarett F. and Younghee Kim-Wait Fund for Contemporary Islamic and Middle Eastern Arts, the Jarett F. and Younghee Kim-Wait Fund for Korean Arts, Gandhara-Art, the Mondriaan Fund, and Ali and Amna Naqvi.

Additional support for the symposium, catalog, and public programs was provided by Cornell University's Institute for Comparative Modernities; College of Architecture, Art, and Planning; Minority, Indigenous, and Third World Studies Research Group; Department of Art; Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies; Department of History of Art; and South Asia Program. We especially thank Mary Fessenden and Cornell Cinema for presenting the special film series curated by Nicole Wolf to coincide with the exhibition. It is a pleasure to work with generous colleagues in all these units to make *Lines of Control* and its programs relevant to the educational goals of the university.

Shilpa Gupta, *Untitled* (*There is No Border Here*)

LINES OF CONTROL: PARTITION AS A PRODUCTIVE SPACE

Hammad Nasar

> Partition, as the underside of independence, remains a festering wound in the collective psyche of South Asia.
>
> —Bhaskar Sarkar[1]

> Visual representations of Partition—despite the rich archive of photographs that must exist in many newspapers and magazines—remain limited, and while a half-century of Indian independence has called for all manner of celebratory events, little has been done to mark this important event in the history of India.
>
> —Urvashi Butalia[2]

> Sometimes when Mr. Kapur spoke about 1947 and Partition, Yezad felt that Punjabi migrants of a certain age were like Indian authors writing about that period, whether in realist novels of corpse-filled trains or in the magic-realist midnight muddles, all repeating the same catalogue of horrors about slaughter and burning, rape and mutilation, foetuses torn out of wombs, genitals stuffed in the mouths of the castrated. But Yezad's silent criticism was always followed by remorse. He knew they had to keep telling their story, just like Jews had to theirs, about the Holocaust, writing and remembering and having nightmares about the concentration camps and gas chambers and ovens, about the evil committed by ordinary people, by friends and neighbours, the evil that, decades later, was still incomprehensible. What choice was there, except to speak about it, again and again, and yet again?
>
> —Rohinton Mistry[3]

The Partition, the Holocaust, and Representation

Over a few weeks in 1947, an estimated 10 to 15 million people were displaced and up to one million killed, as British India split into two sovereign nation-states: a Hindu-dominated but constitutionally secular India, and a Muslim Pakistan. The scale of Partition's bloodshed reflected the roles played; first, by British colonial leaders as they sought a quick withdrawal—it is impossible to improve on Lord Louis Mountbatten's own assessment of his part in overseeing the bloody division: "I fucked it up"[4]—and second, by the personal ambitions of Indian leaders looking to capitalize on the hastily negotiated settlement.

Not that such a settlement remained settled for long. It was followed 24 years later by the Indian-supported secession of East Pakistan and the creation of the independent nation-state of Bangladesh. The birth pangs of Bangladesh were similarly brutal, with estimates of the human costs ranging up to three million killed and between 8 to 10 million displaced.

Given the scale of human suffering, it is not surprising that Partition has been referred to in local popular literature and the media as a "holocaust." And as Bhaskar Sarkar suggests, the economic and geopolitical importance of the region, and the sheer number of scholars working on South Asia may yet make the Partition another "paradigmatic case for thinking globally about collective traumas."[5] But unlike the holocaust of European Jews during the Nazi regime, India's partition has not yet spawned a visual culture of commemoration. As Urvashi Butalia has noted above, until recently there was little to mark Partition in the sphere of the visual arts.

Since Partition's 50th anniversary a decade ago, however, a rich seam of artistic production engaging the topic has emerged. Works such as Nalini Malani's *Remembering Toba Tek Singh*, and Amar Kanwar's *A Season Outside*, and the *Mappings* exhibition (1997) by New Delhi's Eicher Gallery, showing the work of artists from India and Pakistan together, were propelled out of a sense of critical and communal interaction across borders—a sentiment released or at least catalyzed by the violence following the

destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India (1992), and a decade on, the Gujarat pogroms (2002). Indeed, Ayodhya and the communal fissures that erupted in India during the rise of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) pushed a generation of artists to look at the wounds of Partition afresh. Indeed, of the 20 artists of South Asian origin whose works are in *Lines of Control*, only two were born before Partition. So the artistic engagement with the traumas of Partition can be seen more as a Gandhian desire to "be the change you want to see in the world" than as solely an engagement with history.

Anita Dube, a historian and critic, felt compelled to initiate a critically and socially engaged artistic practice post-Ayodhya. Amar Kanwar's celebrated trilogy of films: *A Season Outside* (1997), *A Night of Prophecy* (2002), *To Remember* (2003), shown in this exhibition, is roughly contemporaneous with India's rule by the BJP (1998-2004), which promulgated overt nationalist rhetoric and muscular free-market policies. Kanwar's immersive, complex, fragmentary films can be read as an attempt at unpacking the human cost of the infamous "India Shining" slogan the BJP adopted to project India's economic optimism.

Another important marker in this trajectory of artistic response and intervention was *AarPaar,*[6] a series of cross-border projects initiated in 1998 by artists Shilpa Gupta (India) and Huma Mulji (Pakistan) in the aftermath of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. The projects spanned four years and different media: from a first realization in 2000 where art objects crossed the border and were shown in everyday spaces (roadside restaurants, and *paan* shops) on the streets of Karachi and Mumbai; to a second one in 2002 where artists produced single-color posters exchanged as emails, printed locally, and inserted into the public domain—flyposted or distributed as handouts; and then a final version in the form of short videos in 2004.

More recently, the Citizens Archive of Pakistan launched an oral history project to record Partition stories, and in 2011 collaborated with VASL, the Karachi-based artists' collective, to host a joint residency for artists from Pakistan and Bangladesh to consider the memories of 1971. In the same year we witnessed India's first national pavilion at the Venice Biennale featuring four artists who, in the words of curator Ranjit Hoskote, "stretch the idea of India" and "critique the idea of the nation-state as something unitary or territorial."[7] Overlooking art market favorites, Hoskote showcased four artists who are charting more independent routes, including the quiet minimalist aesthetic of Zarina Hashmi, whose explorations of spatial boundaries and the Urdu language have marked a life-long principled commitment to the cultural specificity of being an Indian Muslim; and the Assam-based Desire Machine Collective, who operate an alternative art space on board a ferry that they are seeking to transform into "an archive and carrier of folk and oral traditions, poetry, people's experiences, and new forms that emerge with a multidisciplinary approach to cultural production."[8]

Partition is how the nation-states of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were formed. It was thus, by definition, a *productive* act: generating new lines and maps; creating borders and regimes of control; fashioning new identities, reconfiguring memories and rewriting histories. The activist, scholar, and theorist Eqbal Ahmad saw artists as "repositories no less than creators of collective memories and emotions."[9] Within Benedict Anderson's formulation of nations as "imagined communities," artists play a crucial role in creating a cultural bond for members of the "community" or citizens of the "nation." The work of artists mentioned above is exemplary in this mode of working—what Irit Rogoff (in this volume) calls an *undisciplined approach* that works on memory, cartography, language, history, trauma and security to unpack what happens when nations are created through the fracture of partition.

Lines of Control – The Story So Far

The genesis of this exhibition was at a symposium—organized at London's Royal Geographical Society in December 2005—examining the encounter of visual artists and filmmakers with the subject of India's 1947 Partition. Under the gentle but incisive prodding of the chair, curator, and cultural theorist, Sarat Maharaj, a round-table of 20 artists, curators, filmmakers, scholars, and cartographers, abandoned the idea of a big exhibition coinciding with the 60th anniversary of India's Partition in August 2007, in favor of a constellation of events that would build on each other and spark different enquiries, with no specific end in sight.

Lines of Control is an exhibition-led enquiry that Green Cardamom developed subsequent to this symposium, its shape and form guided by the

Gujarati proverb: "If you are going to eat an elephant, do it in small bites." Over the past six years the project has spawned writings, artists' talks, and film screenings; a research fellowship; a three-part exhibition spread across London, Dubai, and Karachi with partner galleries; a program of experimental film in Karachi; an exhibition at Cartwright Hall in Bradford, UK; a symposium at London's Whitechapel Gallery; artist projects hosted at Green Cardamom's London space; a specially commissioned project curated for the British Council at their London Head Office; and, participation in public programs from Hong Kong to Los Angeles to Barcelona.

The most important legacy of these different approaches to exploring the partition of India has been the abandonment of fixed ideas of what the project needed to achieve and the form it needed to take. Letting go of these preconceptions has allowed the project to widen its scope: from being a commemorative gesture to becoming one link in an open-ended enquiry; from gaining historical perspective to understanding the contemporary moment through the lens of historic upheavals; from being about the Partition per se to addressing partitions in general; from a desire to identify and display works of art as memorial to considering them as critical texts; allowing us to consider the potential that such explorations offer for knowledge production about self and society.

One corollary of following such an approach has been that while focusing on our small bites, we now find ourselves eating a much larger elephant. The exhibition at Cornell University's Herbert F. Johnson Museum extends the geographic scope of our project beyond the South Asian subcontinent for the first time, comprising over 45 works by more than 30 artists from South Korea to the US via Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Sudan, Palestine, Israel, the Netherlands, and Ireland, alongside our starting point of works from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Encompassing this broader context enriches the project by creating opportunities for comparisons across contexts and begins an investigation of comparative approaches to the visualization of partition.

My own ambition for *Lines of Control* was not to curate a large exhibition that moves objects around the world, but rather to create a platform for exhibition-led enquiry, where each incarnation does new work. In that context, the invitation from Ellen Avril, chief curator of Cornell's Johnson Museum, to bring the project to Ithaca was an outstanding opportunity to work with one of America's leading centers of learning, to eat a bigger elephant. And it has been a privilege to work with her and Iftikhar Dadi (a scholar and artist whose work has been foundational to my earliest engagement with the visuality of Partition), with the assistance of Nada Raza (who has worked on the project since 2007-8) to realize this exhibition.

Indeed the project in its present form would not have been possible without the commitment and engaged support of not only the staff at the Johnson Museum but the wider Cornell community: most directly from Jolene Rickard, whose newly commissioned work anchors the exhibition into the specificity of its present location by exploring the question of sovereignty and territory in the context of the Cayuga Nation; from the curatorial contributions by Salah Hassan and Reem Fadda; the film program hosted by Cornell Cinema; and perhaps even more fundamentally the staff and students of Cornell's College of Architecture, Art, and Planning, who have helped literally construct this show.

Lines of Control at Cornell is a chance for the "undisciplined" work of contemporary artists to enter into a diverse set of conversations with practitioners in different fields to find new meaning. That there are faculty members from the departments of Art, Art History, English, Comparative Literature, Film, History, Music, and Natural Resources using the exhibition as a teaching resource is thrilling. And I am keen to see what such interaction produces.

Planned future incarnations of the project will continue to advance the parallel tracks of broadening out its geographical coverage on one hand and digging deeper in specific areas of exploration on the other. In 2013-14 we plan to collaborate with Duke University's Nasher Museum and its multidisciplinary Borderwork(s) Lab to work with ideas of cartography in the context of South Asia.

What follows below are some of the core ideas explored in the exhibition at the Johnson Museum—around difference and division, borders and security, and memory and forgetting. They function, at least in part, as themes that provide some structure to thinking about an exhibition of this size, but they are meant as points of reference rather than as "sections" of the show—for the works of art seep through the porous divisions between these concepts.

Difference, Division and Nation

> One could argue that Europe has been so harmonious since World War II not because of the failure of ethnic nationalism but because of its success, which removed some of the greatest sources of potential conflict both within and between countries.
>
> —Jerry Z. Muller[10]

> History has not anaesthetized the original crisis of Partition. . . . Partition is the moment of the Indian nation's origin through violent rupture with itself. It both defines and constantly suspects India's identity, dividing it between the responsibility to tolerate differences and the dream of a territory where all are compelled to worship in unison. The deep, valuable diversities of India have kept alive the fear and ambition of future crises of division. It will remain so until Indians begin to come to terms with Partition's political and historical significance.
>
> —Sunil Khilnani[11]

> The difference between a "nation" and an "ethnic group" is analogous to that between a "language" and a "dialect." It is a question of convention. A language is a dialect that has succeeded politically, and a nation is an ethnic group that has done the same thing.
>
> —Rada Ivekovic[12]

As the American historian Jerry Muller recounts, the ethnic cleansing of the Jewish holocaust under the Nazi regime in Germany was rightly shunned, and yet the moving of populations based on ethnicity remained part of how post-war Europe worked. In an attempt at post-war stability, the three powers (the US, UK, and Russia) insisted on the expulsion of all ethnic Germans from non-German countries. By 1947, more than seven million Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia—the largest forced population move in European history.[13]

In Muller's way of thinking, partition is the "most humane lasting solution to such intense communal conflicts."[14] And he argues that while partitions have a cost attached to them in terms of creating refugees, they avoid the long-term instability and cost of maintaining rival groups under one polity—whether it's by force (think of the Kurds in Turkey or the Basques in Spain) or by political negotiations (the Scots in Great Britain and the Catalans in Spain).

The impact of ethno-nationalism is not restricted to Europe. And in the decolonization efforts after World War II, it has been directly exported to swathes of Asia and Africa. Perhaps the most lasting repercussions so far have been in the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, and later East Pakistan's secession/liberation to Bangladesh. And it reverberates in the creation of the Jewish state of Israel in the former British mandate of Palestine. There are key parallels between these two historic instances. Both were efforts by the British to extract themselves from colonial entanglements and in each instance gave birth to the world's first set of nation-states created on the basis of religion rather than ethnicity. The creation of Israel in 1948 can also be seen as a continuation of the project of removing Jews from Europe. And since its creation, more than 750,000 Arabs left or were forced to flee from Israel, and more than 500,000 Jews from Arab countries moved to Israel.[15]

Pakistan, created in 1947, was the home of a majority of the Subcontinent's Muslims. But in the end, a common faith was not enough to hold firm the ties of a nation-state split by the wide expanse of India, and it eventually dissolved into Urdu-dominated Pakistan and Bengali-speaking Bangladesh. But Urdu itself is a language spoken by a minority of Pakistan's population, mostly in urban centers, and is the mother tongue of only those Pakistanis who came from India. Indeed, the migrants or *mohajirs* are euphemistically referred to as being "Urdu-speaking."

But how do people who have lived side by side for centuries become mortal enemies? As Eqbal Ahmad points out in his essay "Partitioned Lands, Divided Sentiments," the Muslim League polled only four percent of the Muslim votes in the Indian elections of 1937, and yet within three years, it formulated the demand for Pakistan and then achieved it by 1947.[16] This dramatic turnaround in political fortune suggests to Ahmad the failure of the "majority leaders to comprehend the anxieties and insecurities of a minority people" and its translation into the demand for separate statehood.

> In my reading the Partition of India was an attempt to bring about not only the establishment of a Muslim nation-state but also the minorization of "the Muslims," and through it the nationalization of Indian culture and polity, by means of a massive

> rearrangement of populations, identities, desires, and memories that sought to turn roughly two-thirds of the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent into non-Indians.
>
> -Aamir Mufti[17]

In his book *Enlightenment in the Colony*,[18] Aamir Mufti opens up the history of the "Jewish Question" to a broader discussion of the exclusion of religious and cultural minorities, and in particular to the issue, indeed the crisis, of Muslim identity in modern India. Mufti sees the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India as a colonial variation of what he calls "the exemplary crisis of minority"—taking as his starting point the conceptual framework put forth by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, where they define minor literature as being "that which a minority constructs within a major language."[19]

Through historically situated close readings of literary and political texts in German, English, and Urdu, Mufti produces a comparative reading of the "minority-ness" of Jews in Europe and Muslims in India, articulating the link between the two through the modernist project of the nation-state, which was part of the solution for both sets of "problems:" the Jews in Europe and Muslims in India.

The modernist formulation of nationalism and the nation-state (for example in Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities") privileges its "unifying project," that is, its desire to produce the one out of the many. Mufti, however, sees the converse of that tendency in nationalism's ability to disrupt social relations by setting up a process of inclusion and exclusion. Hence, he argues that the process of "nationalization" of peoples and cultural practices results in a parallel "minoritization," where the minority "is always potentially exile, and exile is an actualization of the threat inherent to the condition of minority."[20]

Mufti calls for the adoption of secular, minority, and exilic perspectives in criticism and intellectual life as a means to critique the very forms of marginalisation that give rise to the uniquely powerful minority voice in world literatures. This formulation is directly applicable for new hyphenated forms of identity—the Indian-Muslim or the Israeli-Arab—that are unstable and vulnerable to ethno-national violence.

Border, Security and Control

> The surge in violence that began shortly before the Radcliffe award was announced can be traced in part to rumors and uncertainty over where the Line would fall . . . The lack of a methodologically sound boundary-making process must be counted prominently among the failures of the South Asian division.
>
> —Lucy Chester[21]

> Like the traditionally undivided Indian family which separates when brothers and cousins quarrel and build walls along the family courtyard, Indians and Pakistanis make awkward, complementary enemies.
>
> —Eqbal Ahmad[22]

These two quotes give us two different registers of referencing the business of cartography: Lucy Chester sees it as lying within the domain of bureaucratic efficiency, Eqbal Ahmad brings us back into the fold of where much of South Asian life takes place: the family. But this bureaucratic/familial business of drawing lines is foundational to the idea of the nation. Benedict Anderson's articulation of the nation as an "imagined community" is fertile terrain for us to ground this consideration. For Anderson, the nation is "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign,"[23] concepts that he defines as such:

> 1. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.
> 2. The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind.
> 3. It is imagined as *sovereign* because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical, dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and territorial

stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.
4. Finally, it is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.

For Anderson, crucial to the functioning of the nation is the principle of limitation. But this is also a method for exclusion, which allows the nation to define its borders and declare those within it as *belonging* to it. Those excluded from the nation become, at first cut, *strangers* (a notion that Raqs Media Collective has expanded on in their work for the exhibition). And if these excluded people are not accepted by another nation, or are a politically unsuccessful ethnic group, in Rada Ivekovic's formulation, they become the *stateless*.

The social scientist Richard Sennett analysed the history of segregation and "ghettoization" by tracing its evolution from the Jewish Ghetto of Venice in 1516 (where it was used to physically contain the Venetians' "anxieties of difference"). [24] He describes the way in which the Venetian ghetto, created in stages over the course of a century, was surrounded by walls and moats, and was accessible only by a limited number of bridges and gateways that were sealed at night, even to the extent that other external exits and outward-facing balconies were sealed up. The Jews were walled up at night. This is often the fate of the stateless, or politically unsuccessful ethnic groups; and remarkably little seems to have changed in the five centuries that have passed since the Venetian ghetto. The condition of Palestinians living in the West Bank offers an uncanny parallel to the Jewish ghetto of 16th century Venice. All that seems to have changed is the means of surveillance (drones and CCTV rather than the watchtower) and the mechanisms of control (passports, visas).

The other parallel offered is, of course, that of the Indigenous or Native American peoples of North America. In his landmark essay, "Pioneering in the Nuclear Age" Eqbal Ahmad sets out his devastating interpretation of Zionism as an extreme form of "settler colonialism." It is "one that seeks to exclude and eliminate the native inhabitants rather than to occupy and exploit them."[25] By comparing Israel's creation with the European settlement of the Americas and the violent elimination of the native population, Ahmad emphasizes its basis in the myths of "an empty land, of swamps reclaimed and deserts blooming." He highlights how Israel's exclusionary policies and security paranoia led to its embracing a "dialectic of anxiety, violence and expansion." The similarity of the situation in Gaza and that of the Indigenous peoples of North America offers uncomfortable parallels.

Memory, History, and Commemoration

> If there is no suitable past it can be invented.
> —Eric Hobsbawm[26]

> There never were any mosques in Zvornik.
> —Branko Grujic, Serbian mayor of Zvornik[27]

> In many countries in the world today there are memorials to moments of conflict and upheaval . . . scholars have painstakingly built up meticulous archives of people's testimonies, of photographs, letters, documents, memoirs, books in which such historical moments are represented. Very little of this exists for Partition.
> —Urvashi Butalia[28]

There is not one public memorial in India or Pakistan to commemorate the more than one million dead and more than 15 million displaced by India's Partition. If memorials are the mechanism through which, in the words of Kristin Ann Hass, "people make promises to the future about the past,"[29] then this suggests a troubling lack of commitment from those who lived through it and the generations that have followed.

Given that the Partition and the Holocaust happened in the same decade, and noting the presence of Holocaust memorials and museums in locations from Germany to Israel and from America to Australia, it is puzzling that no such initiative has taken place anywhere to commemorate Partition. And one can take no refuge in cultural differences given that ritualistic practices of commemorating the dead exist in both Hindu and Muslim cultures of the subcontinent. This lack signals a discomfort in rendering these memories in concrete form.

Murtaza Vali, in the introduction to his project

of inviting artists to submit proposals for possible memorials to Partition (in this volume), argues that commemoration becomes problematic when there is no clear distinction between perpetrator and victim, where atrocities were committed by both sides (as they clearly were in 1947 and 1971). He identifies a second complication in contemplating such a memorial in that the "violence was not delimited, temporally or geographically." One can debate the finer points of whether such qualifications hold: If commemoration is about collective mourning for loss, it should be possible for both sides to mourn their loss without the need to apportion blame. Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans' Memorial is vivid proof of such possibilities. But Vali's idea of artists helping us to articulate (and perhaps navigate) what Sukeshi Kamra calls "the erasures, silences, and gaps that were required for the triumphalist narrative of nation to be written,"[30] seems a powerful one—in particular as it allows for the memory to be replayed, re-performed, and hence retained (as articulated by Rohinton Mistry, above). For as Vali points out, such loss and trauma is not bound by time. And as the violence and counter-violence of Ayodhya, Gujarat, the Mumbai terrorist attacks, and countless incidents have shown repeatedly, the Partition's efficacy in transforming friends into strangers remains undimmed even after six decades.

History, of course, is no refuge, as it can be rewritten to suit political goals: General Zia ul-Haq turned history "green," with Jinnah, the Anglophile secularist painted in Islamist hues; while the BJP championed "saffron," for example, with the Taj Mahal being "revealed" to be originally a Hindu temple. Nor is this a quixotic South Asian problem. Alternative readings of history continue to cause political ripples, be it diplomatic spats between Turkey and any nation that chooses to link Armenia with the word "genocide," or the debate on what to call people who lived in what is now Israel (if not termed "Palestinian"). And as the writing of history becomes more widespread through the availability of Internet publishing and distribution, the ability of tendentious voices to articulate their claims more broadly will only increase. History, far from being bunk, looks poised to continue to hold its grip on our collective sense of self.

Crossing Those Lines of Control

> As Franz Fanon argued, decolonization, like colonization, is a violent process. South Asian leaders—Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan—strained to avert it and nearly succeeded. Yet at the very end, in the hour of independence, violence did break out—massively and in an inverted manner, ruining friendships, as Faiz Ahmed Faiz wrote, and our "centuries" of loyalties. These remain nevertheless, embedded in our collective memory. Our sentiments divide when the realities of the past and present collide. Hence the need for other "texts of love" and new "translations of hope."
>
> —Eqbal Ahmad[31]

In his new book, *Together: The Rituals, Pleasures, and Politics of Cooperation*, the social scientist Richard Sennett proposes that living with people who differ—racially, ethnically, religiously, or economically—is the most urgent challenge facing civil society today. Perhaps artists are uniquely placed to navigate new paths for us to live with our partitioned, fragmented selves.

South Ossetia, Kosovo, and Sudan are the most recent of a ready stream of live case studies stretching from the heart of "Old Europe" (think Belgium) to the Middle East (Israel and Palestine; Turkey, Iraq, and the "Kurdish question;" and those other "questions" previously, or still, kept in check by dictatorial tyranny) and from South Asia (the Tamils of Sri Lanka and India; the Pashtuns of Pakistan and Afghanistan; Kashmir; and India's impoverished North-East) to Africa (the long-term campsite of the Western Sahara; the tribally charged turmoil of Zimbabwe; the ethno-religious conflicts of Nigeria) and to East Asia (the evolution of Greater China; the Koreas). The afterlife of colonization, the untangling of Cold War alliances, and the continued thawing out of nation states formed in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of three European empires in the 20th century will continue to play out through partitions and drawing of new lines in the 21st century.

It is not just maps that will feel the strain. Through the competing narratives of nationhood, histories excavated and rewritten, and memories re-configured, notions of self will remain a heavily contested terrain for large sections of the world's population. For it is not just the colonized for whom these issues matter, but also the colonizer. What it means to be British or French are

questions that are addressed as much to the Muslim pockets of Bradford and the *banlieues* of Paris as they are to the Houses of Parliament and the Elysée Palace.

Cultural practice, in general, and visual culture, in particular, offers us ways of thinking and exploring these issues in the "safe" environments of cultural spaces. Artistic institutions and practices can play a leading and constructive role in producing new knowledge about our predicaments. Critiques of our current impasses and new imaginations for coexistence are unleashed by the creative and *undisciplined* energy of visual artists—where the unsayable can be shown, the unthinkable can find voice, and the forgotten can find shape as images. Over and above the commemorative or cathartic effect of such processes and practices, is the evidence they provide of an innate and indomitable desire for these lines of control to be crossed.

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[1] Bhaskar Sarkar, *Mourning the Nation: Indian Cinema in the Wake of Partition* (Duke University Press, 2009), 1.
[2] Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence*: *Voices from the Partition of India* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1998), 361-362.
[3] Rohinton Mistry, *Family Matters* (New York: Vintage, 2003), 130.
[4] As related to BBC's John Osman in 1965 and recalled in *The Spectator* (London), September 2004.
[5] Bhaskar Sarkar, *Mourning the Nation*, 306, note 32.
[6] A vernacular expression I would loosely translate as near/far or this side/the other side—most commonly used to evoke crossing. You can find out more about "AarPaar" on the website http://aarpaar2.tripod.com/about.htm
[7] Quoted in Magot Cohen, "India Heads to the Venice Biennale" (http://blogs.wsj.com/scene/2011/01/10/india-heads-to-the-venice-biennale/) last accessed Jan 5, 2012.
[8] http://www.archiving-performance.org/workshop-blog/participating-institutions/desire-machine-collective.html
[9] Eqbal Ahmad, "Partitioned Lands, Divided Sentiments" in *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad*, eds. Carollee Bengelsdorf, Margaret Cerullo and Yogesh Chandrani (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 410.
[10] Jerry Muller, "Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism," in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 87, No. 2 (March/April, 2008): 31.
[11] Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1997), 202.
[12] Rada Ivekovic in "From the Nation to Partition; Through Partition to the Nation" in *Divided Countries, Separated Cities: The Modern Legacy of Partition* eds. Ghislaine Glass Deschaumes and Rada Ivekovic (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 150-174
[13] Jerry Muller, "Us and Them," 27-28.
[14] Ibid, 34.
[15] Ibid, 29.
[16] Eqbal Ahmad, "Partitioned Lands. Divided Sentiments," in *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad* eds. Carollee Bengelsdorf, Margaret Cerullo and Yogesh Chandrani (Karachi, Oxford University Press Pakistan, 2006), 403-411.
[17] Aamir Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 244.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
[20] Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony*, 13.
[21] Lucy Chester, "The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary" in *American Diplomacy*, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_01-3/chester_partition/chester_partition.html #text20, 15 February, 2002
[22] Eqbal Ahmad, "Partitioned Lands. Divided Sentiments," in *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad*, 408.
[23] Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 5-7.
[24] Richard Sennett, *Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 212-51.
[25] Eqbal Ahmad, "Pioneering in the Nuclear Age: An Essay on Israel and the Palestinians" in *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad*, 303.
[26] Eric Hobsbawm, "The New Threat to History," *New York Times Review of Books,* 16 December 1993.
[27] Quoted by Robert Bevan in *The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War* (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), 7.
[28] Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence*, 361-362.
[29] Kristin Ann Hass, *Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 38.
[30] Sukeshi Kamra, "A 'Messy' History and its Many 'Messy' Texts: An Essay on Partition (India, 1947) and its Narratives," in *Literature Compass* 3, No. 5 (2006): 1165.
[31] Eqbal Ahmad, "Partitioned Lands. Divided Sentiments," in *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad*, 411.

Adam Broomberg & Oliver Chanarin, *Mini Israel*

Taghreed Elsanhouri, *Our Beloved Sudan*

PARTITION AND CONTEMPORARY ART

Iftikhar Dadi

The Partition of South Asia in 1947 was the original impetus for the *Lines of Control* project—and the one that impelled London-based curator Hammad Nasar to question the strange and haunting absence of artists who would address it directly. While a number of artists who experienced the Partition, such as Satish Gujral and Tyeb Mehta, did respond to its effects, others approached it only in metaphorical and indirect ways;[1] and by and large there was a structure of experience and feeling that virtually everyone sought to transcend somehow (not always successfully).[2] Contemporary practice by a growing number of South Asian artists—most of whom did not experience firsthand 1947 (or the 1971 formation of Bangladesh)—is now beginning to grapple with the latent complexity of Partition's effects, which extends from grand nationalist, geopolitical, and identitarian agendas into the most personal and intimate aspects of the self.

The resurgence of artistic engagement undoubtedly has something to do with the resonance of what theorist and film scholar Bhaskar Sarkar has identified as the "Partition experience" on the psyche. This experience is not to be conflated with simply witnessing or experiencing events firsthand; rather, it has a "spectral or negative presence," and a "temporality all its own, one that runs alongside and yet is out of sync with the present."[3] Sarkar further notes that this structure of experience is "marked by deferral, gaps, and uncertainties, providing no guarantee of the eventual assimilation of the experience within a coherent history, or of therapeutic closure." The experience, then, is not only individual, or belonging only to those who witnessed it directly, but extends its effects collectively to society in strange ways and works insidiously across generations.

Contemporary cultural and artistic practice is uniquely placed to address this second-order predicament, as it executes a modality of address that seeks neither metaphorical sublimation nor adherence to established artistic form nor legitimacy via the "national modern." The contemporary work of art offers no transcendence and no attempt to redeem events and crises into a utopian metaphor. Rather, it resolutely refuses all claims to authenticity and insistently maps the multiple dislocations and antinomies of the social field.[4] It is characterized by its being both *fully immersed in-its-time*, yet also *simultaneously out-of-joint with it*, and therefore not bound by the "timeliness" of its demands or by the sense of "reasonably" addressing only what is politically and socially pragmatic. Much of contemporary art ethically critiques our conceptions and practices of modern institutions, such as the nation-state, which were meant to usher us into an enlightened new age, but which can no longer suppress the violent memories of their founding or their inassimilable exclusions and remainders.

The insistent questions and ethical demands that the artworks in *Lines of Control* raise—in a probing but fragmentary manner—are articulated and further illuminated by critical scholarship. This publication brings the works of artists in proximity with the research of scholars who also seek rigorous insights into many of the questions that the artworks make visible.

Sumathi Ramaswamy analyzes the intensive visual, cartographic activity engendered by the Partition and features the remarkable work of the "barefoot cartographers" who continue to produce bazaar prints that visualize India and South Asia in ways that are often at variance with official mappings. Naeem Mohaiemen sensitively examines the historiography of 1971, pointing out its lacunas and absences, including its contradictory effects on everyday lives and also the way in which various political groups have deployed the narrative of Bangladesh's liberation for their own ends. Aamir Mufti's illuminating essay offers an extended reading of the life and work of Zarina Hashmi as an exilic artist whose abiding references to the visual outlines of a home and to the Urdu language are situated with reference to "a life lived on the verge of disappearance but with a strange resolve and repudiation of oblivion."

We are especially grateful to scholars who have helped us to situate South Asian issues in comparative and global frameworks. Salah Hassan

examines the latest "secession" or partition—of Sudan—as it unfolded due to colonial legacies and the tendentious and shortsighted policies of its ruling elites. However, by tracing the struggles of various Sudanese political and social groups that sought to transform the country into a genuinely inclusive and democratic society, he shows again that division alone cannot automatically solve issues of basic inequality and injustice in any society. Hyejong Yoo studies an extended body of work that South Korean artists and filmmakers have produced, meditating on the consequences of the division of Korea, an enduring legacy of the Cold War as it played out on a global platform. Yoo offers an analysis of these works as they grapple with the implications of division in everyday South Korean life. Jolene Rickard looks at the ongoing struggle of Indigenous people in the United States and Canada to articulate their own nationhood with associated territories and to recover their languages, even in diaspora. She examines the situation of the Cayuga Nation, which, despite possessing historical precedents and confronting recent legal challenges, as yet has no federally recognized Cayuga territory. Rickard draws upon the legacy of activism in her own family, who are Tuscarora, and their historical relations with the Cayuga, to illuminate the contemporary predicaments of the latter. Her artwork in *Lines of Control* also draws attention to the marking of territory and language as profoundly political and social acts.

In the interview she gives to Hammad Nasar, Irit Rogoff offers rich insights into the role of art today as it intersects with globalization. Rogoff sees critical art today as an *undisciplined* practice that refuses to be contained by institutional or disciplinary protocols and is, therefore, able to provide new insights into our predicaments. Raqs Media Collective, drawing on the poetic compositions of Rabindranath Tagore, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, and Agha Shahid Ali, meditates on the value of encountering a "stranger" with openness and respect and on the positive valences of treason itself. The collective's artistic project for the exhibition, in the form of verses by the three poets overlaid as a sculptural object, further develops their ideas of the stranger who exists in one's immediate proximity.

My own involvement in the *Lines of Control* project, first as an artist, and now also as co-curator of its Johnson Museum manifestation, is artistic and scholarly in the professional sense, of course; but above all, it is deeply personal. Both of my parents and much of their extended families hail from India and left for Pakistan in the wake of Partition. My mother's family, which was based in Lucknow and Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh, traces itself as members of the Rohillas, the quintessential middle-class professionals and civil servants that Aligarh University produced. They were deeply invested in Urdu language and literature (see also Aamir's Mufti's essay in this volume).[5] On the other hand, my father's immediate family was based in Bombay, but the extended family was from the small town of Godhra in Gujarat. The numerous members of the Gujarati-speaking "Godhra community" that had migrated to Karachi formed an elaborate labyrinth linked by intermarriages, and they were above all interested in trading and other business activities, rather than salaried employment.[6] Members of both sides of my family have remained in India, many others migrated to Pakistan and then to Canada, the US, Europe, and the Middle East, forming a dispersal that can no longer be gathered in any stable territory that is "home."[7]

As an artist, my engagement with the legacy of Partition began with a chance meeting, in 1996 at an exhibition in Copenhagen, with Indian artist Nalini Malani, who had moved from Karachi to Bombay following Partition. We discussed an alternative "celebration" of the 50th anniversary of the independence of India and Pakistan, as well as Partition, in 1997. This resulted in an exhibition organized by Pooja Sood that traveled to New Delhi, Bombay, and Lahore.[8] And at the invitation of UK-based curator Alnoor Mitha, we collaborated to develop *Bloodlines* in 1997. But the work could not easily be made together—partly due to visa and travel restrictions—and so it was fabricated by professional embroiderers in Karachi.[9]

This exhibition in Ithaca is an important milestone in my continued engagement with these tangled legacies. I extend my sincere thanks to Hammad Nasar for his generous invitation to collaborate on *Lines of Control* for its avatar at the Johnson Museum, and to Ellen Avril for her consistent and extraordinary enthusiasm for the project.

[1] According to film scholar Bhaskar Sarkar, popular Indian cinema after 1947 situated the experience of Partition in "displaced, allegorical forms." Bhaskar Sarkar, *Mourning the Nation: Indian Cinema in the Wake of Partition* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 30.
[2] As Sarkar notes, the issue was not forgetfulness; rather, "there was a surfeit of . . . mostly disturbing memory that stretched the limits of credibility and haunted people in inchoate ways." Sarkar, *Mourning the Nation,* 28.
[3] Sarkar, *Mourning the Nation,* 30.
[4] Terry Smith, "Introduction." In *Antinomies of Art and Culture: Modernity, Postmodernity, Contemporaneity*. Edited by Terry Smith, Okwui Enwezor, and Nancy Condee (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 1-19.
[5] The previous generation was also trained in Persian. As a child, I remember looking through the classics of Persian poetry and Sufi texts that my great-uncle possessed in his library.
[6] Godhra has been the site of numerous "communal" incidents before and after Partition, and more recently, has become infamous for the burning of a train that sparked the 2002 deadly riots and pogroms in Gujarat. See, for example, Alok Dwivedi, "Godhra in ferment even before Independence." *The Milli Gazette*. 16 March 2002. http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15042002/1504200276.htm
[7] This is undoubtedly an experience shared by many others.
[8] *Mappings: Shared histories* (1997-98) showed the work of three Indian and Pakistani artists each.
[9] *Bloodlines* has never been shown in South Asia itself.

Iftikhar Dadi
Muslims are meat-eaters, they prefer food containing salt. Hindus on the other hand prefer a sweet taste

Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries, *Global Kalea*

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Photography: David O. Brown, Johnson Museum

Nalini Malani & Iftikhar Dadi, *Bloodlines*

MIDNIGHT'S LINE

Sumathi Ramaswamy

The border is the line where there is nothing to see.[1]

Is there an inescapable hegemony of the cartographic line ushered in by the modern science of mapping, a hegemony that has transformed Earth into a geo-coded world and all those who inhabit such a bounded world into subjects of the line?[2] This is the question that provokes the reflections that follow in this essay that focuses on one specific cartographic boundary—the so-called Radcliffe Line—that began to be drawn in July 1947 and was legislated into existence a few weeks later at midnight August 14, with the formal end of British rule in the South Asian subcontinent. While this act of cartographic drawing marks the inaugural moment of two nation-states, India and Pakistan, as newfangled geo-bodies on the face of the earth, it also set in motion a history of tense confrontation, war, and violence in the region that has remained with us—unresolved—to this day. In the dash and in the line, Gunnar Olsson suggests, lies the history of cartography.[3] In the dash and in the line also lies the history of the modern nation-state, and the fate of those who inhabit that bounded realm as citizen-subjects defined by the new limits materialized by scientific cartography.

Drawing the Line, Martyring the Map

The boundary is the imaginary line that draws attention to itself by violence.[4]

Inspired by Michael Taussig's call to allow the image to billow out into our driving concept and to power the engines of our analysis, I begin with a striking image that appeared on the cover of *Time* on October 27, 1947, a little over two months after the British formally withdrew from their Indian empire (Figure 1)?[5] Titled *India: Liberty and Death*, the image features a demonic four-armed naked female figure, human skulls adorning her head, wielding a bloody dagger which she plunges into her own right breast which the other hand clutches; the breast in turn is placed over that part of the map of India that a cartographically-literate reader would identify as Punjab onto which drips vivid red blood from the mutilated organ. While the outline map of "India" (out of which the demonic figure seemingly erupts) is colored yellow, and Kashmir is unambiguously part of it, "Pakistan" (also left unnamed) is green, its eastern wing conforming more to the "notional" rather than actual boundary awarded by Radcliffe's Boundary Commission.

We learn from the printed attribution that the image is the work of Ukrainian-born Boris Artzybasheff, one of *Time*'s most important illustrators active between 1941 and 1965. And yet, the work might reflect not only Artzybasheff's artistic predilections for rich colors, bold design, and imaginative symbolism that at least one critic traces to Russian and Byzantine roots, but also the spirit of the accompanying cover story that it helped illustrate and that is tellingly titled "India-Pakistan: The Trial of Kali." For the brutal ongoing slaughter that the subcontinent was witness to in those hot heady months of 1947, the editors of *Time* put Kali herself on trial. Introducing her to the magazine's reader as "goddess of death and catastrophe, wife-conqueror of the eternal Siva, the dancer," the cover story insisted, "Kali, the Black One, could stand as symbol (or perhaps as scapegoat) for the horror that had [*sic*] walked hand in hand with bright liberty into India." The essay concluded that "the recent sin" of death and destruction "sprang from Kali, from the dark and universal fear which rests in the slime on the blind sea-bottom of biology."[6]

As we know, there has been a morbid fascination in the modern West with Kali which also has its roots in the British colonial preoccupation with this figure variously described by anxious and fearful administrators as "the goddess of death and destruction," and a "terrible goddess" whose worship appealed to "the grossest and the most cruel superstition of the masses."[7] The importance of the Kali figure in the Hindu-Indic religious imagination notwithstanding, *Time*'s image is highly idiosyncratic both in associating the divine form of this goddess with the modern geographic form of India, and also in the visual innuendo that she had turned from attacking cosmic demons (and possibly the British colonizer) to destroying the map of the country itself. In other words, there is no precedent that I know of in the Indian pictorial

Figure 1
Boris Artzybasheff, *India: Liberty and Death*, October 27, 1947.
Cover page illustration, *Time: The Weekly Magazine* (New York).
Image courtesy: Time Magazine/Time.com

archive for this particular image, and that itself makes it singular, but also problematic in its proposition that the catastrophic violence that accompanied the partition of the subcontinent had nothing to do with the British. Instead some primordial force ("black grace") as embodied by this ferocious goddess, had erupted from the very soil of India to destroy its people.

And yet, this was not the only provocative image of a violated map of India that *Time* published. A little over a year earlier, on April 22, 1946, it printed another cover with the provocative title *Mohamed Ali Jinnah: His Moslem Tiger wants to eat the Hindu Cow*.[8] Created by another famous illustrator, Boris Chaliapin, this image shows two tigers attacking the map of India, their claws tearing away at the areas we know of as Punjab and Bengal, while a (British?) lion watches from the margins—possibly a sign that the empire was already retreating from the scene of impending violence; a sinister-looking Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the avowed Father of Pakistan) is in the foreground of the image, his appearance on the cover with its inflammatory title indelibly associating him—for good or bad—with the macabre scene in the background. Unlike the Artybasheff image which to the best of my knowledge was not appropriated by the Indian media, the Chaliapin cover was republished soon after in *Chitramayi Jagat*, a Marathi language newspaper of Hindu nationalist inclination, with a title that translates as "From the Perspective of America: The Question of Hindustan."[9] In this new context, the image feeds into a growing Hindu and Indian nationalist discourse about the "vivisection" of India, and the martyrdom of its map, as we will see.[10]

Between the dates of publication of these two lurid cover images in the distant United States occurred a singular drawing event when a new all-important line made its appearance on the Indian cartographic landscape with bloody consequences. Its arrival into our already geo-coded world has been eerily captured in a 1966-poem titled "Partition" by W. H. Auden, which curiously leaves un-named the line's creator as well as the land that was catastrophically divided by his cartographic act:

> Unbiased at least he was when he arrived on
> his mission,
> Having never set eyes in this land he was
> called to partition
> Between two peoples fantastically at odds
> With their different diets and incompatible
> gods.
> "Time," they had briefed him in London, "
> is short. It's too late
> for mutual reconciliation or rational debate.
> The only solution is separation...."
> ....
> Shut up in a lonely mansion, with police night
> and day
> Patrolling the gardens to keep assassins away,
> He got down to work, to the task of settling
> the fate
> of millions. The maps at his disposal were out
> of date
> And the Census Returns almost certainly
> incorrect,
> But there was no time to check them, no time
> to inspect
> Contested areas. The weather was frightfully
> hot,
> And a bout of dysentery kept him constantly
> on the trot,
> But in seven weeks it was done, the frontiers
> decided
> A continent for better or worse divided.
> The next day he sailed for England, where he
> quickly forgot
> The case, as a good lawyer must. Return he
> would not,
> Afraid, as he told his Club, that he might get
> shot.[11]

Poem though it might be—a work of imagination—Auden captures in spirit the air of confusion, haste, and melancholy that hangs over the work of Sir Cyril Radcliffe and the two Boundary Commissions—one for Punjab and the other in the east for Bengal—that he was appointed to chair, soon after the announcement on June 3, 1947, that British India was indeed to be divided. That announcement itself (that most people heard over the radio at 7 p.m. Indian Standard Time or read in newspapers the following day) was unaccompanied by maps or territorial specificities. Indeed, it was not until August 17, three days after Pakistan was born, and two days after India was created, that the new boundaries were made public knowledge to the very people whose lives were to be catastrophically transformed by this imperial act of inscription on paper and with pen. Between June 3 and August 17, the map as artifact flickers in and out of the official records, at times a concrete object over which men pored and pondered, at other times a spectral presence, sometimes even a virtual non-entity. If we have become convinced, especially under the influence of J. B. Harley, that maps anticipate and enable empire, the Indian summer of 1947 should perhaps persuade us of the contrary truth, namely, that empires can possibly be dismantled

Figure 2
Prani, *The Wise Pandit*, August 14, 1947. Cartoon, *Organiser* (Delhi), Vol. 1, p. 16.
Image courtesy: *Organiser* (Delhi)



Figure 3
V. Verma, *State of the Nation*, January 23, 1950. Cartoon, *Organiser* (Delhi), Special Issue, "Veer Number."
Image courtesy: *Organiser* (Delhi)

without the crutch of the map, or at least the help of good ones.

Much has been made of the fact that Radcliffe, "India's mapmaker,"[12] was a career lawyer with no first-hand knowledge or experience of the subcontinent. For Radcliffe's colleagues in the colonial administration this in itself was a virtue, seemingly conferring upon him an aura of impartiality. Similarly, like him, the South Asian members of the two Boundary Commissions were lawyers, and although we can presume that modern schooling would have given them all some modicum of geographical knowledge, this does not mean that they were necessarily adept at interpreting complicated maps of the terrain they were commissioned to partition over the course of a mere six weeks. Scholarly interpretations of the available record insist that the maps placed at Radcliffe's disposal were inaccurate, inappropriate, or in some cases, plain unavailable.[13] Leonard Mosley, a foreign correspondent whose reminiscences of this fraught period have been used by many historians, writes that one of Radcliffe's principal worries was finding a map of suitable scale to carry out his task. "It seems extraordinary that when you have to decide the fate of 28,000,000 people you are not even given the right map to do it with." Mosley goes on to colorfully observe, "With the slings and arrows of importunate Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs whistling about his ears, Radcliffe took up the largest contour map he could find and began to draw."[14] The French journalist Dominique Lapierre quotes Radcliffe as saying, "The equipment I had at my disposal was totally inadequate. I had no very large-scale maps." It was not just a matter of adequacy but also of accuracy. "The information provided on those [official maps] I did have sometimes proved to be wrong. I noticed the Punjab's five rivers had an awkward tendency to run several miles away from the beds officially assigned to them by the survey department."[15] Locked away in his "lonely mansion," Radcliffe had little exposure to either the land he divided up or the people who lived on it, and neither he nor members of his two committees had time to undertake detailed foot, aerial, or hydrographic surveys. So, in the end "they retreated behind closed doors, working from maps using pen and paper, rather than walking the land and grasping for themselves the ways in which vast rivers, forests and administrative districts interlocked and could best be separated."[16] Midnight's line certainly appears to have had a fraught birth with not too much forethought or expertise brought to bear on its drawing.

If the mighty British Raj in its last days showed a curious *lack* of map-mindedness as it went about its business of drawing lines and withdrawing from the subcontinent, its colonial subjects on the contrary demonstrated an unusual and surprising flair for the deployment of maps and faith in cartographic efficacy in the immediate years leading up to Partition and especially in the months before and after August 1947. All of a sudden, maps began to be invoked and used in very revealing ways. Penderel Moon, a senior colonial administrator, writes of attending a meeting convened by the Muslim League in Lahore in late June in a large private home: "On the floor and on a big table a number of maps of

the Punjab were strewn about, variously coloured and chequered so as to show the distribution of the population by communities. We all fell to poring over these maps. It became plain in a very few minutes that no-one had any definite idea where we should claim that the dividing line should run..."[17] In turn, one of the Muslim League members of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Muhammad Munir, wrote in deep suspicion of Radcliffe's secretary Christopher Beaumont's "distinctly pro-Hindu leanings." "...whenever I went to his office, I found him poring over a large map and was surrounded by Hindus."[18] So much so that over the course of July 1947, the two Boundary Commissions set up by the British were inundated with petitions that resorted to maps as objects of persuasion. To be sure, the presence of maps in these memorials was a response to the official request that all memoranda submitted by interested parties "should be accompanied by such maps as may indicate the proposed line of demarcation between the two new Provinces."[19] Nonetheless, the fact that each of the interested parties rallied around and created maps is important to note, as is the fact that in the deliberations before the Commissions, they debated each other cartographically on the placement of various dots and dashes and lines. We do not know who actually drew these maps, nor the mechanics of their production, but it is revealing that in producing such artifacts, these men did not have access to official Survey of India maps which had been since the War restricted to "official use only."[20]

On both sides of the projected dividing line, various individuals also resorted to the media to publish their aspirational maps of the new nation(s). Like *Time*'s lurid images, some turned to the imagery of violation and martyrdom, especially on the Indian side of the impending border. Thus, on August 14, 1947, on the eve of Indian independence and the day of the birth of the new state of Pakistan, the Hindu nationalist weekly *Organiser* (whose masthead continued to carry a large outline map of undivided India into the 1950s), published a cartoon to mark the event (Figure 2). Entitled "The Wise Pandit," the cartoon presented a female body, her face contorted in pain laid out transversely across a map of undivided India. Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be sworn in as Prime Minister of independent India, is seated on a cushion outside the nation's geo-body, and hacks away at one of her arms (stretched out over the land that had been declared Pakistan on that day) with a sword in one hand, while his other seems to pull at her hair (laid out over the disputed territory of Kashmir); a disembodied Jinnah snarls at him. The brevity of the caption in (garbled) Sanskrit underscores the menace implicit in this illustration: "Total destruction caused by the evil Pandit [Nehru]."[21] Three years later on the eve of the declaration of India as a secular Republic on 26 January, 1950, a cartoon called "State of the Nation," showed an anthropomorphized Indian geo-body—of ambiguous gender—in tears over its dismemberment by daggers, drops of blood spilling out from the severed parts; we are not told who wields these daggers but there is an implicit suggestion that it is the project of Pakistan (Figure 3).

The Hindu nationalist *Organiser* is at the other end of the ideological spectrum from Gandhi, but it is worth recalling that that exponent of non-violence used the trope of "vivisection" (the cutting up of the body of a living organism) to refer to the territorial partitioning of India to which he was fiercely opposed. Even Nehru,

Figure 4
Bharat Mata. Frontispiece to Tamil schoolbook by V. Lakshmanan, *Putiya Aarampakkalvi Tamil (Moonram Puttakam)* (New Elementary Tamil: Book Three). Mannargudi: Shri Shanmugha Publishing House, 1958.
Image courtesy: Tamil Nadu State Archives,Chennai

whose secular-socialist vocabulary did not usually resort to the somatic idiom, lamented, "…but above all, what was broken up which was of the highest importance was something very vital and that was the body of India."[22] And indeed, from at least the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the territory variously called "Hindoostan," British India" or just "India" in colonial maps and laid out as empty cartographic space within a graticule of latitudes and longitudes was also contrarily imagined as the body of Mother India, or Bhārat Mātā, and gloriously pictured in all manner of visual media ranging from oils and acrylics to chromolithographs and cinema (e.g., Figures 4 and 9).[23] Thus for many involved in visual labors on the Indian side of the new border, it was not just the map of India that was being violated when midnight's line was finally announced, but Mother India herself.

Teaching the Nation's Map Form, Artfully

We have lived within the lines we have traced, and been made the subjects we have become.[24]

We do not yet know of the precise mechanisms by which Indians or Pakistanis began to learn of the precise shape and contours of their newly formed countries, given the confusion that prevailed for several days on both sides of the border following Independence. Learning the new shape of their nation must have especially come as a shock to the citizens of Pakistan, for their country indeed more or less turned out, as Jinnah famously feared in 1944, "maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten," divided in two parts, with hundreds of miles of hostile territory separating them. Not least of the cartographic conundrums to contend with in the years leading up to the Partition was that most of the principal sponsors behind the idea of Pakistan, including (and especially) Jinnah, were strategically vague about the shape and form of their homeland. As David Gilmartin writes, "The two-nation theory, the basis for the Muslim League's Pakistan demand, was a fundamentally non-territorial vision of nationality, and for most Muslims, the meaning of Pakistan did not hinge primarily on its association with a specific territory."[25] Even the man credited with coining the term "Pakistan" in 1933, the Cambridge-based aspiring lawyer Choudhary Rahmat Ali, who had a clearer sense than others of the territorial contours of his



Figure 5
Cover page for Choudhary Rahmat Ali. *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of "Indianism*." Cambridge: The Pakistan National Movement, 1940. Image courtesy: David Gilmartin

imagined nation, did not at first include maps in the appeal that he released on 28 January 1933, *Now or Never*: *Are We to Live or Perish for Ever*?[26] In 1935, however, a two-page letter addressed to the House of Lords (who were then considering the Government of India Bill) included a header image which was a map of British India, the parts colored green and covering Baluchistan, Sindh, North West Frontier, Kashmir and Punjab, named "Pakistan," the rest marked as India.[27] Rahmat Ali published several maps over the next decade that clearly point to the cartographic imperative at work in modern nationalist imaginations, even for those for which territorial clarity and certitude are problematic (for example, Figure 5). It is clear from such images that Rahmat Ali's future "Pakistan" would be a bounded territory that lay mostly in the northwestern part of southern Asia although its boundaries shifted over the years and across these maps.

Rahmat Ali was based in the United Kingdom, but he was not alone in generating such

aspirational maps, reminding us of Thongchai Winichakul's insistence that "a modern nation-state *must* be imaginable in mapped form..."[28] In the subcontinent, we learn from Yasmin Khan that in the months leading up to August 1947, Jinnah was inundated by fan mail which included "different maps of Pakistan carved in wood."[29] Even prior to 1947, images of wildly different geo-bodies (variously named) proliferated in the public domain, all of them nevertheless resorting to the protocols of scientific cartography and the use of lines to create bounded spaces. They also without fail took the mapped form of British India as the starting point for their imaginations. It is not clear whether the creators of these maps necessarily saw their new homeland as wholly separate from "India," the lines and hatchings of cartography giving a sense of the certitude of unambiguous belonging and territorial homogeneity that existed perhaps only on paper. Thus, in 1938, Syed Abdul Latif, a retired university professor of English at Osmania University in the southern Indian princely state of Hyderabad, published a pamphlet titled *A Federation of Cultural Zones for India* whose cover image was a map titled *Cultural Distribution of India*. The dark-colored "Muslim zone" included territories scattered all over the map of India, in contrast to Rahmat Ali's more compact imagination.[30] Around the same time, under the patronage of Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, a map was published showing a "Quinquepartite Confederacy," made up of various federated units including the "Indusstan Federation" [sic] which roughly occupies the place marked Pakistan in today's maps along with the entirety of Kashmir. Neither of these maps uses the name "Pakistan," notwithstanding the name's appearance on Rahmat Ali's maps from slightly earlier in the decade. The word "Pakistan" did appear in a bi-lingual map (in Urdu and English) that was printed on the cover of a pamphlet titled *Khilafat-i-Pakistan Scheme* in 1939 and later recycled in 1945 on the cover of another pamphlet whose English title is *What is Pakistan and How Will It Be Created*? (Figure 6).[31] In the map, a territory called "Pakistan Caliphate" stretched from the western edges of British India to the eastern, claiming much of the Hindi/Hindustani belt of northern India; the rest of the territory was given the name of God's earth or territory inhabited by non-Muslims but under the protection of Islam pending imminent conversion.

Figure 6
Cover image of Urdu pamphlet, *Pakistan Kya He Aur Kaise Banega* [What is Pakistan and How will it be Created], 1945 (originally printed in 1939). Image courtesy: David Gilmartin



In retrospect, it is all too easy to dismiss such visualizations as fantasies not worthy of our attention, and indeed little attention has been paid to such aspirational maps in the existing scholarship on the idea of Pakistan that I have read. Nations, however, yearn for territorial form, and these mapped wishes are symptomatic of that yearning, but also revelatory of what I have called the hegemony of the cartographic line. Ayesha Jalal has persuasively argued that Jinnah and his core followers almost until the very end generally operated with the notion of shared sovereignty, "which seemed the best way of tackling the dilemma posed by the absence of any neat equation between Muslim identity and territory." Thus, the boundaries between the proposed Muslim homeland and "India," had to be "permeable and flexible, not impenetrable and absolute."[32] Inevitably though, as Muslim nationalists rushed to materialize their contending visions of "Pakistan" on paper, the flexile imagination of shared sovereignty began to

be undone by cartography's lines of apparent certitude.

The adherence to protocols of statist cartography is apparent as well in non-official maps of independent India, which began to appear in bazaars and streets in that new country around and after August 1947. Such maps are primarily the work of artists who I have called "barefoot cartographers," some of whose practices I have traced back to the closing decades of the nineteenth century.[33] These "artful" mapmakers of the street and the bazaar have a critical and constitutive role to play in producing and disseminating knowledge about the terrain of the nation among the citizenry. I would even propose that it is through the labors of barefoot cartography and such artful mapmakers—more so arguably than through the highly specialized operations of the state or science—that many Indians became familiar with the shape of national territory that they inhabited as citizen-subjects. This was especially true during the colonial period when in most schoolrooms across the country, but especially in rural India where the majority lived, geography books, atlases, maps, globes, and other such artifacts were scarce objects that hardly anyone would have encountered in their daily lives. In contrast, mass-produced and commercially available materials and goods, numerous and ubiquitous, attempted to reach the average Indian and deliver their varied image-messages. And yet, the knowledge of the terrain of the country that is disseminated through barefoot cartography and bazaar art is inflected by the somatic and worshipful, the commercial and the libidinous, so that "India" rarely appears as empty social space as it does in normative maps marked by lines and grids. In the artful mapping of the bazaar, bodies appear to matter more than boundaries, the affective more than the abstract.



Figure 8
New India No. 2 No. 700. Print bearing signature of Sushil Das. Published possibly by Empire Calendar Manufacturing Co., circa 1950s-1960s. Image courtesy: Priya Paul, New Delhi.

Figure 7
New India, No. 400. Print bearing signature of Banshi, circa 1950 (publisher's information not decipherable). Image courtesy: Priya Paul, New Delhi.

Consider Figure 7 titled *New India*, possibly published sometime between Indian independence on August 15, 1947, and the so-called "accession" and "integration" of princely states between August 1947 and 1951 and the states re-organization that began in the mid-1950s changing the internal boundaries as well of the new nation. The lion capital (the newly installed national emblem), and the tricolor

national flag at the top of the print suggest that this image was possibly meant to celebrate the arrival on the political landscape of the Republic of India on January 26, 1950. Although "India" is not named as such, and is instead cartographically depicted as a proliferation of numerous constitutive units, all meticulously delineated and named, the newly created Pakistan is identified (as are neighboring new nations Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon), the color green reserved as in many such maps and prints for the new Muslim country. This print adheres to the terms of state cartography in its general conformity to national boundaries as these began to be inscribed in normative maps after August 1947. And yet, what sets *New India* apart from normative maps of the country and makes this an instance of barefoot cartography, in the way I have defined it, is the presence of the heads of the leaders of the nation—the "big men" of India—arranged in roundels around its borders. It is almost as if the newly-won national territory cannot be merely shown as empty cartographic space, marked off by geometric lines and blocks of hues, and instead needs the legitimizing presence of these faces, left un-named but well known to any patriotic citizen as the men who had led India to freedom. These familiar faces then appear to introduce the recently configured national territory (the nation's "geo-body") to the citizen-subject, lending their recognizable—and possibly comforting—presence to the new spatial reality that had come to fundamentally alter the lives of everyone on the subcontinent after August 14-15, 1947. In *New India No. 2* (Figure 8), such big men are displaced by the Everyman, tilling the soil of the nation to yield a rich harvest, while Gandhi smiles down on vignettes of the patriotic-bucolic (although one suspects that he might not have entirely approved of the presence of the industrial-scale technology in the fields of Nehruvian India!). This print also illustrates the contrary imperative to show Indian national territory as one homogenous whole, as opposed to Figure 7's colorful mosaic, even while East Pakistan's very existence is completely disavowed.

Indeed, in such prints, the commitment to showing the Radcliffe Line—whose very drawing resulted in such displacement, trauma, and bloodshed—is inconsistent at best, and ranges from adhering strictly to its course to producing some semblance of it to completely dissolving (parts of) it (as we see in Figure 8).[34] Instead, the imperative appears to be to fill in empty cartographic space with all manner of activities and bodies, most often the torsos and heads of the new big men of India: Gandhi, Nehru, and others. This is because, as I have suggested elsewhere, barefoot cartography in India, even while cheekily reliant on the state's cartographic productions, also disrupts them by injecting the anthropomorphic, the devotional, or the maternal into the spaces of secular science. It thus has an affective and worshipful, even idolatrous, investment in national territory in contrast to command cartography's geometrical grids of certitude and lines of power. This is most apparent when we turn to images where Mother India is shown occupying the map of India. Soon after Independence, P. S. Ramachandra Rao—who had produced other such images in the past—painted a bodyscape in which Mother India's sari, clad in the new national tricolor, is arranged to suggestively approximate the shape of India in a manner that appears to leave out the new national territory of Pakistan, east and west (Figure 9).[35] More recently, an artist by the name of Appu painted a bodyscape where too Mother

Figure 9
The Splendour that is India: *Bharath Devi*.
Print bearing signature of P. S. R. Rao published by P. Ethirajiah and Sons, Madras, circa 1947. Author's collection

Figure 10
Map of India. Print circa August 1947, publisher unknown.
Image courtesy: Priya Paul, New Delhi.

India clad in the national tricolor, stands against a silhouette of a map of India, in which both Pakistan and Bangladesh have not been incorporated.[36] All the same, such images are in contrast to many others where clearly, the historical fact of Radcliffe's line is denied, erased or occluded, and in which Mother India's body is deployed in various ingenious ways to claim territory that no longer belongs to independent India. For instance, to invoke one example from a myriad of others, in an illustration that appeared in 1955 in a Tamil textbook from southern India, Mother India occupies the map of India, all critical borders to the west, east, and north totally erased (Figure 4). The imperialist manner in which Mother India's body is deployed here is further heightened by the fact that her scarf—painted green, the color of Pakistan—gracefully and seemingly innocently reaches out into Pakistani national territory: Radcliffe's critical cartographic work from a decade earlier is utterly invisible in this print.

Map of India in Figure 10 is an important reminder indeed that such prints may not be as benign as they look on first appearances: it shows the newly-delineated map of India in the company of Jawaharlal Nehru who looks directly out at us with a slightly weary look. Possibly the most striking aspect of this print is the Indian tricolor flying triumphantly over the nation's territory, the staff bearing it firmly planted on Kashmir.[37] Indeed, the most revealing acts of deletion, occlusion, or incorporation in such mass-produced prints lie in the pictorial fate of the contested territory of Kashmir. In July 1947 when Radcliffe showed up in India to divide up British India, his mandate did not extend to Kashmir: Within a couple months of his cartographic deed, however, the two new states were at war over this territory that has largely left matters unresolved until this day. Official maps of India subsume the entirety of Kashmir, disavowing the Line of Control (LOC), the de facto border that separates Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. Pakistani maps in turn have a stamp tersely stating "disputed territory" marked across the region, leaving the north-eastern edge of the country "ostentatiously unbounded—an astounding rebuttal of the universal dependence of national maps on borders."[38] Barefoot cartography in India, by contrast, ingeniously places Mother India's head on Kashmir, the halo and the crown claiming all of the territory without question for the cause of India (see, for example, Figure 4). In seemingly solving thus the problem of Kashmir somatically, such prints also reveal that symbolically the loss of Kashmir would amount to a decapitation of Mother India herself, and hence worthy of defending by sacrificing one's own life and limb in her cause.

Anthropologist Christopher Pinney writes that "the trauma of Partition was never visually represented by the commercial picture production industry" of India.[39] I would amend this statement by suggesting that at least some sections of this industry responded to "the trauma" by an aggressive counter-cartography in which the new lines and boundaries that carved the body of Mother India into bits and pieces on statist maps are either re-aligned or entirely dissolved, and her wholeness restored back to her in the placement of her limbs and body, the swirl of her sari, the flow of her hair. Paradoxically, it is the artist who worked for the mass-production image industry in the rough and tumble of the street and the bazaar—away from the elite world of gallery artists—who may have led the way in this regard in probing and challenging the legitimacy of Radcliffe's line, at least from an (Hindu) Indian nationalist perspective. If we agree

with Ananya Kabir that the artist "is the most effective vigilante of national desire," then it might be the humble barefoot cartographer—relatively unknown, even anonymous—who emerges as the midnight line's paradigmatic Indian challenger.[40]

This essay has been adapted from the author's "Art on the Line: Cartography and Creativity in a Divided India." In James Akerman, ed. *Mapping the Transition from Colony to Nation* (forthcoming)

[1] Adapted from Nicholas Mirzoeff, *The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 242.
[2] For cartography's role in "geo-coding," see John Pickles, *A History of Spaces: Cartographic Reason, Mapping, and the Geo-Coded World* (London: Routledge, 2004).
[3] Pickles, *A History of Spaces,* 17-18.
[4] Attributed to Italian sculptor Gilberto Zorio. See Richard Flood, and Frances Morris, eds. *Zero to Infinity: Arte Povera, 1962-1972* (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 2001), 327.
[5] Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
[6]http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,854810,00.html (Last accessed on March 12, 2011).
[7] Sumathi Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 108-110.
[8] I thank Lucy Chester for drawing my attention to this image, which can be viewed at http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19460422,00.html (Last accessed on Jan 2, 2012).
[9] I thank Lee Schlesinger for help with translating the Marathi title.
[10] Raminder Kaur, *Performative Politics and the Cultures of Hinduism: Public Uses of Religion in Western India* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), 239- 242.
[11] W. H. Auden, *Collected Poems*, ed. Edward Mendelson (New York: Random House, 2007), 803-804. There is virtually no discussion of why Auden might have written this poem at this point in the critical scholarship on the Partition of India, which invariably cites this poem.
[12] Sunil Khilnani, "India's Mapmaker." *The Observer*, June 22 1997, 7.
[13] For a complication of this argument, see Lucy Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 83-88.
[14] Quoted in Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia*, 85.
[15] Quoted in Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia*, 86.
[16] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 106; see also 88. It is important to note that the so-called Radcliffe Line, as with many such boundary making exercises, was a collective act rather than a one-man exercise.
[17] Quoted in Khan, *The Great Partition*, 104.
[18] Quoted in Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia*, 119. In a subsequent interview with Lucy Chester in February 2000, Beaumont vehemently denied such accusations.
[19] Quoted in Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia*, 66.
[20] Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia*, 66.
[21] So, unlike Chalipan and the editors of *Time*, this image holds Nehru as well responsible for the destruction of the map of India.
[22] Sankaran Krishna, "Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politic in India." In *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, edited by Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker, 193-214 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 195.
[23] Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation*.
[24] Pickles, *A History of Spaces*, 3.
[25] Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative." *Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 4 (1998): 1068-95, quote on 1081.
[26] For a recent discussion of Rahmat Ali's cartographic productions, see Alyssa Ayres, *Speaking Like a State: Language and Nationalism in Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 25-27, 105-123.
[27] British Library, India Office Records, L/P&J/8/689, ff. 494-95.
[28] Thongchai Winichakul, "Maps and the Formation of the Geo-Body of Siam." In *Asian Forms of the Nation*, edited by Hans Antlov and Stein Tonnesson, 67-91 (London: Curzon Press, 1996). Quote on 76.
[29] Khan, *The Great Partition*, 43.
[30] India Office Records, L/P&J/8/689, ff. 422-27.
[31] Thanks to David Gilmartin for alerting me to this map, and for discussing it with me.
[32] Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty*: *Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850* (London: Routledge, 2000), 400.
[33] Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation*.
[34] For other examples, see http://tasveergharindia.net/cmsdesk/essay/116/index.html
[35] Kashmir, however, is claimed for India as it is in many such productions.
[36] Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation*, 51.
[37] For another example, see http://tasveergharindia.net/cmsdesk/essay/116/index.html, figure 8.
[38] Ananya Jahanara Kabir, *Territory of Desire: Representing the Valley of Kashmir* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 8-9.
[39] Christopher Pinney, *Photos of the Gods: The Printed Image and Political Struggle in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 146.
[40] Kabir, *Territory of Desire*, 187.

Taghreed Elsanhouri, *Our Beloved Sudan*

SUDAN: THE TUMULTUOUS ROAD TO PARTITION

Salah M. Hassan

The sudden news of the partition of Sudan into two countries—Sudan (North) and the creation of the new Republic of South Sudan (South)—in January 2011 took the world by surprise. To those who are well versed in Sudanese political affairs, the secession of the South had long been coming as a result of an endemic crisis of governance that plagued the country since its independence from British colonialism in 1956. Yet, during the last decade, the dominant western media and mainstream press have focused solely and obsessively on the war in Darfur and the tragic humanitarian crisis created by the repressive policies of the current Islamist military dictatorship of the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime. This has taken attention away from a related and much more brutal and costly protracted war, namely the North/South civil war, that had raged on and off for more than 50 years since 1955.

The obsession with the crisis in Darfur in the western media and mainstream press, as I have argued elsewhere, has more to do with the U.S. and European allies' hegemonic interest in the region than with a genuine concern for human rights, democracy, justice, and the well-being of the people of Darfur.[1] The war in Darfur provided a much-needed distraction from the violent invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the brutal occupation of the Palestinians. The obsession with Darfur was also affected by the nature of activism in the west and its engagement with African and Arab worlds' issues, which has shifted from much more informed and progressive ones to a more fragmented and issue-oriented activism, and tends to lean to the right and conservative side of politics.[2] This has been further reinforced by the stark absence of articulate Sudanese voices in the leadership of these groups and in the media, which have been dominated by that of western NGO representatives; and as is generally the case in Africa-related advocacy, the discourse has been dominated by Western celebrity activists, aid workers, and other self-appointed experts and spokespersons. The agendas of these movements are dictated by their ideological concerns and the self-interest of their leadership, with little concern for any discourse inside Sudan or interest in the views of Sudanese on both sides of the conflict.

The media's racialization of political conflicts in Sudan, whether it is the North/South or Darfur wars as "Arabs" against "Africans," with Arabs (Northern Sudanese) cast as aggressors and Africans (South Sudanese or Darfurians) as victims, has further consolidated the negative stereotypes of Arabs that have been widely circulating in the West. In the process, the root causes of the conflict in Sudan have been mystified, and the main culprit, the NIF government, in the case of Darfur, has been exculpated from its direct responsibility in using so-called Arabs to fight its dirty war against the Darfur resistance movement.[3]

Before delving into the root causes of the current crisis in Sudan that led to its partition, I would like to reflect on terms such as "secession" and "partition," which I use interchangeably in this essay. As I argue, the case of Sudan bears the symptoms of both secession and partition. The two terms—partition and secession—seem to imply slightly divergent connotations. Partition as an act tends to be associated with external or third party intervention, and in most precedents it happens to have coincided with colonial intervention and moments of decolonization, which were given legitimacy through the use of international bodies such as the United Nations. Cases in point are India/Pakistan and the creation of Israel on historical Palestine.[4]

Historically, partition might have been associated with or caused by massive political and inter-ethnic violence that necessitated such external intervention. In some cases, partition has served to weaken stronger states or was deliberately manufactured to serve certain political interests (colonial or neo-colonial) motivated by a "divide and conquer" strategy, rather than a genuine concern for peace and justice, which are often used in the rhetoric of justification for external and third party interventions. On the other hand, historical and most of the recent acts of secession have shared the characteristics of partition. However, secession is often considered to be a willful act

on the side of the group or region of a country who choose to secede, as in the case of Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia, former Yugoslavia's partition into smaller states as a result of several acts of secessions or inter-ethnic wars, or the division of the former Soviet Unions into several new nations states. In most of these cases of secession, international intervention might have occurred to keep peace or conduct a referendum, but such intervention might have also taken place as an after-thought and not necessarily as the major cause of secession. Yet, the road to secession is littered with violence, wars, and third party intervention to a degree that makes it difficult to separate secession as a concept from partition as an outcome. The fact is that most inter-ethnic conflicts in much of the 20th and 21st centuries have been manufactured or instigated in ways that gave them the appearance of a typical secession.

The partition of Sudan is certainly rooted in the arbitrary nature of the post-colonial state in Africa, but it is for the most part an indication of the failure of the ruling elites to address questions of power sharing or to manage ethnic diversity after independence from colonialism. However, in the case of Sudan, the specific policies crafted during the British colonial period (known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1898-1956) had sown the seeds of the eventual secession of South Sudan. The Closed District Ordinance of the 1920s, which further intensified ethnic, cultural, and religious differences between the North and South, is a case in point.[5] Devised first to prevent further Islamization and Arabicization of the South, the Ordinance opened the South to European Christian missionary activities and curtailed the movement of the population between the northern and southern part of the Sudan by requiring special passports and travel permits, leading to the creation of two separate administrative units for each region. The history of the slave trade activities in the South during the prior Ottoman colonial period (1821-1885) and the implication of northern traders in such infamous practice left bitter legacies in the perception of the North in the southern imaginary and vice versa.

The above-mentioned factors point to a classic scenario of secession as a natural outcome, whereby southern Sudanese were left with no option but to secede. Yet, the external factors and the role played by the international community, and more specifically the U.S. and some of the EU countries, as witnessed in the process leading up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, could have only resulted in a classic case of partition. The detrimental role played by the NIF regime in Sudan and its disastrous policies notwithstanding, a resolution to the fundamental crisis of governance in Sudan could have led to a different path other than partition of the country. This I envision within a more optimistic scenario in which Sudan could have become a model for a secular, democratic, and united state—a space within which all people have equal access to power, wealth, and natural resources, irrespective of their ethnicity, race, class, or gender.

The Root Causes of the Secession

The North/South civil war that eventually led to the current partition of Sudan, like the one currently raging in Darfur, has been part of a larger crisis of governance, which is intricately related to how the ruling classes have managed ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity within Sudan as a nation-state since independence. Sudan, as a nation-state, has been and continues to be scarred by the monopoly of power by a minority of Arabized elites from central and North Sudan at the expense of the marginalization of people from other regions, including south and western Sudan, the east, and a large sector of the North itself.

My main objective is to read the road to the partition of Sudan within the context of the crisis of governance in Sudan by paying special attention to the views and analysis of what has come to be known as the "modern forces" in the lexicon of contemporary Sudanese political discourse.[6] This loose alliance of diverse groups includes nonsectarian political parties, such as the Sudanese Communist Party and its allies; the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A); civil society groups such as trade unions, the women's movement, and professional associations; and urban-based ethnic (tribal) associations, including the rebel movements in Darfur. The broad vision of these groups was first articulated in the literature of the Sudanese left, and most recently popularized and crystallized by the SPLM/A under the leadership of the late John Garang through his idea of the "New Sudan," which in turn translates into a vision of a united secular and democratic Sudan that calls for the separation of religion and the state, respect for diversity, equal access to national wealth, and

power sharing among all groups.[7] This broad alliance of political forces shares several common views of the civil wars experienced in Sudan.

Sudan is characteristic of many postcolonial nation-states in Africa that are home to multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious societies. It is an example of a pluralistic society formed by people whose notions of belonging and national identity differ markedly. As in other African countries, the Sudanese condition is shaped to a large extent by prevalent power inequalities, unequal development, and differential access to resources and opportunities. The outcome has been a constant crisis of governance, civil war, ethnic cleansing, famine, and other human-made disasters that have gripped the country since independence but whose roots were formed during the colonial period. Differing visions for the future of the country have been contested. At one extreme is the vision of separation (fragmentation of the country into several states); at the other is the preservation of the status quo by any means, including violent ones (the military solution), which ultimately means the continuation of inequalities within a "united" country. Various political groups have at times propagated proposals to decentralize state power through a federal system that provides autonomy for regions such as Southern Sudan and other disenfranchised areas, and guarantees the right to self-determination for their people.

The protracted war in the South began in 1955 at the dawn of Sudan's independence from British colonialism and was a logical outcome of the inequalities and imbalance in power sharing that characterized the colonial period. The war was also a consequence of the failure, typical of postcolonial regimes since 1956, to seriously address these inequalities. By all accounts, the scale of horror and loss of human life over the stretch of 50 years of the civil war between the South, represented first by the Anya-Nya (1955–71) and SPLM/A (1983–2003) and then by the government army, was equally if not more devastating than the current conflict in Darfur. Most important, there are many significant similarities between the manner in which the war was conducted by the government in the South and in Darfur, with respect to the political discourse, ideological justification, and military tactics adopted by successive governments since independence in resolving regional conflicts and civil wars, including the use of paramilitary militias as counterinsurgents. Similar to the recent case of the Janjawid in Darfur, the practice of recruiting Arabized nomads to fight the SPLM/A in areas bordering the South can be traced to Gaafar Nimeiri's regime (1969–85). The continued mobilization of paramilitary groups known as Murahaleen formed by recruits from the Baggara nomads—the Misayriyyah—was carried out well into the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi. The Misayriyyah wrought painful devastation and undertook mass killings in the South among the Dinka communities in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. In many ways this served as a rehearsal of the Janjawid attacks against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, who at present form the social base and ground support for the guerrilla warfare waged by the Darfur resistance movements.

The comparison, which I draw between the North-South civil war and the current war in Darfur, becomes even more compelling and enlightening, when we examine the intersections between the two conflicts. Both in turn have serious bearings on their evolution, and perhaps final resolution, for the following interconnected reasons: First, the Darfur armed rebellion is a direct offshoot of its South Sudan counterpart and the rise of the SPLM/A as an important political force on the national scene. In fact, the earlier incarnation of the rebel movement in Darfur—not to underestimate its autochthonous causes and legitimacy—was directly linked to the political vision of the SPLM/A's efforts to build a national movement based on alliances of the oppressed and marginalized people of the Sudan. A case in point is the Darfur-based SPLM/A battalion led by Dawood Bolad, himself a former NIF member and student activist in the Muslim Brothers movement, which was brutally crushed by the NIF government's armed and security forces in 1992. Most recently, and as a result of the secession of South Sudan, the Northern government intensified its assault on all fronts, militarily and diplomatically, against the major Darfur armed resistance movements, which refused to sign the Qatar-brokered Darfur Peace Agreement in 2011.[8] Second, the CPA, which ended the North-South armed conflict, has simultaneously created both a model and a ceiling for expectations about what might be envisioned or agreed on as a resolution to the Darfur and other similar crises. It is a model because the CPA provided the means to address issues of self-governance, inequality, and access to power. It also made available resources for post-conflict rebuilding of affected communities

in the South. On the other hand, it is a ceiling because the CPA's provisions for power sharing and representation in both the executive and legislative branches of government, including the National Security Organization, have given the two signatories (the SPLM/A and the National Congress Party [NCP]) a disproportionate advantage over the rest of the country's political powers, which comprise most of the Sudanese civil society and constituencies, including Darfurians. Third, the rise of the insurgency in Darfur was directly linked to the timing of the signing of the protocols of the Naivasha Agreement in 2003, which ended the war in the South in a clear victory for the SPLM/A. Encouraged by this victory, it is not a secret that the timing of the Darfur rebels' 2003 attack on the military base near El Fasher signaled the beginning of the war in Darfur, which was intended to deliver a strong message to the government that their legitimate demands could not be ignored.

The conflict in Sudan has been commonly perceived as North (Arab and Muslim) against South (African, Christian, and animist). Accordingly, the war was portrayed in both racial and religious terms—that is, as "Arab" versus "black African" or "Muslim" versus "Christians." The racialization of the war has shaped the involvement of right-wing evangelists and the more conservative segments of the international community with devastating effects on both the production of knowledge around South Sudan and most recently Darfur and the overall formulations of foreign policy vis-à-vis a population in distress. This propensity to racialize the war not only dominates the discourse of Western media, but it has also further perpetuated internalized racialization among certain elements on both sides of various conflicts within Sudan. These include constituencies within the northern Arabized ruling elites and within the South Sudan and Darfur resistance movements. The former hoped to exploit the religious feeling and emotions of the northern masses and to gain the backing of Arab and Muslim states in furthering their local agenda. The latter, justified by decades of exploitation, discrimination, and broken promises by the ruling classes, have found a convenient way to describe the conflict and to draw the sympathy of the outside world. Though it contains an unfortunate element of truth, this racial and religious perception of the Sudanese crisis is both misleading and simplistic, as it tends to conceal a far more complex and ever-changing dynamic political and cultural scene.

There has been a rising awareness, especially among the modern forces inside Sudan, that the civil war in the South, and now in Darfur and the eastern province of the Red Sea Hills, should be ascribed to the conflict between a "center"—North and central Sudan—controlled by the established economic interests of a ruling group dominated by northern and central Arabized elites, and the "periphery," which is dominated and exploited by this center. However, this perception should be viewed with some caution as it tends to assume a homogeneity of interests among Northern groups and does not pay attention to specific historical developments and cultural differences within regions labeled as peripheries. Among these peripheries, the South is the most underdeveloped economically and most controlled by the center, although there is a tremendous potential for change in the current state of affairs. Yet it is not radically different from other peripheral regions such as Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills in eastern Sudan. That is to say, if the war did not start in the South, it would have started elsewhere in the disadvantaged regions or the North's own localities.[9] Here, too, I find it crucial to interrogate the oversimplified binary of center and periphery as absolute social, economic, and political formations. The interface of race and class identities is bound to recast this dichotomy by elucidating its complexity and multiplicity.

The fact that the war could have started somewhere other than the South is exemplified by the rise of ethnically based political resistance movements in those regions that at one point or another called for armed struggle against the government. As witnessed during the years of the conflict between 1985 and 2003, certain elements from regions such as Darfur, the eastern front, the Nuba Mountains, and even the North have joined the SPLM/A or formed their own battalions as affiliates to the movement.

Historically, by and large, this second perception is the view of the modern forces within the Sudan, including the SPLM/A and most of the Darfur armed resistance movements today. Inside Sudan, this view is gaining acceptance and has become the starting point for the current national dialogue on the ongoing crisis and the future of the country. In light of Sudan's historical and geopolitical circumstances, I argue that the current crisis of governance in Sudan that led to the secession of the South must

be explained by two major factors.

First, a contributing factor is the policy of unequal development between the center (mainly the areas of North and central Sudan) and the peripheries (more specifically in eastern, western, and South Sudan), created by colonial policies and perpetuated by the dominant postcolonial ruling class. The power structure—represented by the different vital state institutions, such as the economy, the army, the civil service, and security apparatus—is controlled and monopolized by a minority of Arabized Muslim Sudanese from the relatively developed areas of the central and northern riverine Sudan. Not to be discounted is the alliance of politically mobilized self-interested individuals and groups from marginalized areas such as South Sudan or Darfur and the eastern province who worked hand in glove with repressive governments to the detriment of their own populations.

Second, all the successive postcolonial governments have consistently perpetuated the racist policy of Arabization and Islamization of the South. Starting with the first military dictatorship in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this policy has violently repressed the southern Sudan rebellion and efforts to address the injustices and policies that afflicted their communities for decades.

At this juncture, important distinctions must be clearly drawn. While the reality of the North-South conflict was not religious, religious bigotry coupled with racial and sectarian manipulation of political loyalties has always been an inflaming factor. The introduction of Islamic law (*sharia*) in September 1983 meant that the conflict was increasingly reformulated in religious terms.

The injection of religion into Sudanese politics has now reached its climax with the policies of the NIF regime, which presents a serious threat to the unity of the country. Accordingly, the conflict is increasingly perceived as one between the NIF government, on one hand, and the secular Sudanese modern forces all over the country, on the other.

Certain dangerous developments have added to the complexity of the Sudanese crisis. It bears repeating that the policy of forming and arming paramilitary tribal militias was initiated by the Nimeiri regime and further consolidated by Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1986 under the pretext of defending civilian populations against SPLM/A attacks. This policy, with its devastating effect of the militarization of rural areas, has been taken to its extreme by the NIF government's incorporation of these militias into a paramilitary fundamentalist army known as the Popular Defense Force (PDF), established by a government decree. In the case of Darfur, this resulted in the creation of the Janjawid. The tragic consequences of this policy have been the worst human rights violations and massacres committed in the history of Sudan against civilians, including southern Sudanese and now against the people of Darfur. These cases include the infamous massacres of El Jabalain (1989) and El Dien (1986). Besides southern Sudanese, the tragic policy of ethnic cleansing pursued by the NIF junta has targeted certain non-Arabized Islamic groups such as the Nuba and Fur.

In the aftermath of the partition, this violent and racist policy is now being pursued to its extreme in the case of the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile regions, leading to massive displacements of innocent people and destruction of their environment, cultures, and their social and economic well-being, and consequently the return of the SPLA/SPLM-Northern Command to the armed struggle.[10]

In the South, in addition to the internal legacy of inter-ethnic violence, which has it roots partially in the colonial period, and partially in the context of the war for liberation and how it was conducted by the SPLA, we find a rising number of cases of violence instigated and aided by the regime in the North in the aftermath of independence, mostly with the aim of destabilizing the new government of South Sudan. This type of destabilization program is also used by the regime in the North as a pressure to extract more concessions from South Sudan with regards to the negotiation on post-referendum issues, such as disputed border zones (the oil-rich Abiye area) and sharing of oil resources. Oil fields are mostly located in the South.

Making Sense of History: A Case for United Sudan

As I have argued thus far, the rise of armed resistance movements in the South and in other similarly disenfranchised parts of the country, such as Darfur, is both a reaction and a genuine reply to the central government's long-standing policy of marginalizing and viciously repressing the "periphery" in Sudan. This resistance, especially in its armed incarnation, should be linked to greed, the lack of true democracy, and the narrow hegemonic interests of a minority of Arabized elites (military and civilians), who have

controlled power since independence. Even democratically elected leaders have at one point or another resorted to curbing democratic rights, including freedom of expression and clamping down on civic and political organizations. They have also chosen violence to counteract the legitimate demands and genuine grievances of the marginalized regions. All have adhered to the concept of a Sudan assumed to be predominantly Arabo-Islamic in both culture and outlook. This orientation constitutes the basis for the government's policies on education, information, cultural planning, and foreign relations.

Despite the partition, I would passionately argue that Sudan, by virtue of its unique history, the complexity of its situation, and certain developments before and after independence, still has the potential to become a model for creative answers to the crisis of nation-states in postcolonial Africa. These solutions are envisaged in the context of a unity that preserves and respects diversity within a pluralistic democratic system. The country can also provide creative perspectives on democratization in Africa as a whole. One lesson to be drawn from the modern political history of the Sudan is that a lack of both democracy and the guarantee of basic rights endanger unity, the real basis of which can be negotiated only under democratic rule. To some extent, unity in Sudan has been the logical outcome of certain objective historical developments, and in fact partition is the aberration.

It is true that the current borders of Sudan were drawn after the Turco-Egyptian colonial occupation in the 19th century. The same borders have produced a history of relations necessitated by the nature of the land, the flow of its rivers and water resources, population movements and internal migrations, ancient trade routes, and other mutual benefits among the inhabitants of its various regions. Centralized states from the days of Kush and Meroe had been established in different parts of the country. Although none of these states succeeded in controlling the whole area known as Sudan today, economic exchange, social influences, and cultural predominance flourished beyond their centers to include the whole country. In Sudan, where reciprocity has been central to society and culture, these values will no doubt come to play an instrumental role in conflict resolution and peace promotion. The relationships between the different regions of the Sudan have been marked by exchange and interdependency in economic development and security, as well as in social and cultural systems. Despite the current malaise and crisis, this interdependency and exchange would benefit the different regions more than exchange between each region and neighboring countries.

Sudan's borders have remained intact despite Europe's scramble for Africa, the Mahdist revolution and other anticolonial uprisings, post independence civil wars, and the upsurge in ethnic violence. Unity has prevailed in spite of British colonial policies that led to the current state of unequal development and the imbalance in power relations between the center and the peripheries. The colonial separatist scheme was first defeated in the Juba Conference of 1947, when Northerners as well as Southerners agreed on an independent unified country. Sudan gained its independence in 1956 with approximately the same borders. This was not a gift from the British or any other foreign power but a consequence of the nationalistic struggle of the Sudanese people. In spite of continuous challenges and crises, Sudan had managed to preserve its unity and territorial integrity as a country until the recent partition.

The democratic struggle for the preservation of unity is exemplified by several positive landmarks in the history of the Sudan: the charter of the October 24, 1964, revolution; the Round Table conference of 1965; the declaration of June 9, 1969; the establishment of the SPLM/A in 1983; the charter of the April 1985 uprising; the Koka Dam Declaration of 1986; the Sudanese Peace Initiative of 1988; the interim program of the national government formed after the events of December 1988; the spirit of the Armed Forces' Memorandum of February 1989; the signing of the charter of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 1989 and the amendments added to it when the SPLM/A became a signatory to the charter in 1990; and most recently the CPA and its success in bringing peace to the South, opening up room for a resurgence of civil society, and creating openings for greater civil liberties and freedom of expression. However, Sudan continues to live through a tragic crisis of governance, engulfed in a vicious cycle that starts with a popular uprising, followed by parliamentary rule, which is overthrown by a military coup d'état. The civil war in the South raged intermittently for five decades, lasting through three military and three civilian, democratically-elected governments. Within this bleak political landscape, a democratic option capable of affecting a just and lasting peace was

impossible to institutionalize. Furthermore, democratic ideas have not been able to establish themselves within institutions that are capable of protecting and defending themselves.

The source of my optimism, despite the realities of the partition, is that Sudan has a long history of "people's power," which managed to topple two military governments, in October 1964 and March and April 1985, through nonviolent means, including popular uprisings, civil disobedience, and general strikes. Sudan was one of the first democracies in the region, as it started its political life after independence as a multiparty democracy. Unlike many African countries, Sudan has a strong civil society base in terms of powerful trade unions, well-organized professional associations, and political parties. Despite the troubling history of military rule aborting short-lived democratic experiments, which has plagued its political life since independence, Sudan has continued to have one of the most powerful grassroots democratic movements in Africa.

A major cause of democracy's failure in Sudan is that the modern forces, known for being the main instigators and architects of the uprisings and revolutionary change, always fail to retain power during the transitional period of democratic rule. While these periods always involve enacting electoral rules, these very rules intentionally curb the representation of the modern forces in the Parliament and the government at large, and thus deprive democracy of its social power base. Consequently, power flows into the hands of the traditional sectarian forces known for their betrayal of the people's basic needs and demands.[11]

The consequence of the exclusion of the modern forces from power—in addition to other flaws in democratic practice, corruption, and lack of seriousness in providing a solution to the basic problems facing the country—has been a total sense of desperation and chronic crisis.
The election laws passed by the transitional Parliament and signed by the two ruling parties in 2008, under pressure from the U.S. and other CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) international power brokers, paved the way for the national elections of 2009, which ended up consolidating power in the hands of the NIF regime in the North and paved the way for the referendum that legitimized the partition of the country. Moreover, these laws posed new challenges to democratization of the North after the partition and point to new forms of exclusion of women and marginalization of the modern forces for a genuine democratization.

The struggle for democracy continues vigorously in the Sudan, despite the partition and the brutality and the unprecedented oppressive policies of the current NIF military regime, which came to power in June 1989. This struggle culminated in several positive developments. The first one is the appearance of the SPLM/A as an important political force on the national scene with a progressive vision and inclusive agenda for the whole country. This has been a great departure from the Anya-Nya movement, which espoused both separatist and reactionary visions in its political and social agenda.

The rise of the SPLM/A has broadened and strengthened the role of the modern forces as a foundation for transformative and democratic politics in Sudan. The SPLM/A objective of the New Sudan builds on the struggle of the modern forces to subvert the hegemony of sectarian politics and cycles of military rule in establishing a democratic society. The second positive development was the formation of the NDA, a prodemocracy coalition of opposition groups that signed a major charter in 1989, offering the hope of an alliance between different political parties and movements. Although it is totally defunct now and despite its troubling history, the NDA and other coalitions of opposition groups have enriched the public discourse on politics by offering the hope of an alliance among different political parties and civil society groups to agree on national programs and a detailed agenda for the transition to a multiparty democracy. The new alliance between several opposition groups in the North offers a feasible plan of action to counteract the NIF's monopoly of power. Furthermore, it solidified measures for a national transitional government and advocacy of a constitution that is crucial to the rebuilding of multiparty democratic rule.

Moving Forward: Reunification or Peaceful Co-existence?

It is true that the signing of the CPA in 2005 between the NIF government and the SPLM/A, and the eventual secession of the South Sudan, in addition to the exclusion of all other political forces, have complicated the possibility of a more comprehensive national reconciliation and/or the potential for future reunification. The potential for reconciliation, as I pointed to earlier, could have

paved the way for a national constitutional conference with the aim of restoring a true democracy to the whole country.

At this juncture, it is imperative to identify the real obstacles thwarting the establishment of democratic good governance especially in Sudan and more specifically what is left of it after the secession of South Sudan. Major issues, which represent frontiers of democratization in Sudan, should be addressed, taking stock of the burning issues pertaining to civil wars, political violence, burgeoning militarism, and the role of religion in politics. This is exceptionally relevant in light of the NIF government's articulation of the relationship between religion and the state. Although *sharia* was introduced first by Nimeiri in 1983, the ascension of the Islamist military government to power in 1989 signaled a new phase in the reinforcement of the relationship between religion (Islam) and the state as it conforms to NIF's infamous Islamic civilizing project. However, most serious is the resurgence of separatism as an ideology in the political public sphere, which envisions the fragmentation of Sudan into several states. The option of the separation of South Sudan as embedded in and legitimized by the CPA through the referendum that allowed Southern Sudanese to secede has created a precedence to follow by other disenfranchised regions. Although the post-CPA governance structure allowed the possibility of a new Sudan in which religious and cultural diversity could be respected and preserved, the commitment of the NCP to the future of a unified Sudan has proven to be questionable from the start. The exclusionary and repressive politics of the ruling NCP did not make unity a desirable option, and as all indicators clearly confirmed, separation emerged as the most preferred scenario for the people of South Sudan.

In light of the arguments I have tried to advance throughout this essay, the true challenge has become that any subsequent government in Sudan (North) that is serious about democratizing the country must face these issues. Moreover, recent regional and international developments must be taken into consideration.

First, the NCP's exclusionary practices toward all other political forces outside the government continue to stall the full implementation of the CPA and settlement of post-conflict issues, which were not fully addressed in the CPA itself. For example, if unchallenged, the conflict over the Abiye region and the drawing of borders between the North and South, the sharing of oil resources, the plight of nomadic group to whom political borders create serious hardship for their economic and social well being, will have disastrous consequences for the future of democratization in Sudan and the possibility of peaceful co-existence let alone the possibility of reunification. Nomadic groups such as Missayriyyah (considered Northerners) and the Dinka (of southern Sudan) have seasonally moved into each other's territories in search of water and land for grazing their cattle and livestock. For centuries, they have interacted, even intermarried, creating a peaceful, mutual mode of co-existence. Moreover, Southern Sudanese who have lived most of their life in the North have been forced to move to the South.[12] Second, the NCP's insistence on a military solution for regional civil wars, despite its empty rhetoric of peaceful negotiation as in the case of Darfur, has opened the door to the possibility of a permanent foreign military intervention, which will lead to a de facto and further fragmentation of the country. With the indictment of President Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC)—the first ever against a sitting head of state—the lack of cooperation of the NIF regime with the ICC, and the absence of serious efforts to prosecute crimes against humanity in the region, the future of Sudan (North) as a viable democratic and united entity has become gloomier than ever before.

The only way out of this impasse is embodied in the demands advanced by the most active elements of the civil society and political parties in Sudan (North). In this regard, the most urgent task is to put an end to the Darfur crisis through a serious national effort that involves all concerned entities. This includes addressing the heinous crimes committed by the government against Darfur and the persecution of all criminals at all levels, and by collaborating with the ICC and other international entities involved in the Darfur crisis. This effort should include a dialogue leading to a final settlement that involves all the parties to the conflict and addresses the regional and international dimensions of the issues in question. Further steps should also include convening a national conference, with the participation of all component parts of the civil society and political parties, including all rebel groups in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and The Blue Nile Provinces. This should help set up a framework for lasting and just peace, for security throughout the country, and for the strengthening of national unity and a united

democratic Northern Sudan. It should do so by settling questions of identity of the country; promoting development and the sharing of power and wealth; specifying the relationship between state and religion; and then drafting a permanent constitution in light of decisions taken by the conference.

In a similar vein, the new South Sudan faces similar challenges of democratization and post-conflict rebuilding of the country's infra structure, economy and social fabric in the aftermath of one of the most devastating civil wars in the African continent. Of course, the burden is on the SPLA leadership to face such challenges head-on and to move forward with serious democratization and policy of inclusion of all political forces and ethnicities. Early indicators of rampant corruption among its own rank as a political ruling power, along with the chaotic presence and impact of western NGOs and their competing interests with national development of South Sudan, are among the difficulties the SPLA dominated government will have to face.

In the meantime, the South is also challenged by the deliberate program of destabilization by the NIF regime which continues to feed into the increasing inter-ethnic violence, by arming and providing military and logistical support to anti-SPLA groups in the South. Negotiation over exporting of its own oil through the existing pipelines which run through the North has proven to be one of the weapons the North is using to create obstacles for South Sudan. In this case South Sudan leadership is forced to deal with the challenges of living with its new neighbor, who continues to oppress the rest of its own population and perpetuate the same tragic policies it pursued against Southern Sudanese.

All indicators point to the intricate, overlapping, and consequently inseparable destinies of the two nations in the past, present, and future. It is too soon to predict what the future carries in terms of possibilities of re-unification or at best a peaceful co-existence. However, yielding the best outcome hinges on the future of democracy, good governance, and restructuring of power and access to wealth for the people in both entities. Accomplishing these goals will pave the way for a peaceful co-existence, which will most likely make it possible to argue for a case of successful re-unification.

[1] Salah M. Hassan, "Naming the Conflict: Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan," in Salah M. Hassan and Carina Ray (eds.). *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 154-169.
[2] Examples of earlier activism and engagement would be the 1980's anti-apartheid movement and solidarity with the Palestinian people, in comparison to recent ones such as the Save Darfur movement that dominated the discourse on Sudanese politics over the last decade.
[3] In reality both victim and aggressor are victims of the government's counterinsurgency tactics, which will have far-reaching consequences on the region, its demographics, and its future development.
[4] For a good discussion of an historical case of partition see: Yasmina Khan, *The Great Partition: the Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
[5] For more details on the British colonial policies towards the South and the Closed District Ordinance of 1922 and their long term implications in Sudanese politics see: Tim Niblock, *Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics 1898-1985* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 154-156.
[6] *Modern forces* is defined here broadly to include the Left, the Sudanese Communist Party and its allies, and other elements of the secular democratic movements in Sudan. It is a term that was first introduced through the literature of the Sudanese Communist Party, which remains influential in shaping Sudanese politics and public intellectual life in Sudan.
[7] It is important to mention that the concept of the New Sudan is rooted in the idea of the modern Sudan or the modern forces propagated decades earlier by the Sudanese Communist Party and in the writings of its charismatic leader, the late Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub.
[8] Most recently, the SPLA/North represented by its Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile Battalions under the leadership of its Commanders Yasir Arman, Abdel Aziz Al Hilu, and Malik 'Aqar signed an agreement of a united armed front known as The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) on November 11, 2011 with three of the Darfur armed movements including the Justice and Equality Movement led by the late Khalil Ibrahim, who was recently assassinated by the NIF regime, and the two factions of Sudan Liberation Fronts led by Abdul Wahid Mohammed Nur and Minni Minnawi, which all refused to sign the Doha Peace Agreement in 2011. The SRF founding memorandum known as "Kauda Declaration," calls for regime change through a popular uprising aided by armed struggle.
[9] By *localities*, I mean to include poor and oppressed Northerners suffering from government's neglect and discrimination, such as the people who suffered in the aftermath of the Kajbar Dam massacre and also in the flooded zones of Merowe Dam among other incalculable losses and dispossessions visited upon them by the state.
[10] According to the CPA, the referendum which gave the South the right of self- determination in January 2011 will be followed by a special consultation to determine the future of the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile regions, either to remain part of the North or the South.

[11] Breaking this vicious cycle by ensuring the participation of three major political forces—the political parties, the modern forces, and the military—at all levels of the government (judicial, executive, and legislative) to ensure a smooth transition to working democracy is the only way out of this crisis. This point and other basic demands have been consistently stated in revolutionary charters signed prior to popular uprisings (October 1964, April 1985, and October 1989) led by the modern forces. It is important to remember that out of the 52 years of Sudan's independent rule, multiparty democracy has ruled for only 11 (1956–1958, 1964–1969, and 1985–1989). Perhaps because of their short-lived rule, democratic regimes have failed to redress these shortcomings.
[12] Televised scenes of scores of people from the South standing in scorching heat under the naked sun, surrounded by their furniture and lifetime belongings and waiting to be transported to the South, provide a glimpse of the human cost of partition.

Christina Leung & Chris Oliver assembling DAAR's *The Red Castle and the Lawless Line*

Photography: Bernard Yenelouis

WHO ENJOYS THE FRUIT OF THE TREE OF PARADISE?

Raqs Media Collective

When familiarity breeds only contempt or at best indifference, the slim hope there is for solidarity lies in the kindness of strangers.

No one can avoid the fate of becoming a stranger after crossing a border.
When a border crosses a land, all that was hitherto familiar becomes strange.
Even trees, wells, harvests, and telegraph poles become alien.

hum ke thahrey ajnabi itni madaraato.n ke baad
phir banai.ngain aashnaa kitni mulaqato.n ke baad

we who have been rendered strangers, after so many travails
how many meetings will it take for us to embrace each other again

Faiz Ahmed Faiz

In some of our languages, a guest is always a stranger, an *atithi*. She comes without warning, without appointment, without news, notice, or prior agreement about date, *tithi*, of arrival. She changes the rules the moment she appears, unannounced, uncalled for, unexpected. It follows that every stranger is also always untimely.

There are some cities where there are purgatories called *Foreigners Registration Offices*. They remind us of the close ties between the words "host," "hostility," and "hospitality."

Here, in the labyrinth of domesticated estrangement and estranged domesticity, where all that is strange about a person is tamed, detained, and kept bound; here, patiently, the stranger offers up yet again a name, a place, a number, a date, a trace, a relation, and a reason.

A stranger may be a guest, and a guest may be god, but a stranger is also always a prisoner on parole.

India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Bangladesh, Israel, Palestine—so many names for so many states of quarantine. So much familiarity, so much contempt. Better the admission of a future mutuality of strangeness than the bitter explosive ancestral familiarity of hatred. At least there will be questions left to ask of each other.

Achena-ke bhoy ki amaar ore?
Achena-ke-i chiney-chiney uth-be jibon bhore

what fear have I of strangers?
the cup of life will fill by knowing the unknown

Rabindranath Tagore

The question is no longer about how not to be strangers towards each other.

How to be a stranger? Why be a stranger?

How then, to break and betray, if and when necessary, the covenants of salt, the obligations of servitude and loyalty, the *namak-halali* of nativity and nations?

How to be a *namak-haram*?

Why spill the salt of the lord and master?

Treason too can be a commitment.

In order to make peace with the alien, first one must become a stranger to oneself, reciprocally, the alien too must turn against herself. At the intersection of these two turns lies the fulcrum of possibility. Salt, not blood, must be spilt on both sides. It takes two traitors, two *namak-harams* from two hostile sides, to act with all the courage of treason that they can muster in their bones.

Will you, Beloved Stranger, ever witness Shahid—
two destinies at last reconciled by exiles?

Agha Shahid Ali

The care of strangers is the gentlest and the sharpest form of sedition.

It is said that the tree of paradise, the Tuba tree, stands with its roots reaching for the sky. This is an indication that the truly blessed are not afraid to forsake a meager claim on a patch of earth, a fenced in plot of ground, for the sake of the wide expanse of heaven. It is also said that the fruit of the Tuba tree is kept aside for the strangers who care for each other and stay true to all that is strange. It is the stranger who will inherit paradise.

The *Namak-Haram* will taste the sweetest fruit.

Rashid Rana, *All Eyes Skyward During the Annual Parade*

Nalini Malani & Iftikhar Dadi, *Bloodlines*

WAITING FOR A REAL RECKONING ON 1971

Naeem Mohaiemen

> I remained in the [insane asylum] for six months in 1973. What drove me mad? Well, I felt the collective guilt of the Army action which at worst should have stopped by late April 1971.
> —Colonel Nadir Ali, Pakistan Army, "A Khaki Dissident on 1971," *Viewpoint*, December 17, 2010.

> Our fathers committed a deadly mistake, a crime—they made Bengal into Pakistan. We did not want to stay sons of slaves, so we created Bangladesh. Now, let us imagine Bangladesh never became independent, we were still East Pakistan. What would we see around us? We would see the flag with moon and stars, we would hear "Pak Sar Zamin Sad Bad," Urdu would be spoken everywhere, the cinema hall would be showing "Bahana" and "Banjaran," the president would be some Punjabi, the army—from major to brigadier to general—would be filled with Pathans and Punjabis, the millionares would all be Pakistani, the roads would be filled with laughing Sindhis in their jeeps. Those who roar around in Pajeros today—they would be standing on the roadside shaking in front of those same jeeps. The Adamjees, Dawoods, Bawanys, and Kabuliwalas would run this country. We would be happy to lick the dust off their feet.
> —Humayun Azad, *Amra ki ey Bangladesh cheyechilam?* [Is this the Bangladesh we wanted?] (Dhaka: Agamee Prakashani, 2003), 21.

Bangladesh turns 40 this year. The country's 1971 liberation war, during which it broke away from Pakistan, and the genocidal killings during the conflict, remains the defining fulcrum for Bangladesh's existence and trajectory. But outside Bangladesh, 1971 is mostly a forgotten moment. In the western media, it is routinely referred to as the "Third India-Pakistan War," usually in the context of understanding Indo-Pak hostility. This mislabeling suits India and Pakistan, as they leverage available history to argue for primacy of claims. Local historians have produced much of their work only in Bengali, contributing further to this marginalization.

On this 40th anniversary, new books are forthcoming from Yasmin Saikia,[1] Nayanika Mookherjee,[2] Srinath Raghavan, and Salil Tripathi. Much of the newer research continues to work through the debates about the death toll, definitions of genocidal action, examination of targeted populations, and the question of war crimes trials—for both the Pakistani army (a symbolic demand at this time) and their partners inside Bangladesh (a practical demand with impact on current politics). What is still missing are more fluid narratives, less focused on "settling" political questions than on leaning more toward structuring a new synthesis.

Inside Bangladesh, political parties pose the greatest threat to historians. Every few years we are gifted a new government, and a whole set of "established" histories are wiped out. Every time there is a change at the top, inevitably an official comes down to the archives and asks to see what is inside. With a tradition of abrupt and forced *pala bodol* (changing of the guard), every state functionary assumes that nothing that came before his time will help his cause. Therefore, the safest path is to destroy all documents, which the official does with mechanical and unemotional efficiency.

The anniversaries remain the same—1952 Language Riot, 1968 Anti-Army Movement, 1971 War—but the names of actors change at a frenetic pace. After 40 years of independence, we are still paralyzed by basic debates: Which is the declaration of independence—Sheikh Mujib's Ramna Racecourse speech, or General Zia's Chittagong radio broadcast? These two speeches circulate with vigour whenever the parties that owe their legacy to Mujib (Awami League) and Zia (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) come back to power. The original, crackling audio may still recirculate, but now crucial seconds will be mysteriously clipped out. No wonder many choose to remain in wilful ignorance about the

many meanings of 1971. Perhaps they rationalize: it will change in a few years anyway.

With a majority of the population born after the war, we also have, at times, an uncomplicated, flattened, and corporatized relationship to history: an iconic image of *Mukti Bahini* guerrillas *(freedom fighters)*, smoothly photoshopped into an advert for the launch of more branches of BRAC Bank, for example. Or the aged veterans of the 1952 language riots, filmed in bas-relief for a "30 Minutes That Shook The World" campaign commemorating the language movement but also marketing the country's largest mobile telco Grameenphone (majority owned by Telenor Norway). Looking at the crowds of people at a midnight commemoration at the Shaheed Minar (Martyrs' Monument), I remarked to my friend and collaborator, architect Salahuddin Ahmed, "This is good, isn't it?" Growing up under the Ershad military regime (1982-1990), we remembered how celebrations of liberation had been driven underground. By contrast, this was shaping up as a tidal wave of consciousness. But Salahuddin gently reminded me that the ubiquity of tiger-striped head bandannas (advertising the number two mobile telco, Bangla Link, owned by Orascom Egypt) indicated the potential for a slide toward another kind of de-historicising: memory driven only by product placement opportunities.

I have remarked at public events that along with this corporate instrumentalisation of history, the greatest damage to the process of recording 1971 stories has been the involvement of politicians. They have repeatedly dabbled in the process of documentation and compilation—attempting to set up a reward-patronage system for loyal academics and punishment system for those who refuse to toe the party line.

Last year, the government announced an initiative to have the 15-volume *Shadhinota Juddho Dolil Patra* (documents of the liberation war) sent to government schools. A few days later, I saw sales agents with boxes of books from Hakkani Publishers, bound together with twine, waiting for their bus to arrive. Over the next few years, these books may find their way into many *mofussil* (rural) schools and offices. A commendable effort, but I worry, still: What happens if the opposition political party comes back to power? Does the Dolil Patra become blacklisted, as "incorrect history"? We have been prisoners of history for a very long time: *Gilteo pari na, ugrateo pari na* (Neither can we swallow, nor can we spit it out).

Fluctuating witnesses

In 1993, I began an oral history project on the war through the Thomas J. Watson Foundation. Although oral history work on 1971 was still relatively new at that time, an element of rote repetition had already crept into people's stories. While there was not yet a Liberation War Museum, there were some "known" sources and books.[3] These would lead people to interview the same person who had already been on record multiple times (a masters thesis, another magazine article, an anniversary television show).

Everyone seemed to have a similar story of crossing the border, always aided by the kindly, bearded villager who would say, "*Apa, apnara jan, ami thaki, aro lok ashbe*" (Sister, you go, I'll stay, there are many more coming). Whether that story was a collective legend (of the self-sacrificing noble villager) mingled with actual memories was difficult to parse. The stories of 1971, from these exhausted voices, would later remind me of Amitava Kumar's interviews after the Gujarat riots of 2002: "I saw from the way in which he recited the details that, in the name of charity and the need for news, this little boy had been turned into an automaton or an agony-machine."[4]

There were other forces at play that dulled the energy of storytelling. In 1994, Ghulam Azam, alleged head of Pakistani *Razakar* paramilitary death squads during 1971, finally received Bangladeshi citizenship.[5] (Prior to this he had lived in Bangladesh on a Pakistani passport with an expired visa). The day the Supreme Court delivered the verdict returning Azam's citizenship, there were riots in Dhaka. Burning cars and upended rickshaws were on the road as I drove to an interview. From that period onward, a dark mood gripped many of my interviewees. A malaise of *kisher shadhinota* (What independence?), already part of the body politic after 20 frustrating years, seemed to deepen after the Azam verdict. Aggrieved also by the gradual collapse of Jahanara Imam's symbolic war crimes trial project in the subsequent years, they turned away from the "glorious" stories to a weary recounting of the ways the years after 1971 had failed them.[8]

In Pakistan, my research focused on Urdu-speakers (broadly referred to by Bengalis, often incorrectly, as "Biharis") who left Bangladesh after 1971. Taken by the novelty of a Bangladeshi interviewer, people were energized and responsive. I was living in Karachi's Orangi Town, and halfway through my stay the city was

convulsed by gun battles between the government and the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). As curfew was declared, all schedules were thrown off and we retreated indoors for a week. But the pause brought an unexpected benefit: even more of a willingness to talk about 1971. "You see, this is what the Bhuttos did in 1971, and they are doing it again," said one Muhajir seperatist in an interview. Others invoked the rupture of 1971 as inevitable, and subsequent rebellions in Balochistan, North West Frontier Province, and Sindh as carrying on that trajectory.[6]

While many of the interviewees in Bangladesh had confounded me with their exhausted and depressed moods, those in Pakistan exuded relief at finally having a platform to speak. One moving account came from a Bihari who told me, "I had already left for West Pakistan, but my brother was still in Chittagong. One day I heard your Mukti Bahini had come and killed him. You know, I couldn't cry when I heard that news, but I cried when I heard Dhaka fell."[7] The knowledge of Bengali violence against Bihari locals created a conflicted research experience, since I was still emotionally attached to the idea that Bengalis had killed only Pakistani soldiers, not civilians.

In giving oral recollections, each side had powerful claims to make. But selectively chosen anecdotes cannot automatically be expanded into macrohistory, overriding larger tendencies that individual stories cannot adequately represent. Certainly, a full history cannot be written without extensive research and teasing out of the symbolic meaning of urban legends and the role that some "Biharis" played as the blunt edge of West Pakistani domination–as informants, strategic hamlets, and suppliers of manpower for death squads (alongside Bengalis who opposed the rupture of Pakistan).

While the killing of Bihari civilians by Bengalis is not defensible, a sober evaluation of role, scale, and power also has to be part of writing history. A distinction needs to be made between the violence of a chaotic, freelance Bengali mob and the systematic violence of the Pakistani military and the death squads they supported and armed. Afsan Chowdhury explains the dynamics of revenge killings: "Bengalis did commit atrocities including rape of Bihari women and unless we accept that we shall never have the moral force to stand up to ourselves. . . . I have also explained the role of the Pakistan army in facilitating this and it was important for Biharis to understand that. Did the Pakistanis expect to attack Bengalis in Dhaka and expect the Biharis living unprotected and unsafe all over Bangladesh to be untouched? I believe [the] Pakistan army didn't care about them and practically signed their death warrant. This is further proven by the abandoning of the Biharis after their defeat in December and [their] escape under Indian army protection leaving the Biharis behind, the staunchest of Pakistanis, to face the music of vengeance."[8]

Two wings without a body

Partition resulted in the creation of two Pakistans, and from the beginning relationships between the two wings were strained and distant. At many key junctures after 1947, the attitude of the central state toward East Pakistan was not only that this was a troublesome province, but that this was a disloyal part of the Muslim body politic. Several key confrontations, including the Agartala conspiracy case against Sheikh Mujib and several Bengali army officers, highlight that the West Pakistan government was on hair-trigger alert about the loyalty of the Bengali population. Mujib's declared and public position that the Kashmir crisis needed to be solved through negotiations with India further deepened the suspicions of the Pakistani military bureaucracy.

West Pakistani hostility, racism, and religious intolerance towards East Pakistan is a key element in understanding the violence of the war. In her recent book on post-1947 Pakistan, Saadia Toor states that "the attitude of West Pakistani elite towards the Bengalis also became increasingly more racialized over time."[9] Toor has summarized these tendencies that were prevalent in everyday conversations:

> There was cultural prejudice of course—basically the idea that East Bengali Muslims were culturally too "in thrall" to Hindu culture. But the Pakistani army's own discourse was more explicitly racist. It had inherited the ideology of the "martial races" of the subcontinent expounded by the British and the latter's contempt for the "effeminate" Bengali. During the army operation in 1971, this racism found its most explicit expression in the idea of Bengalis being an "inferior" race whose gene-pool must be "fixed" by the forcible impregnation of their women. Commentators from the 1970s onwards have spoken about this attitude being rife within the military and within certain parts

of the upper echelons of liberal society in West Pakistan.[10]

Tariq Ali also refers to this endemic racism: "The soldiery had been told that the Bengalis were an inferior race, short, dark, weak (unlike the martial races of the Punjab) and still infected with Hinduism. Junior and senior officers alike had spoken of seeking, in the course of their campaign, to improve the genes of the Bengali people. Fascist talk of this character gave the green light for the mass rapes suffered by Bengali women regardless of class or creed."[11] Anthony Mascarenhas has similarly documented the equation of East Pakistan as "half Muslims"[12] and "Kaffirs," and the Bengali Hindus as "undependable, undesirable aliens."[13] A Punjabi officer in Comilla confided to Mascarenhas, "My God, what couldn't we do with such wonderful land. . . . But I suppose we would have become like them."[14]

More significant than anecdotes are the infrastructures, recommended in the Report of the East Bengal Language Committee and reflected in major newspapers such as *Dawn*, that rendered Bengalis as lesser citizens—a history Toor explores in detail in her book. From the Pakistan government's policy of making Urdu the sole national language (Jinnah labeled any opponent of this policy an "enemy of Pakistan")[15] to the grudging acceptance of Bengali, following the 1952 language riots, but with the proviso that it would be "reformed"[16] to discourage use of words of Sanskritic origin.[17]

The 1952 riots in support of Bengali resulted in media coverage in West Pakistan which was couched in the language of religion, creating an outsider in the form of "non-Muslim foreigners"[18] that were "dressed in a different way"[19] and "Hindus distributing anti-Urdu literature."[20] The Pakistani ruling party, the Muslim League, labeled the post-1952 developments as nothing less than a "Hindu conspiracy."[21] As Pakistan lurched into the post-1952 era, structures of exclusion hardened, "exacerbated by the highly derogatory attitude of non-Bengali members of state institutions towards Bengalis."[22]

A sentimental fog

The Indian recollection of 1971, particularly in West Bengal, plays a role in shaping the way the story of the war was presented on the world stage. The West Bengal intellectual class operated within a vision focused on the Indian role and a glorified narrative of Bengali freedom fighters. On the other hand, Bangladeshis saw not only the heights of 1971, but also the crushing setbacks afterwards. The manhunts against Maoists in 1973, the man-made famine of 1974, the massacre of Mujib in 1975, the counter-coups until 1977, the second assassination in 1981, and all the manipulations and setbacks that came in between and afterward served as a reality check. Faced with our own brutal self-rule, it became difficult to believe in a fully sanitized history of 1971.

West Bengal's sentimental altruism started during the war. Consider the "Bangladeshi" songs being broadcast from Swadhin Bangla Betar radio in Kolkata. Many of these were written by Indian Bengalis. Their loving and (post-1947) forgiving view of their "brothers across the border" comes through in the lyrics: the iconic "*Shono ekti Mujiborer*"[23] (From one Mujib will come . . .) which included the line "*Harano Bangla ke abar phire pabo*" (We will find the lost Bengal again); or the song "*Amra shobai Bangali*"[24] with its impossibly optimistic, and eventually crushed, dream of a secular whole that would reverse the tragedy of Partition ("Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Muslim/We are all Bengali"); or the harkening back to a pre-Partition bucolic life in "*Padma nodir pare amar chhotto shobuj gram*"[25] (My green village on the banks of the Padma River).

1971 remains, for a generation of West Bengalis, the tantalizing possibility of some form of united Bengal—if not politically, then at least philosophically. It was also an equalizing moment when Bengali Muslims asserted themselves as being steeped in the same Bengali culture and deployed that culture as a weapon. 1971 functioned as a space where West Bengal could imagine that the wounds of Partition would finally be healed, at least on a symbolic level.

In the 1970s and 1980s, as West Bengal stagnated, people looked back in fondness at 1971 as the moment when they transformed world history. From Senator Edward Kennedy flying into Dum Dum Airport to review the refugee camps, to Indira Gandhi invoking for the world the crushing financial pressure of refugees, Kolkata was at the center of events. Every family had a story to tell—of giving succor to a Mukti guerrilla in their home, and if a Muslim, then even more proof of the war's syncretic character: "*Jano to, amader ranna-ghor obdi dhukte ditam*" (You know, we even let them come up to our kitchen).[26] West Bengalis participated in

fundraising, writing, and performing poems and songs, and then finally were offered a glimpse and a *pranam* of Sheikh Mujib in 1972. When legendary Tagore singer Suchitra Mitra passed away in 2010, Kolkata TV highlighted her rendition of "*Amar Sonar Bangla*" (My Golden Bengal) at a 1971 fundraiser, with tears streaming down her cheeks as she sang.

But along with this deification, there was also a rebellion by some West Bengalis against the sentimental view of 1971. The same East Pakistan refugees, viewed as a danger, helped the leadership of the local branches of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) to become right-wing opponents of "illegal migration." West Bengal's Leftist politicians invoked the same refugees for their pro-people politics. Even Trinamool Congress stalwarts claimed that seeing refugees in squalor at Sealdah Station made them enter politics in order to build a prosperous state. As researcher Udayan Chattopadhyay pointed out, "All of those sentiments about Bangladesh were wishfully imposed during the war by people in West Bengal removed from the conflict itself and unaware of the reality. Fast forward to now, and they ask themselves, 'Where did that spirit disappear to?'"[27] The West Bengali utopian aspirations projected onto 1971 have led to a lingering disappointment that energizes a counter-narrative inside India. These have contributed to a continuing erosion of the India-Bangladesh relationship.

Debating genocide

Beyond "settled" facts, histories produced in 1971 were burdened with the propaganda impulse in a struggle that played out both domestically and internationally and included superpower proxy rivalries. One document in particular that embodies the state narrative is the Government of Pakistan's *White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, August 1971*. The white paper was produced to prepare the ground for arguing at the United Nations (as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto subsequently did) that the Bengalis had severely provoked the army with acts of violence, that the army had to step in to protect Bihari lives and property and the unitary republic, and that the entire conflagration was due to Indian interference. Several other white papers published during the war, including reports from the International Rescue Committee,[28] multiple hearings of the U.S. Senate[29], the U.S. House of Representatives,[30] and the Geneva Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists[31] presented a completely different picture. All these reports had problems of access and possible bias, but at the least they acted as a counterbalance to the one-sided Pakistani government narrative of its white paper. Even the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report commissioned by the Pakistani government was pressured by Bhutto to edit out unfavorable comments against the state, hence the suppression of the 1972 report and the sanitization in the 1974 supplement.

The legal definition of genocide includes the specific intention of destroying all or part of a community—racially, religiously, or otherwise defined. Therefore, the targeted killings of Hindus is the most debated part of the war narrative. The religious demographic of refugees into India, which was estimated as 80% Hindu by May 1971,[32] was considered evidence that the Pakistani army targeted individuals and communities based on religion. The targeted executions of professors, artists, and journalists in the last days of the war is another major charge against the Pakistan army. In drawing up and carrying out death lists, Bengalis collaborating with the army had a particular role in providing local intelligence.

Historian Afsan Chowdhury notes that surveys were started by the Mujib government in 1972 in order to confirm the official death toll and were only shut down during the post-1975 Zia regime. After 1974, the issue of exhumation of dead bodies to do a more accurate accounting was permanently off the table, due to the devil's deal Mujib was forced to cut to get support from the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). At a time when the Bangladeshi economy was on life support and desperately needed an infusion of oil money, the understanding with the OIC was that the issue of trials for Pakistani army atrocities should be put aside and "brotherly relations" between the two countries encouraged. Later, after coming to power in 1975, General Ziaur Rahman focused on building up a power base outside of Awami League loyalists, which was partially accomplished by rehabilitation of alleged 1971 collaborators (even though Zia fought in the war).

The exact definitions of what were "genocidal" actions during the war matters tremendously, especially in the context of the ongoing legal challenges around unresolved issues of 1971. War crimes trials for Pakistani officers is possibly a lost cause by now. The opportune time for that was 1972, but at that time the officers were chess

pieces to be exchanged for the Bengali officers imprisoned inside Pakistan. The issue of repatriation for the "Biharis" or "Stranded Pakistanis" is also largely settled through their relative assimilation over 40 years—and also due to the court verdict (shamefully late) which gave them full voting rights ahead of the 2008 elections. What remains unsettled is war crimes trials for the Bengalis who were involved in death squads with the support of the Pakistan army. This has a direct impact on current politics, as many of the accused belong to the main Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami. The head of the Jamaat, Ghulam Azam, has already retired (possibly pushed out by young Turks who wanted to remove the 1971 stigma from the party), but the second tier is now under investigation by the current Awami League government in Bangladesh.

The potential trial of alleged war criminals remains a highly emotive issue, and the Awami League party hopes to strengthen its hold on *Sreeti Ekattur* (1971 memory)—which has consistently helped them, especially with the youth vote in recent elections. But as the legal structure of the war crimes tribunals is weak, some analysts worry that the verdicts will lack credibility.[33] The Jamaat has already shown itself ready to deploy international lawyers. Its members have legally challenged an *Economist* magazine article which named the current Jamaat chief, Matiur Rahman Nizami, as head of the Al-Badr death squad.[34] The Channel Four documentary *War Crimes File*, a collaboration between Gita Sahgal, David Bergman, and others, has also been subject to libel action by the British-Bangladeshis alleged to have committed war crimes.

One of the key strategies deployed by Jamaat has been to redefine the nature and vector of wartime violence. A Jamaat advocate appeared on television in 2007, denying that there had been any death squads and arguing instead that anyone who participated in "pro-Pakistan actions" was defending the legal unitary structure and that therefore their actions were not "war crimes." In a context where the ongoing war crimes trials are now under various legal and political challenges, new attempts by certain journalists and academics to remove "genocide" as a descriptor from the war (as in the recent *New York Times* op-ed piece by one of the alleged war criminals' defense lawyer) is hardly a neutral or disinterested act.[35]

Understanding brinkmanship

The complex events leading from post-1970 election negotiations to the March 1971 military crackdown remain a historical gray area with many unanswered questions. How did Mujib struggle to balance leadership of an increasingly frustrated Bengali population with conflicting tendencies and an electoral mandate of being leader of "all Pakistan?" What were the tensions between the League's middle class leadership and the radical students who raised the flag of Bangladesh on campus? What was the available space for those who saw war as inevitable but did not fully accept Mujib's leadership? In fact, at what point did war become truly inevitable? All this is especially obscured because many key Bengali participants were killed in the 1970s.

The cataclysmic 1970 cyclone and the botched relief effort, which altered the League's election results, is a key starting point for the impending collapse. In fact, the delay in giving cyclone relief, and the unacceptable time lag before Yahya visited the disaster zone, turned it into a campaigning platform for Sheikh Mujib. The image of the unfeeling West Pakistan side was already built up through the poster *Shonar Bangla shoshan keno?* (Why is Golden Bengal a cremation field today?), and the mishandling of cyclone relief efforts became another turning point in perceptions.

The accounting of economic gaps between the two Pakistans was not only mapping out disparity, but also precisely charting how revenue raised in East Pakistan was being transferred to West Pakistan. This was especially relevant in the case of East Pakistani export goods like jute—the fabled "golden fibre of Bengal"—which became a symbol for a larger neo-colonial, exploitative relationship. As the structures of the unitary state were centralized in West Pakistan, any export revenue was first channeled through the Western wing before getting disbursement (if any) to the East. Widely discussed in academic and political circles at that time was a chart which outlined "Transfer of Resources from East to West Pakistan." From 1956 to 1970, economic analysis from Professors Rehman Sobhan,[36] Akhlaqur Rahman,[37] A.R. Khan,[38] Nurul Islam, Anisur Rahman, and others[39] conclusively demonstrated that East Pakistan's development was being systematically thwarted due to transfer and diversion of resources to West Pakistan.

East Pakistan started from a much poorer economic level in 1947. However, economic

theory predicts that all else being equal, poorer regions grow faster than richer ones in a well-integrated economy that is not distorted by deliberate government policies. That is, poorer East Pakistan should have been growing faster, to catch up with the Western Wing, just as poorer European countries grew faster after World War II. Even Yahya Khan admitted that East Pakistan had fair grievances in the area of economic policy. (It was the control of foreign and defence policy that became a sticking point during negotiations). Rehman Sobhan points out that, "Even Pakistanis have argued since the early 1960s that policies and resource allocations were discriminatory to East Pakistan. This indeed was quite well argued by Mahbubul Haq in his book, *Strategy for Economic Planning*."[40]

The Pakistan army's post-war protestations to the public were that they had wanted an orderly transfer of power and it was the politicians who got in the way. But the reality was far more complex. The leadership transition from General Ayub Khan to General Yahya Khan was in the wake of an extraordinary pan-Pakistan upheaval that focused simultaneously on a landed elite, a business class (at that time almost entirely West Pakistani) and the military. As with many other such conflagrations, the military jettisoned Ayub to save itself. Yahya's task was not only to transfer power to civilians, but also to maintain the Army's role in key decision making (an antecedent to today's Pakistani National Security Council was considered).

We need to consider especially how the army envisioned that election results would play out. Whether misguided by faulty local intelligence (especially in East Pakistan), or lulled by the past history of squabbling in Pakistan's political class, the military had predicted that the results would produce a "hung Parliament," with no party gaining an absolute majority and the army being the final decisionmaker and arbiter. Yahya hoped to continue as president after the elections, becoming the ultimate kingmaker and guarding the army's business and political interests. The military did not properly evaluate the defining role of the 1970 cyclone backlash, and the withdrawal of populist left leader Maulana Bhashani from the election. These two factors scattered and rearranged many pre-election calculations. Although Bhashani made the prophetic prediction as early as 1957 of East Pakistan saying *assalamu alaikum* to West Pakistan,[41] he was eventually outmaneuvered by his opponents (including Mujib and the war-time Awami League leadership, as well as post-71 Mujibists).[42] Whatever symbolic value Bhashani may have hoped to achieve by withdrawing, the result was the opposite–non-participation in this decisive election rendered his party and other allied ultra-left groups as non-players in the negotiations (as well as in the wartime Mujibnagar high command).

The election's shocking results were followed by a series of maneuvers and feints, miscalculations and intrigues. While the pre-March 25 negotiation timeline is contested, it is not opaque. Sisson & Rose's *War and Secession* is a solid book on the conflict—although it has selection bias (33 Pakistani, 49 Indian, 39 American, and 12 Bangladeshi interviewees). However, leaving that aside, the book deals extensively with the minutiae of the negotiations, and gives some indication of behind-the-scenes intrigues. In fact, the negotiations leading up to March were a case study in brinkmanship. In the end, it was Bhutto who emerged with the maximum gain (post-1971 premiership of West Pakistan) compared to what was legally his right. After the election landslide, the Awami League had an unexpected supermajority, which was both their asset and liability in negotiations (the Army was unwilling to trust the League's word, as the "brute majority" could be used to push through any legislation, including cuts to the military budget). Bhutto shrewdly parlayed his small majority in West Pakistan via the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) into an equal seat at the table with Mujib and the League. A quick study, Bhutto had foreseen the Ayub regime's impending collapse and left the military cabinet in 1966 to form his "rebel" PPP and capture the spirit of dissent in West Pakistan (an acrobatic feat, given his feudal wealth and links to the military establishment). Yet, Bhutto realized that his position in 1971 was extremely fragile. His majority inside Pakistan was small, and without the abillity to dispense state patronage, many of his party members would defect. Sitting in opposition in a Mujib government would surely cause the PPP's implosion. He also knew that the other West Pakistani parties, while temporarily acknowledging the need for a united West Pakistan front, would soon start to leave the coalition (as some did in the final days of the March negotiation, when Bhutto's control over the military became obvious).

Especially worth mentioning is the evidence of the privileged access Bhutto had to the military during supposedly neutral negotiations. Sisson and Rose describe the private meeting that Yahya

held with Bhutto at the latter's Larkana baronial family estate. At this meeting, Bhutto called Mujib a "clever bastard" who could not "really be trusted" and wanted to "bulldoze" his constitution through the National Assembly. He also played on the army's beliefs about the fundamental nature of East Pakistan, when he questioned whether Mujib was a "true Pakistani."[43] All of this was reflected in Yahya's later comments about Mujib and needing to "sort this bastard out" and "test his loyalty."[44] Having set various fears in motion, Bhutto brilliantly stoked the Army's paranoia about the Awami League being too close to Delhi and soft on the Kashmir issue. In his February 28 speech, Bhutto used a masterful mix of threats ("break the legs") and insinuations ("they would be traitors") against any West Pakistani politician who wanted to meet with Mujib to broker a solution.[45]

The Awami League had an overwhelming majority and had the legal right to take power without negotiation. Their mindframe was possibly akin to how Salman Rushdie responded to Benazir Bhutto's version of 1971 history: "You feel like using words of one syllable to explain. Listen, dear child, the man had *won*, and it was your father who dug in his heels . . ."[46] But politics is never only about being in the right. Mujib failed to reach out and pacify the Pakistan army, doing the necessary end-run around Bhutto to isolate him. Refusing requests to come to Rawalpindi to meet with the government team, displaying a newfound assertiveness during talks, flying the Bangladesh flag on a car during a negotiation meeting, and encouraging the physical isolation of Bhutto during his Dhaka visit—all of this helped to rattle the already jittery army. The League was absolutely correct to suspect that Bhutto was a "stalking horse" for the army, and that they could not trust him in a new cabinet. But a cunning strategem could have been to invite him into the cabinet, neutralize him through red tape and then eventually fire him. Similar Machiavellian designs seemed to occur to Bhutto at every turn of the negotiations, but not to the League team, which proceeded down a linear path of demanding full implementation of the Six Points election manifesto.

Yet at the same time, the League seems to have done everything in its power to continue negotiations, all the while stymied by Bhutto's grandstanding and the military's continued bolstering of forces, a fact visible to all and adding to the sense of the inevitable bloodbath. Even up to March 20, *The Forum*, known as the English language organ of the League's leadership, published an editorial, "Options for a Sane Man," beseeching for a negotiated solution:

> Whether people want Pakistan or not they certainly will not have it thrust on them at bayonet point... Does Yahya really intend to unleash genocide on 75 million Bengalis merely to protect the interest of this handful of buccaneers who have bled the nation for 23 years?. . . In such a situation a public renunciation of the use of force by Yahya to solve the nation's political problems, backed by a withdrawal to West Pakistan of units pumped in since 1st March and the return of the rest to barracks, would clear the air.[47]

Blind spots of 1971

If not for a singular focus on the unresolved issues related to genocide, we could have by now probed elsewhere for a more complicated unpacking of 1971, some of which would have been productively jarring to the conventional narrative. Among many unresolved issues within the war is the rise of Bengali nationalism, and the failure to maintain it as a fully inclusive framework. While Bengali Hindus were a crucial part of the dynamic and the depiction of the 1971 struggle, the reality is that the Awami League, as well as other political elites, were mainly led by Bengali Muslims. While the process has been gradual, one of the ways this has hardened further in recent years is through the continued reduction of the country's Hindu population, aided by the "Vested Property Act," a holdover of the communal "Enemy Property Act" enacted after the 1965 India-Pakistan war. Successive Bangladesh governments, and allied powerful individuals, have used this Act to grab Hindu property using a combination of court action, bribery, and force.[48] Although the Act was overturned in recent years, by now the Hindu population has shrunk considerably and is severely economically disadvantaged.

The other poison pill embedded within Bengali nationalism is that it has no space for non-Bengalis, whether Biharis, flatland Adivasis, or the Indigenous Jumma (Pahari) people of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). This surfaced immediately after 1971, when the constitution was being framed. The first act of protest against the new government on the floor of parliament was by parliamentarian Manabendra Larma, who opposed the constitution's definition of only

"Bengalis" as the people of Bangladesh. Larma announced, "You cannot impose your national identity on others. I am a Chakma, not a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh, Bangladeshi. You are also Bangladeshi but your national identity is Bengali . . . they (Hill People) can never become Bengali."[49] The tragic history of the CHT from 1972 to the present day parallels the buildup to the 1971 war: a 20-year guerilla war for autonomy, slow-motion ethnic displacement by Bengali settlers, and finally years of betrayal even after the 1997 Peace Accords. To a Pahari, the coercive force of the Bangladesh army and Bengali settlers is possibly indistinguishable from that of the Pakistani army and armed Biharis during 1971.

One unstable dynamic coming out of the war was the longevity of the "undisputed" leader concept. The 1970 election results were a total victory for the League, due to Sheikh Mujib's charisma as a politician who could speak to the masses, especially in the villages. But once the war began, fissures appeared within the movement. Khandaker Mushtaque of the Awami League was the first to allegedly make secret overtures to American contacts (later that same Mushtaque happily ascended to the "civilian leadership" after the 1975 assassination of Mujib). The ultra-Left within the Bengali forces were also hamstrung by having to accept the leadership of the League in what some analyzed as the "battle of two bourgeois forces." Bhashani's isolation increased during the war, and the Indian leadership actively monitored him and at one point had him under semi-house arrest.

The Left's challenge to Mujib's leadership surfaced very rapidly after 1971. In the first university elections of the new nation, the League's student front suffered a shock defeat to the communist-backed Student Union. The next elections saw another defeat to the socialist Jatiya Samajtantric Dal (JSD), an alliance that included people who had deserted the Awami League for more far-left options. The League then began a campaign against the JSD, including extrajudicial killings. While the JSD was being suppressed, the Maoists who had already been a growing force (and a source of paranoia for Indira Gandhi, who feared cross-border alliances with West Bengal's Naxalites) grouped together as the underground Sarbahara Party. Their campaign of sabotage, targeted assassinations, bombings, and a successful national strike in 1974 (symbolically evoking, for some, Sheikh Mujib's own national strikes against the Yahya regime) badly rattled the government. The Sarbahara Party leader's execution while in police custody was one of several events delegitimizing the Mujib government.[50]

Another key tension left over from 1971 was within the army, as well as between the military and the civilian state. There were tensions between the returnee officers (who had been in Pakistani prison camps) and those who had fought on the battlefield. There were also leftist factions inside the army, as well as a confused amalgam of anti-India, pro-Islamist and other overlapping and contradictory strands. Also to be accounted for were the informal guerillas, who had to be taken into the army. Some were never absorbed, becoming freelance and unstable elements, such as Kader Siddiqui (because the international press was finally allowed in after the fall of Dhaka on December 16, Siddiqui's public bayoneting of Pakistani "collaborators" remains the most widely photographed moment of 1971, reversing the narrative about who was the perpetrator of the majority of war violence).[51]

Resentment, as well as ambition, was growing even among those officers who had once called Mujib "Banga Bandhu" (friend of Bengal). The same Major Zia who had seized Chittagong radio and made the announcement of independence on behalf of his "great national leader" Sheikh Mujib, later became the ultimate beneficiary of the factionalized coups and counter-coups in 1975. Mujib aggravated tensions with the army by creating his own paramilitary units, the *Rakkhi Bahini* and the *Lal Bahini*. Eventually, the military responded with its own murderous logic, becoming within four years the same disrupter of democracy that the Pakistan army had been in the post-1947 period. The Bengali officers had already crossed the Rubicon by rebelling against the military chain of command in 1971.

A Shakespearean tragedy was writ large when Mujib voluntarily came down the stairs of his home to meet the attacking soldiers on the morning of August 15, 1975. After all, he had faced down the far more dreaded Pakistan army in 1971 and survived to return as leader of a new nation. These were his own boys, they would not harm him.

Waiting for Godot

In the 1960s my father was a surgeon in the Pakistani army. Posted to Rawalpindi Army Headquarters in West Pakistan, he dutifully voted

in the 1970 election and waited for the expected transfer of power. After the war broke out, Bengali officers who were trapped in West Pakistan were sequestered and removed from "sensitive duties." At some point they were asked if they "optioned" for East Pakistan and when the answer was affirmative, they were transferred instead to prison camp. In this manner my parents and I (at the age of three) arrived in Bannu prison camp, and were later transferred to Mandi Bahauddin and finally Gujranwala. At adjoining camps were two uncles who were members of the Army Engineering Corps. When I asked my mother if it was dangerous, she said "We were afraid every day that they would finish us. No one knew what would happen next."[52]

Finally in 1973, the Pakistan government negotiated our repatriation to Bangladesh, in exchange for the Pakistani POWs in India. Fokker Friendship planes, manned by the Red Cross, waited at Lahore Airport. When we boarded the plane, father handed our bedding to another Bengali family that was still stranded. The recipient later became the chief of the Bangladesh Air Force. At the age of four you don't remember much, but I have a clear memory of my father driving his white Volkswagen at breakneck speed toward the airport. My mother was nauseous but he was afraid to stop, and so she vomited continuously out of the side of the car. It was some kind of homecoming.

Back in Bangladesh, everyone had already been promoted in rank, and they had not really counted on us returning. Suddenly there were too many lieutenants, captains and majors. By 1975, as tensions grew, some army officers started getting posted overseas. Six months before Sheikh Mujib's assassination, my father was among many sent to work as doctors in Libya. While we were there we received news of the murder of Mujib, and later of my grandfather's death. In that desert exile, there was a small *milad* prayer, and I couldn't discern whether it was for my grandfather or Sheikh Mujib. I liked to imagine it was for both.

Later, as the counter-coups came, some of Mujib's killers escaped and found refuge in Libya, much to our Bengali community's chagrin. (Even back then, the Tripoli government specialized in giving refuge to international outlaws.) Finally, we returned to Bangladesh and now a military man was president. He wore dark sunglasses, made trains run on time and appeared in a white shirt exhorting the nation to dig ditches. He also faced saber-rattling confrontations with India. The 1971 "special relationship" soured very quickly.

During the bloody 1975 *Sepoy Bidroho* (Soldiers Mutiny), one of my uncles escaped the mutineers because his batman (personal servant) warned him to flee. (That same hated batman system was the one thing the mutiny succeeded in abolishing in the army.) All three of my family members eventually became senior officers. Beyond pride in flag, language, culture, and global standing, this is important at the granular level. The personal is political. A similar sentiment animated my older relatives who lived through Partition. An uncle who was a physics teacher woke up one morning in 1947 to find that many Hindu teachers had crossed the border into India, and so he was now "in charge." The improvement of individual lives on a microscale often provides the collective rationalization for new borders.

Radical historians would argue that the subaltern actually remains in the same area of darkness, and it is mainly the Bengali Muslim middle class and elite that have benefited from 1971. Twenty-two West Pakistani business-baron families were replaced by 22 Bengali families, and by now perhaps by 500 families. As the late Humayun Azad argued in his famous polemic: Is this the Bangladesh we wanted?[53]

When I probe my family history, nothing seems settled. There are no simple heroes or villains—only people who made difficult choices: the cousin who fled his house to join the rebels, narrowly evading capture by the Pakistan army; the uncle who escaped being executed, although the rest of his engineering colleagues were mowed down by a Pakistani firing squad. Within the same family is also an uncle (the physics teacher) who remained in his job during the war, and for that became the target of post-1971 "collaborator" witch hunts. These same pervasive witch hunts moved Enayetullah Khan to write his famous editorial condemning the fratricidal settling of scores, "Sixty-five Million Collaborators."[54]

It is possible that no one was more discombobulated by history's earthquakes than my maternal grandfather, Syed Murtaja Ali. An Islamic historian, he was also the brother of Bengali literary figure Syed Mujtaba Ali. In 1947, Mujtaba wrote one of the first essays defending Bengali as the state language of Pakistan.[55] Unable to punish Mujtaba, who went into semi-exile in West Bengal, the Pakistani government slowed down the civil service career of Murtaja Ali. What was Murtaja thinking in 1971? He had already paid a steep price as a Bengali in "united

Pakistan." But he had also "optioned" for this same Pakistan in 1947, moving my mother from Assam where she was born. He had voted for Mujib, everyone had voted for him, but what did he think of the collapse of the "Pakistan" dream of his youth?

Every Bangladeshi family carries many such contradictions within itself—contradictions of impulse, afterthought, hesitation and bravery. But how they choose to remember all this varies, ranging from exuberant mythmaking to quiet soul-searching. The realities of people's actions during war are always a combination of beautiful heroism and a liminal failure of nerve. It is a fundamental aspect of being human.

Bangladesh is still waiting for that human history of 1971.

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Dedicated to filmmaker Tareque Masud and cinematographer Mishuk Munier, who passed away in a tragic accident in 2011. They were key witnesses for the ongoing War Crimes Tribunal–Tareque had been collecting documentary evidence of atrocities, and Mishuk was an eye-witness to the death squad that executed his father, Professor Munier Chowdhury, in 1971. Tareque Masud also directed several key films on 1971, including *Muktir Gaan*, *Noroshundor*, and Cannes-award winning *Matir Moina.*
Editorial comments received from Jyoti Rahman, Saadia Toor, Udayan Chattopadhyay, Nayanika Mookherjee, Shabnam Nadiya, Afsan Chowdhury, Rehman Sobhan, David Ludden, Hameeda Hossain, David Bergman, Annu Jalais, and Syed Yousuf.

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[18] *Dawn*, February 23, 1952.
[19] Debate over the Restriction and Detention (Second Amendment) Bill, Constituent Assembly Debates, November 17, 1952. Cited in Toor, *State of Islam,* note 27, 207.
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[22] Toor, *State of Islam,* 41.
[23] Gauriprasanna Majumdar (lyrics), Angsuman Roy (music, vocals).
[24] Gauriprasanna Majumdar (lyrics), Shyamal Mitra (music, vocals).
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[49] *Parliament Debates, Government of Bangladesh*, 1972, p. 452. Quoted in Amena Mohsin, "Language Identity and State," *Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia,* Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
[50] Naeem Mohaiemen, "Guerrillas In The Mist," *Sarai Reader 06: Turbulence* (Delhi: Sarai Programme, CSDS, 2006).
[51] The photographs of Siddiqui bayonetting prisoners have been used many times to try to "represent" the amount of violence carried out by Bengalis. Here is Oriana Fallaci's hyperventilating recall: "They thundered 'Allah-akbar, Allah-akbar.'. . . at the conclusion of the slaughter, the twenty thousand faithful (many of whom were women) left the bleachers and went down on the field. Not as a disorganised mob, no. In an orderly manner, with solemnity. They slowly formed a line and, again in the name of God, walked over the cadavers. All the while thundering Allah-akbar, Allah-akbar. They destroyed them like the Twin Towers of New York. They reduced them to a bleeding carpet of smashed bones." (Oriana Fallaci, *La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio* [The Rage and the Pride], translated from Italian, Rizzolo, 2002). Note that Fallaci possibly fabricated her memory of the "Allah-u-akbar" chant, an unlikely coda to a war that had, at least temporarily, made "Islamic" framing more difficult.
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Naeem Mohaiemen, *Kazi in Nomansland*

ART AND THE DIVISION OF KOREA

Hyejong Yoo

A discussion of art and the division of Korea might seem to be self-evident—for all contemporary Korean art since 1945 directly or obliquely developed under the condition of the division. Nonetheless, this observation does not distinguish between art "under" the division and art "on" the division. It also assumes that South Korean artists could freely explore the division and relevant politics in their works, which has not been the case. The enduring hostile relations between South and North Korea and both regimes' physical, ideological, and political control of the border have not only infringed on the constitutional rights of citizens and suppressed the unfolding of democracy, but this hostility has also complicated aesthetic and cultural explorations of the division.

Since the 1960s, dissident South Korean writers, thinkers, and performers have actively engaged with the condition of the division as an insurmountable and unique hardship of Koreans and the condition that Koreans must overcome to achieve liberation in their work. As a result, aesthetic and cultural explorations of the division have almost always had symbiotic relations with and allusions to the building of a legitimate and democratic nation-state. While dissidents have been actively involved in the Koreans' predicament through alternative cultural movements, dissident artists did not engage the division as subject matter for art until the 1980s. Instead, and owing in part to the strong political and cultural influence of the United States, artistic modernism pervaded art practice in post-war liberal South Korea. It was not until the late 1970s that *minjung misul* ("The People's Art") emerged as Koreans' yearning for freedom and democracy culminated in mass protests after decades of authoritarian dictatorship. Critical of institutional art practices (i.e., formalistic experimentation) *minjung* artists attempted to communicate the social and political realities of artists (and Koreans) that had been shaped by Japanese colonialism, civil war, the national division, and rapid modernization. Moreover, the movement was incorporated as a tactical instrument in the anti-government and pro-democracy protests of the 1980s.[1]

Although dissidents perceived the division as the main source of Korea's misfortunes, their idea of reunification was more allegorical and metaphorical, and it did not readily translate into a full-fledged unification movement until the 1987 Democratization Movement. Then, the democratization of society created room for a reunification discourse and movement with greater freedom, which had long been suppressed under the South Korean government's staunch anti-communism. With a loss of *minjung misul*'s momentum, in the post-1987 era there was an increase in the number of alternative art spaces, programs, and commercial galleries, as well as the emergence of periphery culture, and a flourishing of "postmodern" artistic experiments. Beginning in the late 1990s and the 2000s, many young artists and artists' collectives, grouped under the pseudo-journalistic term *post-minjung,* navigated the new social and culture milieus.

In the mid-1990s and 2000s, due to then-President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy, which transformed South–North relations, the art of the division fostered and imagined a creative traversing of the national boundary on multiple levels, both within and beyond the Korean peninsula. Although this essay limits itself to art and the national division of Korea, such artistic and political imaginings have been made more possible by socially engaged artists' expanding the notion of the national boundary and their intersections into other divisions that exist in multicultural Korean society. These include such issues as foreign migrant workers and Muslims (including Korean Muslims), who are not easily accepted into, and are even estranged from, the rest of Korean society. The influx and commingling of diverse peoples and cultures have challenged and interrogated mainstream values held by a majority of Koreans, as well as those of the progressives.

In general, South Korean art that tackles the division—and other visual expressions, generally—changed immensely after the Sunshine Policy. As a result, art on the division of Korea can be explored in two historical periods—before and after the Sunshine Policy—but both intertwined with themes of democracy and reunification. Because the division has seriously hindered the development of democracy, the democratization movement is seen as working toward the aspirations for a unified nation-state. Artistic and

visual explorations of the division and reunification have critically engaged in or supported the commonly shared ideas on the division. Moreover, they have been greatly influenced by the artists' relationships to the shifting politics/policies of the state, and alliances with the dissidents and later, with the progressives. The artworks and films in the following discussion all address multifaceted imagining of crossing boundaries under the division, pertinent to the efforts for democracy and reunification.

A Divided Peninsula

The division of Korea has its roots in the Japanese occupation of the peninsula from 1910 to 1945. It was conceived in discussions of the future of Korea and other Japanese colonies by the Allied powers toward the end of World War II. Soon after the United States' nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan on August 6 and 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan as agreed at the Yalta meeting and rapidly attacked the Japanese army in Northwest China, Manchuria, and the South Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. Prompted by the Soviet Union's involvement in the Korean peninsula, the United States saw the Peninsula's importance in the future geopolitics of East Asia. In light of the fierce geopolitical and ideological struggle of the incipient Cold War, the southern part of Korea fell under the influence of the United States and its containment policy and the northern part became a Stalinist state under the sphere of the Soviet Union. Massive numbers of people migrated or escaped from both the south and the north across the arbitrarily drawn 38th Parallel before the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were formally established on August 15, 1948 and September 9, 1948, respectively.

In 1953, after the armistice in the Korean War between North and South, a "temporary" Military Demarcation Line was formed with the 1.25-mile wide buffer known as the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The war, which resulted in immense human and material loss, greatly shaped sociopolitical discourse and the psyche of South Korea, and in subsequent years the two Korean states competed for the status as the sole legitimate state on the Korean peninsula, each labeling the other as illegitimate. The South and North Korean (or NK) states attempted to prove the superiority of their ideological and economic systems by industrial development and military strength. The North gained the upper hand until the early 1970s and the South aggressively pursued state-led modernization from the 1960s on—along with political and ideological suppression, which sacrificed social and distributive justice and democracy. The totalitarian North Korean state, a single-party state run by the Korean Workers' Party, followed the Great Leader Kim Il-sung's (1912-1994) *juche sasang* (self-reliance ideology) as the official ruling ideology, which continues to influence the government today.

Under the policy and propaganda known as "Military First" and "A Strong and Prosperous Country," North Koreans have been suffering an unparalleled human rights crisis, including suppression of speech and religious freedom. Tens of millions of North Koreans are believed to have suffered from famine and food crisis (children suffer the most from hunger and malnutrition); and up to three million North Koreans have fled to China for survival since the mid-1990s but have been forcefully repatriated by Chinese authorities. China's own human rights violations put the NK refugees under grave risk of detention, torture, or even execution. Desperate women are coerced to sell themselves as prostitutes and sex slaves. And more than 15 to 20 million people are imprisoned in gulags across the country, exposed to murder and biological testing, and more than twenty thousand people have defected to the South.[2] With the sheer scale of this ongoing human rights calamity, the succession of the new leader Kim Jong-un (1983-), the son of the late leader Kim Jong-il (1941-2011), have made South-North relations even more complex.

From the Summit Meeting to the Sunshine Policy

The former progressive president of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung (1997-2002), implemented the Sunshine Policy in 1998 to promote a peaceful coexistence and easing of tensions.[3] The Sunshine Policy's main principles were: no absorption of North Korea in the process of unification; no tolerance of armed provocation; reciprocity; and separation of the economy from politics. As Kim's administration saw NK economic hardship as hindering the peace process, it provided NK with economic assistance while encouraging the

North to engage with its neighboring countries, and vice versa. The Kim Administration also refrained from criticizing the NK regime and helped the public to view NK as a partner in unification efforts.[4]

Sixty years after the Korean War, in June 2000, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il met in Pyongyang, and many Koreans expressed great enthusiasm for the positive changes in South-North relations. The two leaders issued the 6.15 South–North Korea Joint Declaration, agreeing to independent and joint efforts for unification, resolving problems of separated families in the South and the North, acknowledging common elements in South and North unification plans, cooperation and exchanges of economic, civic, cultural, sports, and all other fields, and official dialogues between relevant South and North officials to implement the agreements. The summit meeting shook the earlier anti-communist "Red Complex" in South Korea, even creating a favorable "Kim Jong-il syndrome" in South Korea. Supporters of the Sunshine Policy praised it for promoting reconciliation and cooperation, expanding inter-Korean interactions in the economic, socio-cultural, and sports arenas, and lessening military threats to some degree.

However, critics of the Sunshine Policy accused it of immorality, naïveté, and short-sightedness, and regarded it as a massive failure. The Sunshine Policy was implemented against the backdrop of the South's continued struggle for recovery from the major financial crisis of 1997 and the North's experiencing a human rights crisis that had the potential to collapse the regime. Hence, it was seen as more of a pragmatic measure (or "anti-collapse measure") with a low expectation for return. By the mid-1990s, as many as one million North Koreans had perished in one of the worst famines in the 20th century,[5] and the food crisis persists to the present day. By placing political and diplomatic engagement with NK over issues of human rights, the Sunshine Policy inadvertently resulted in an appalling degree of continuing human catastrophes. Further complications followed when it was discovered that Kim Dae-jung's Administration did not use official routes (i.e., it relied on the conglomerate Hyundai) for negotiations and paid Kim Jong-il more than $500 million dollars to entice him to participate in the 2000 summit.

After the summit and South–North family meetings, the Sunshine Policy was strained by the North's rigid and non-reciprocal attitudes, and its anger in response to George W. Bush's declaration of North Korea as part of the "Axis of Evil." Above all, the North's missile launches and nuclear tests, as well as the 1999 and 2002 Yeonpyeong naval attack and the West Sea Battle, led many people to conclude that the Sunshine Policy had failed. Even after the nuclear issue, the former progressive Roh Moo-hyun government (2003-2008) of South Korea continued to provide North Korea with food, fertilizer, and other necessities, and cooperated on projects such as the Mt. Geumgan tour program and the Gaeseong Industrial Park. However, the following conservative government of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) has assumed a harder stance toward North Korea. Lee, an opponent of the Sunshine Policy, demands that North Korea disable its nuclear weapons before the South provides the economic assistance that could become the basis for reciprocal and mutual benefit to the two Koreas. However, critics of Lee's NK policy argue that it has deteriorated and strained inter-Korean relations and that it is increasing military threats, as evidenced by the 2010 civilian bombing attacks by the North on Yeonpyeong Island.

Crossing Boundaries: *Pungsan'gae* (2011)

The 2011 film *Pungsan'gae* (directed by Jeon Jaehong; script by Kim Gideok) is noteworthy for its daring forcefulness in imagining crossing boundaries, reflecting changes in South-North relations after the Sunshine Policy. The main character of *Pungsan'gae* is a deliveryman, but not a typical deliveryman: He smuggles ancient relics and videotape interviews of families separated by the division, and he delivers people from one side of the heavily guarded border to the other. The man, nicknamed "Pungsan'gae" (dog of the Pungsan county in the North—the same breed of dog given by North Korea to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung at the 2000 Summit in Pyongyang), carefully chooses his customers based on their personal stories or their practical requests from among countless letters attached to the "Bridge of No Return" at Yimjin River. His usual business takes a dangerous turn when the Korea Central Intelligence Agency asks him to bring the lover of a former top North Korean official to the South. In pitch darkness, on their dangerous journey, Pungsan'gae and the lover of the former NK official—despite her terror and her frustration with Pungsan'gae's "unresponsiveness" to her condition—share a

moment of sympathetic understanding, beyond the language and form of Cold War politics.

The hero and heroine are soon caught in multiple webs of suspicion and interrogation about their allegiances to South and North Korea (and to the NK ex-official, as well), and they are manipulated by the conflicting agendas of the agents for the two Koreas. In the end, all three—Pungsan'gae, Yin'ok (the lover), and the NK defector/"traitor," who belong to neither South nor North—are killed. The grim plot of the movie allegorizes the tensions between South and North Korea, ongoing by the failure of the Sunshine Policy or even after the implementation of the policy.

Pungsan'gae's free movement over the border from South to North, and vice versa, is truly exhilarating. Such a feeling would be directly proportional to the ideological and political oppressions one feels under the division. From the straight description of the "impossibility" of the crossing, the film further embraces the South and North by perpetually regenerating their 60-year conflict and the division in miniature wars as well as through the everyday coexistence of the two Korean agents. The inclusion of the two Koreas and peoples is significant not only because it reveals the striking mirror images of their institutional inhumanity and the sacrifices of their people, but also because it calls attention to the expansion of Koreans' intellectual and cognitive map in geospatial terms for reunification, which was previously limited to the South.[6] (Even when the North was represented, it existed mostly as a symbol of unification in films before the mid-1990s.) This expansion opens up the individual's innovative engagement in the division not as a victim but as an agent capable of manipulating and reexamining its violence for his or her own interests, critical reflection, and imagining, among other things.

Figure 1, **Shin Hakcheol**, *Modern Korean History-Synthesis*, 1983. Oil on canvas, 51.2 x 153.5 inches. Courtesy of Samsung Museum of Art Leeum

The People's History as a Competing Vision: *Modern Korean History-Synthesis* (1983)

In his surrealistic oil painting *Modern Korean History-Synthesis* (1983), Shin Hakcheol (1944-) represents the people's struggle to rectify the distorted development of modern Korean history and their fulfillment of a unified nation-state (Figure 1). The black-and-white photorealistic work depicts a large vertical (phallic) figure composed of countless images from popular culture, historical pictures, and journalistic photos of Korean historical events, along with large, grotesque, and violent shapes of human and inanimate objects. The multifaceted, glossy "photomontage" reminds one of Shin's powerful encounters with modern Korean history through historical photos and his reinterpretation of the history from the dissident viewpoint. The course of history in Korea after 1945 was central to the rise and development of dissident consciousness, discourse, and activism. The dissidents' perception of the post-1945 era evolved from their dissatisfaction with and distress over the abject condition of the majority of Koreans and their nation-state, which they saw as having been continuously shaped by the history of colonialism and ensuing dictatorships, foreign interventions, and disorienting modernization. In envisioning a sovereign Korean nation-state, the dissidents perceived the people or *minjung*—not the state—as the true source and reservoir of historical sovereignty and agent of modernization.

Reflecting the dissident discourse, Shin articulates modern Korean history through multitudes of people sharing fervent desires for liberation and reunification in multiple historical moments. In the painting, the people, the living and the dead, swarm across the land, creating a pattern like the surface of a brain. Intensified by continual suffering, the yearning and aspirations for liberation becomes so vigorous and explosive that the people, articulated in a dynamic organism, rise up through the air. The organism embraces the historical moments and forces that gave birth to and shape (the notion of) *minjung*: the Donghak Peasant Uprising, the nationalist movement, liberation, the civil war, the 4.19 Student Uprising, modernization, and the democratization movement. Nonetheless, the historical progress of the people is obstructed by conditions such as the division, militarism and war threats, and foreign interventions, expressed in abominable and monstrous shapes of humans, weapons, and consumer objects.

In the momentum of their historical struggle, their true liberation is achieved through democratization and reunification. Their long-awaited reunification is visually expressed by the vertical structure of the narrative: its verticality slowly leads one's eye to the last stage of the fervent struggle, thereby mimicking the feeling of yearning. At the same time, such visual movement becomes a metaphor of sexual union between man and woman. As the unfolding of the people's struggles is articulated in a phallic figure, its upward thrust to the nation's holy Baekdu Mountain in the North alludes to (sexual) intercourse between the two peoples. A kissing and embracing couple at the top of the painting further suggests reunification. This work presents a phallic-centered reading of Korean history and of Korean society's hyper-masculine culture, including the militant and patriarchal culture of the dissident. As the artist's work faithfully visualizes the dissident view of Korean history, it does not leave much room for critical reflections on the dissident discourse, but this characteristic is shared by many other works on the division and reunification.

Imagining the People's Community: *Won'guido* (1984)

Oh Yun's (1946-) scroll oil painting *Won'guido* ("the painting of spirits of grudges and sorrow") shows the dissidents' vision of the people's horizontal community—the working model and metaphorical process for the reunified Korean national community—whose members are intertwined with their shared sufferings and with their collective desire to overcome and to live humanely (Figures 2, 3). As its title suggests, *Won'guido* traces Oh Yun's heart-wrenching dialogue with Korean history, from the civil war to the 1980 Gwangju massacre—the Gwangju citizens' uprising against the Chun Doo Hwan's (1980-1987) military authorities and the state's atrocities against its citizens.[7] The work represents the spirit of grief, agony, and grudges in which the living and the dead coexist: because of excessive sorrow and grief, the spirits cannot leave this world, while the living themselves become specters.

The epic narrative opens with a group of armed skeleton soldiers marching toward the war with red and orange banners as the clouds of war hang heavy over the sky. A menacing and perilous

Figure 2, **Oh Yun**, *Won'guido* (*Vindictive Spirits*), 1984. Oil on canvas, 27.2 x 181.9 inches. Courtesy of National Museum of Contemporary Korean Art.

air spreads out across the picture plane with the foul smell of death. A marching band of headless musicians follows the soldiers with propaganda papers spreading over the air. Two men wearing headbands and carrying a megaphone and flags propagate anti-communist messages, while people carrying a placard with an "amulet" to avert "evil spirits" (or dissidents in the 1980s' context). In the air, a floating ghost is wrapped in barbed wire, the kind seen along the highly fortified border with North Korea. Grieving women appear to have lost their minds from the excessive shock and pain of the Gwangju experience.

In this unfinished scroll painting, Oh Yun depicts people and spirits in a style similar to the archetypal figures of his woodcut prints, reflecting the fact that he is a prominent woodcut printmaker: solid and iconic features of faces reminds us of patterns of traditional Korean seals and the firm lines of woodcut knives. As groups of people and spirits narrate historical events on this scroll, the variations of their similar appearances suggest the perpetual condition of the people's wretchedness in the past, present, and future. The endurance of suffering is further articulated by the artist's maneuvers of vivid, contrasting colors for the scroll's narrative and background spatial structure. Oh Yun uses red, orange, purple, turquoise blue, black, purple, yellow, white, and earth colors for that background. These are variations of the symbolic colors of the five basic elements of the universe, according to Chinese (and other Asian) philosophies of the universe (red, white, green, black, and earth). They create on the scroll a cosmic space and time that embraces all beings of earth and heaven. The background thereby becomes a theatrical stage where the people's sufferings and pains are uttered and enunciated in continuum.

The flowing color "ribbons" of the background not only interlink the separate historical events but also function as the octave for the communal "music" of the people. Like musical notes, each group of people creates their sounds in dissonance, articulating their innermost psychic emotions from the inhumane and alienating experiences of modernity: for example, the sharp tinkling of metallic combat boots, the flipping sound of propaganda papers, the murmuring and moaning of ghosts. As one scans the images, the assemblage of the sounds generates both minor key solemn music and the electrifying rhythm of traditional Korean peasant music, without beginning or end. The musical articulation of the people's condition mimics both the artist's and the viewer's interaction with Korean history on the scroll as well as the people's determination to transcend their predicament.

In this "epic novel," the people's past and present are woven together as in a tapestry. One can engage in their continuing experience of *han* (long-repressed emotions of grudges, sorrow, and grievances) and their wishes to overcome it in both present and futuristic terms. As the scroll is spread open, the figures' stories are shared with the viewer. And as it is rolled back up, their suffering and healing are entwined. Its horizontal form can be seen as a visual metaphor of *han* and its transcendence into *shinmyeong* (joy, bliss and ecstasy).[8]

The departure scene of the Righteous Army in the novel *Arirang*, written by the prominent, highly controversial writer Cho Jeongrae, also clearly captures this idea.[9] After several years of guerrilla warfare during the colonial period, the generals of the Righteous Army decide to disperse their soldiers because it is utterly reckless to fight against a Japanese army that aims to exterminate them. Before leaving their base, the soldiers together sing the folk song "Arirang," standing arm-in-arm in a circle.

Retaining the original melody, each person sings his own personal version of "Arirang," with new lyrics, in high spirits. The singer-soldiers criticize and satirize the colonial situation while demonstrating their determination to fight to the end. They resolve their *han* through *shinmyeong* (arising in dance), and they renew their community as seeds for germinating their own liberation and sovereign nation-state—which could be interpreted as democratization and reunification in the 1980s.

The Division as the Site of Encounter and Dialogue: *DMZ* (1989)

In the photo collage *DMZ*, Kim Yongtae (1948-) reimagines the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone)—the tangible symbol of military and ideological conflicts—into the site of encounters and coexistence between people (Figure 4). The DMZ was created as a buffer zone (1.25 mile long from the front line and 2.5 mile wide) between South and North Korea by the Armistice Agreements of July 27, 1953 at the end of the Korean War. Many people remember the DMZ as the most heavily militarized border in the world; but that place of enduring tensions is now rich with ecological diversity and abundance because it has been left undisturbed by humans for so long. In October 1, 1953, the "ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty" was officially signed, and the ROK and US agreed to assist each other in self-defense against external attacks in the Pacific. Concerning the rights and obligations of the two parties, the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was made in 1967, which was widely considered in South Korea to be an unequal agreement. The Combined Forces Command was established in 1978 to coordinate the United States Forces Korea (USFK) and the more than 680,000-strong Korean armed forces. There have been several changes of the US-ROK security relationship since the 1990s: the US's playing a supporting role behind the ROK army; the return of Yongsan base in Seoul (2004); reduced numbers of US troops in Korea (to 28,500); and expected transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK military on December 1, 2015.[10]

Reflecting the entwined relations between South Korea and the US, Kim Yongtae examines the DMZ as a way to contemplate and inflect dissident narratives of the division as experienced in everyday lives of Korean women (or sex workers) and American soldiers, intermixed as a result of the US political and military intervention in the division and its aftermath. In his collage work, the three letters D, M, and Z glitter in icy sapphire blues and other colors against a solid black background. The photographs stand out in the darkness, reminding one of neon signs or busy nightlife scenes. This is probably because that was how the work was first envisioned and made by the artist in his exploration of the city of Dongduchon, where many Korean bar girls/sex workers and American soldiers mingled in its famous adult entertainment and red light districts, clustered near the US military base. In his field trip to the town, Kim Yongtae happened to see photos taken by these people, and he collected unclaimed photos from photo studios.

In the photos, one can glimpse personal moments shared by Korean women and American soldiers or among American soldiers, outside their "usual" interactions: There are wedding pictures of interracial couples, Korean and American couples hugging and kissing, American soldiers posing against a kitschy landscape background, first-year ceremonies for mixed-race babies, and more. By combining these personal photos into the shape of the letters DMZ, Kim artistically expands and reconceptualizes the conventional

notion of the DMZ into a space that invites the commingling of two (or more) different peoples, cultures, and powers. Although their relations could be easily read within the binary of oppressors and victims, replicating the unequal relationship between the US and South Korea (as often manifested in reality), *DMZ* lets the viewer wonder if there are other ways of viewing these relationships or of coexisting for the two parties beyond the dissident's discourse and ideology and the rhetoric of ethnic unity.

Like the Korean women in Dongduchon and other US military base towns, American soldiers are also influenced by the political and historical circumstances of the division and of the US military's involvement in the Korean peninsula. If the women were marginalized and despised for not adhering to the proper social and moral order, the American soldiers were disliked and even loathed for representing the US military's occupation and "imperialism." For both Korean sex workers and American soldiers at Dongduchon whose lives were largely defined by ideological representations, these photo sessions in the studios might provide moments when the soldiers can capture snap shots of their real selves to share with missing ones, the sex workers can act out with their friends, and genuine interracial couples can record their love. In *DMZ* joy, laughter, playfulness, and affection—however short and fragile—transcend the logic of Cold War politics and challenge to a certain degree, the dissident ideology and discourse.

UnBelonging in the Crossing of Boundaries: *Dear Pyongyang* (2008)

In *Cunnilingus in North Korea* (2005), the Seoul-based Web art group Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries (see their catalog entry) imagines the crossing of boundaries through women's sexual pleasure and joy, which has often been narrated from masculine, political, and ideological perspectives. Similar to the YHCHI's critiques on the two states' patriarchal and parochial nationalism, in the documentary film *Dear Pyongyang* (2008), the *zainichi* (ethnic Korean residents in Japan and/or Korean Japanese) Korean director Yang Younghee teases out, or reveals, the oppressive mechanisms of national boundary that are overlooked by the dominant and majority members of society.

Yang Younghee, who has been astonished and befuddled by her father's life-long loyalty to North Korea, traces her family's diasporic past and present in Japan and NK. Under the repatriation movement of Koreans to the North beginning in 1959, her father, a fervent pro–North Korean movement (*chongryeon*) leader, sent his three sons to NK in 1971 with great hope. Yang, their only daughter who remained in Japan, grew up studying the Great Leader Kim Il-sung's teaching of Korean history and other subjects in pro-North Korean schools. Nonetheless, in her first visit to the home land (North Korea), she felt estranged from and incompatible with North Korea, and it has taken many long years for her to understand NK and her father. Because she is the girl child, her father is mainly concerned about her marriage, rather than being a revolutionary warrior the way he hopes for his grandsons. Although she is excluded from the patriarchal genealogy of revolutionary efforts, in fact, this enables her to navigate and question myriad ideological and political complexities that *zainichi* Koreans, including that of Yang's family, have faced under the division and Cold War politics.

During the earlier, colonial era, Koreans could freely cross the "border" of Japan and were considered "equal" citizens of the empire.[11] Beginning in 1947 and upon the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, however, the Japanese state declared that non-Japanese residents would be transferred to alien registration, thereby cutting off any benefits and protections they had received. This measure accelerated many Koreans' decision to repatriate. Under the division and the subsequent civil war, Koreans in Japan became stateless, and the Korean community there experienced sharp internal divisions that reflected the partitioning of their homeland.[12] When the Republic of Korea was established in 1948, they were forced to choose their nationality, either *kankoku* (South Korean state, but this citizenship was not acknowledged until the normalization treaty in 1963), or *chosen* (Korean ethnicity and Joseon, the state before colonialism and North Korea after 1965), for the alien registration certificate.[13]

From 1959 onward, spurred by Japan's eagerness to repatriate Koreans, the International Committee for the Red Cross, the Japanese government, the Japanese Red Cross, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and *chongryeon* collectively worked to "return" 93,000 Koreans by their "free will" to the "homeland," despite the fact that most "returnees" came from the southern part of the peninsula.[14] Although this effort was presented as humanitarian work, historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki

Figure 4, Work by artist **Kim Yongtae**, photography by Kim Youngsoo, *DMZ*, 1989.
Photo collage, 38.6 x 89.8 inches. Courtesy of Samsung Museum of Art Leeum.

reveals the intricate political and ideological underpinnings of the project under the Cold War politics. When these people arrived at their "bright new future," their new home instead proved to be a place of poverty and hardships, and thousands of people were subjected to tortures, imprisonment, and persecutions.[15] The status of the *zainichi* in Japan and their "exodus" forcefully suggest life's insecurity and an ongoing crisis of diasporic identity in the rigid boundary-making system of nation-states.

Although Yang's dad's prominence and his loyalty to NK guarantee some comforts to his son's families, her dad's decision to send his three sons turned out to be overly optimistic. Nonetheless, he continued to invest his ideological convictions, idealist passions and hopes, and "patriotism" to what the NK Great Leader Kim Il-sung's *juche* ideology was supposed to represent and what he hoped NK would be, although it did not achieve it: a utopian nation-state for Koreans. Yang's filming of her father's candid talk about his convictions and regrets, of her visit with her parents to her brothers' family in Pyongyang, and of her parents' love for each other exposes the multiple divisions that exist between herself and her dad, herself and her brothers' families, as well as the hopes and challenges of crossing those barriers. Through this work the geospatial, political, ideological, and generational divisions within the family unfold, and an allegory of Koreans' fate under national division emerges.

The "Epochal" Meeting of the Two Koreas: *Flying* (2005)

In his short video piece, *Flying* (2005), Park Chan-Kyong captures the unrealization of the 6.15 South–North Korea Joint Declaration, using video footages from the Summit meeting (Figures 5-9). In June 2000, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and the South Korean delegations flew to Pyongyang for the South and North Korea Summit meeting. The 6.15 South–North Korea Joint Declaration was realized as a result of the historic talks between June 13th and the 15th. However, even after the passage of five years, the artist, art critic, and film director Park Chan-Kyong noticed that little had been achieved beyond several high-profile business ventures and brief meetings between separated family members, but that there were virtually no artistic comments and reflection on the policy and its aftereffects.

Flying is his response to the unfulfilled promises to the Summit meeting. He creates the thirteen-minute work by editing source images, including unaired video footages of the one-hour flying. The work began with the passionate handshakes between the two late-leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, and consists mostly of flying scenes taken from the airplane. Nevertheless, the scenes are shown upside down to express the dizzying excitement felt by the delegation's first direct flight to North Korea. The work is accompanied by the 1977 *Double Concerto,* by the renowned South Korean composer Yun Yisang, who lived in exile in West Germany (and later in Germany). The concerto

was inspired by the Korean fable of Gyeonwu and Jiknyeo, a couple who were separated by a god as punishment for their disobedience, but who met once a year with the help of birds who sympathized with their plight. Their separation is a metaphor for the national division as well as for the personal fate of the composer, who, under the National Security Law, could not return to South Korea until his death.

The artist, Park Chan-Kyong, depicts the historic Summit meeting as the encounter of intertwined yet different perspectives out of the discrepant experiences of the North and South. He reinterprets the meeting through the notion of "creative ambiguity," diplomatic jargon for wording in agreements that can be interpreted in whatever way benefits the interpreter, and used by the South Korean delegation to the Six-Party Talks on North Korean nuclear development. The term suggests that politics, easily presumed to be clear-cut, carries the ambiguity of art, thereby showing the trajectories between art and politics and opening up diverse ways of articulating the realities.[16] For instance, if flying means travel in the South, it reminds the North of the US air attacks during the Korean War. Because of the painful memory of the war, NK insists on developing the nuclear weapon. As a gesture to assuage grief and pains of NK people, Park reverses the black-and-white footages of the U.S. combat planes' bombing in North Korea to restore the original condition: the dropped bombs are returning back to the sky, instead of going down for targets of the ground.

Because of the different historical experiences between South and North, the various players involved could interpret the meeting of the two leaders in many dissimilar ways. As they finally arrived at the Pyongyang airport, the North Korean army and personnel were welcoming the South Korean delegations. However, the June 15 South–North Joint Declaration remained unfulfilled, as if it were a daydream. The last scene of the film, flooded with the pink and red flowers of the welcoming North Korean crowd, looks surreal and dreamy, evoking a great sense of helplessness and intangibility.

Toward Reunification: *A Dream of Conception (Joy)* (2011)

The lack of critical artistic expressions on the Sunshine Policy and its related politics appears to be odd, as there are active involvements of many aspects of division and reunification issues by socially engaged artists, especially by the *minjung* artists. This may have resulted from their self-censorship under the enduring existence of the National Security Law, or from strong conviction of the correctness of the former-progressive governments' Sunshine Policy. In addition, based on the artists' everyday understanding of humanness, the artists might not see a reason to address it in their art. Considering that South Korean state politics toward NK profoundly shapes the relationship between South and North Korea, nonetheless, one can ask why the policies/politics were excluded from their artistic contemplation and how they can be constituted as creative artistic material to investigate. Is art fundamentally incapable of such explorations, given that critical art on the Sunshine Policy is extremely rare? What does the lack of critical distance between their political beliefs and art imply, and what can be done to break the creative, intellectual, and ideological barriers for art's political imagining?

If Park Chan-Kyong comments on the Sunshine Policy in a calm and distanced stance,

Figures 5-9 **Park Chan-kyong**, *Flying*, 2005. 2-channel video, color, sound, 13-min. Courtesy of the artist and PKM Gallery

the South Korean artist Song Chang takes up the challenge of exploring reunification and North Korean defectors in his emotionally-charged collage and oil paintings, which have been widely discussed in society after the policy. In his *A Dream of Conception* series, he articulates reunification of South and North in the images of sexual union between a man and woman, conception, and childbirth. Song believes that although the division is the main source of Koreans' grievances and misfortunes, after 60 years of the war, the memories of the division are disappearing, and the significance of reunification is doubted by the younger generation. Their disinterest in reunification mirrors their cold-hearted attitudes toward NK defectors who can be called "the North Koreans whom South Koreans meet before reunification." Even though South Koreans have accepted other Asian migrant workers and their families into the multi-cultural Korean society, the artist says that they do not warmly welcome defectors to join South Korean society, which would be the first step in preparing for reunification.[17]

Although he does not comment directly on the sociopolitical realities around the division and NK defector issues, Song Chang imagines reunification of the two Koreas and the two peoples through the metaphor of a child's birth. In his work of collage and oil on canvas, *A Dream of Conception* (*Joy*), Song Chang depicts a woman giving birth to a baby in two adjacent canvases, as if to suggest the division or to show a flash of light at the last effort in her labor (Figure 10). Her life-sized body, comprised of compressed soft-drink cans, is placed diagonally against a background of gloomy, gray-blue and brown colors overlaid with dripping whitish-gray colors. Her voluptuous body of harsh, angular white outlines and the dynamic diagonal composition appear powerful, almost aggressive, as all emotional and physical outbursts and shaking from a painful delivery are still traceable. Unlike the common image of a mother holding a baby, what Song captures is the moment when mother and child feel the world as something new and acknowledge and celebrate the bodily, emotional, and sensory experiences they share. The baby is still connected to its mother by a thick umbilical cord, left on the ground in a mirror image of its mother.

The artist speculates that reunification of the two peoples and the birth of a new national community would be an expansive, aesthetic, affecting, and powerfully physical experience. Thus, he chose collage as his medium for this work rather than his usual choice of painting. His pressed aluminum cans bring out rich and varied colors, sheen, textures and sound qualities, and even offer the sensation of coldness. The various shapes of squashed aluminum cans, which comprises the bodies, reminds one of a cube made of hundreds of thousands of recyclable cans ready to be shipped to a factory. Exuding a cold, metallic feel, the woman's body (and the baby's) appears as the waste and residue of capitalism, consumerism, and mass production. And the background, painted in subdued colors of sienna, blackish brown, dark slate gray, slate blue, and others, accentuates the inhumanness and harshness of the environment that she endures under the division.

Nonetheless, such an "environment" becomes the foundation for the birth of a new universe and reality (for her and for Koreans). Her hard struggles, and the ecstasy and bliss she felt from the child's first crying, are shared with the viewer through the tactile imagining of her "skin." The woman and baby's bodies have a texture and all-over-ness that shifts focus from the body to the



Figure 10, **Song Chang**, *A Dream of Conception (Joy),* 2011. Oil on canvas, aluminum cans, 72 x 71.7 inches.
Courtesy of the artist.

skin where her experiences are most intimately expressed. The background seems to be an extended skin, and the vertically dripping whitish-gray colors of the background appear to be tears, sweat, secretions, and discharges of the body after her labor. Sharing a great sense of relief and fulfillment with her, one becomes aware that reunification of the divided nation would be conceived in radical re-conceptualization of humanism and its extension to NK people; and that the challenges and hardships on the way to reunification would be similar to labor pains.

Conclusion

The national division of Korea and hopes of reunification were suppressed as subject matter for art until the late 1970s. Some of this suppression was self-censorship by artists themselves, while most of it reflected sociopolitical conditions that made free cultural expression dangerous. However, changes in South-North relations, and the transformation of Korean society by globalization, informatization, and multiculturalism (i.e., influx of migrants), has created rich and fertile ground for creatively traversing the multiple boundaries and partitions in and beyond Korean society. These divergences and fissures have created a reflexive national and transnational space across national boundaries, which helps one to look inward from outside in envisioning the Korean nation-state. More and more artists are bringing fresh viewpoints to critically assessing and intervening in the possibility of such trans/national crossings. Often, socially engaged artists and other cultural practitioners have aligned themselves with the progressives' discourse and ideology in which persists an earlier, more parochial Korean nationalism. Hence, to investigate these divisions in a global context, artists are asking how they can conduct an open examination of their own ethical bases and social workings, how they can investigate progressive politics, and how they can reinterpret ethics and social justice in their reworking of art and other worlds. What kinds of art forms and content can be envisioned—not only from a dialogue with national experiences but also with parallel artistic and visual expressions in other parts of the world? These ongoing dialogues and inquiries regarding these multiple divisions are setting the direction for the development of much of South Korean contemporary art.

I would like to thank the intellectual historian Jacqueline Pak for her comments.

Romanization of names follows the artists' preference. If not, I follow the Revised Romanization System.

[1] For a detailed analysis of *minjung misul*, see Hyejong Yoo, "Democracy as the Legitimate 'Form' and 'Content': *Minjung Misul* in Dissident Nationalism of South Korea." (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2011).
[2] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/05/north-korea-release-us-activist?INTCMP=SRCH
[3] The policy takes its name from one of Aesop's fables, *The North Wind and the Sun:* a tale in which the sun, not the wind, makes a man remove his coat voluntarily. The Sunshine Policy is based on President Kim's reinterpretation of West Germany's *Neue Ostpolitik* ("New Eastern Policy" of "change through rapprochement") and the USSR's *Glasnost* (Openness) and *Perestroika* (Restructuring) policies under Mikhail Gorbachev.
[4] Chon Hyun-joon, "The Inter-Korean Summit: Evaluation and Tasks Ahead," *East Asian Review* 14, No. 2 (Summer 2002), 3-16: 5.
[5] Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform* (New York: Columbia University, 2007).
[6] Suk-young Kim, "Crossing the Border to the 'Other' Side: Dynamics of Interaction between North and South Koreans in *Spy Li Cheol-jin* and *Joint Security Area*," in *Seoul Searching: Culture and Identity in Contemporary Korean Cinema*, edited by Frances Gateward (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 225.
[7] Officially, the government killed 200 in the uprising (although the actual number of deaths may have exceeded 2,000, according to Gwangju citizens). Hundreds more went missing, and thousands were injured.
[8] Kim Jiha, "Jungryeokjeok chowol yiraneun saengmyeong gwa geumajeo beoseonan keun pyeonghwa: Oh Yun gwa na" ["Life which Overcomes Its Existential Gravity and Larger Peace beyond Life: Oh Yun and I"], in *Oh Yun: Sesang saram, dongnae saram*, 117. This writing was originally published in *Oh Yun: natdokkaebi shinmyeong madang* [*Shinmyeon Madang of Bogy*] (Seoul: Keolcheo buks, 2006).
[9] Cho Jeongrae, *Arirang,* 12 vols. (Seoul: Haenaem, 2002).
[10] http://www.koreaembassy.org/bilateral/military/eng_military4.asp; www.usfk.mil
[11] Sonia Ryang, "Introduction: Between the Nations: Diaspora and Koreas in Japan," in *Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan*, edited by Sonia Ryang and John Lie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 5.
[12] Ibid., 7.
[13] Ibid., 9.
[14] Please refer to Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan's Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
[15] Ibid.
[16] Interview with the artist, November 15, 2011.
[17] Interview with the artist, September 14, 2011.

ONONDAGAS
3 Rivers
Seneca
Salt L.
Onondaga
CAYUGA
Glass L.
Canadasegy
Cayuga
NATIONS
The Villages on the East Branch of Sasquehannah are ... by Delawares and ...
Owegy
Oksinenga
Chughnut
Tiaoga
Pensylva
EXPLANATION
Indian Villages

MINDS IN CONTROL

Jolene Rickard

Transnationalism hangs on to the form of the nation-state while privileging the flow of people across national borders: It cannot accurately locate Indigenous space within the "trans national" because it ignores Indigenous self-determination and, ultimately, inherent rights.

The Americas remain problematic because they have yet to acknowledge the habitual movement of Indigenous peoples across the US, Canadian, and Mexican borders. So, where are the intersections with cultural theory and art-world analysis for artists from cultures like the Onkwehonwe or any discrete First Nation community? Are we seamlessly folded into the discussion of globalization as transnational, or forever fixed in anthropologically defined authentic culture?

Indigenous peoples globally share similar colonial histories, yet remain among the most economically disadvantaged. Dispossessions of homelands are a critical factor in the destabilization of Indigenous peoples, and this is very much present in the work I created for the exhibition *Lines of Control*. *Fight for the Line* (2012) is about a local, yet very specific, negotiation of a border; but it stands in for ongoing tensions throughout the Americas and globally for Indigenous peoples as we continue to assert our right to our ancestral homelands. Everywhere you step in the Americas, a similar marker could be planted reminding more recent arrivals of the continuous erasure of the cultures that predate modern notions of nationhood. Creating markers is a strategy that has been used by a number of artists to witness the ongoing act of colonization in the Americas, including James Luna (Luiseno), Hachivi Edgar Heap of Birds (Cheyenne/ Arapaho), Zig Jackson (Mandan/Hidatsa/Arikara), Bob Haozous (Warm Springs Chiricahua Apache), Hulleah Tsinhnahjinnie (Tuskegee/Dine'), Alan Michelson (Mohawk), and many more. What this list of artists represents is that the encroachment on Indigenous spaces—physical, cultural and political—is not unique to a specific region or border but is felt across the Americas.

Each Native American, First-Nations, Aboriginal, or more recently, Indigenous, people has a key event or rupture that sets in motion the fight for its claim to homelands. Since 9/11, the tension between Indigenous peoples at the US, Canadian, and Mexican borders in the Americas has escalated. The discussion of the US-Mexican or US-Canadian border in the North American press does not recognize the space of Indigenous peoples or inherent rights in this negotiation. And gatherings like the IV Indigenous Summit (2009) or the Indigenous Peoples Border Summit of the Americas II (2007) are not part of the border discourse in North America.

Most recently, President of Bolivia Evo Morales sent a message of greetings and solidarity to the IV Indigenous Summit Abya Yala[1] (2009), "We should not forget that for the liberation of our peoples, we must recognize that the land does not belong to us; instead we belong to the land."[2] As the first Indigenous, specifically Aymara, leader of a nation-state in the Americas, Morales reminds us that "natural law" supersedes human-made laws, including fixed borders. At the inaugural session of this summit, Tupac Enrique Acosta of Izkalotlan Pueblo, clarified the distinction of Indigenous peoples in relation to the US-Mexican border, stating that, "We did not cross the border, the border has tried to cross us," and that, "As Indigenous peoples of Abya Yala we are not immigrants in our own continent."[3]

At the 2007 Indigenous Peoples Border Summit of the Americas II held at the Tohono O'odham Nation, appreciation for the sixth session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was expressed. Specifically, the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples affirms and recognizes a full range of our human rights, as stated in article 36:

> 1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other peoples across borders.
>
> 2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right.[4]

The summit at the O'odham land was attended by delegations of Mohawk, Oneida, Navaho, Acoma Pueblo, Hopi, and O'odham people. Bill Means, cofounder of the International Indian Treaty Council, attended the summit to document human rights abuses at the border for a report to the United Nations. He called for "solidarity of Indigenous Peoples throughout the world to halt the arrests of Indigenous Peoples who are walking north in search of a better life, and to bring down the US/Mexico border wall."[5]

Tohono O'odham Nation land is point zero for the controversial "Apartheid Wall" that is snaking its way along the southern border of the US. The construction of the border wall, reported by Bill Means based on a conversation with one of the workers, is contracted through the Boeing Company, which subcontracted the work to the Israeli defense contractor Elbit Systems that participated in the construction of the "Apartheid Wall" in Palestine.[6]

In the Americas the global spotlight is on the militarized US/Mexican border; but the presence of the US/Canadian border is just as controversial for Aboriginal, First Nation, Native American, and Indigenous peoples that live between this border often referred to as the "medicine line." Legal scholar Sharon O'Brien locates the formation of the "medicine line" with the establishment of the international boundary at the 49th parallel between the United States, Canada, and the Indigenous peoples of the Great Plains:

> Again and again Blackfeet warriors fleeing northward after a raiding attack watched with growing amazement as the pursuing troops of the United States Army came to a sudden, almost magical stop. Again and again, fleeing southward, they saw the same thing happen as the Canadian Mounties reined to an abrupt halt. The tribes of the Blackfeet Confederacy living along what is now the United States–Canadian border came to refer to that potent but invisible demarcation as the "Medicine Line." It seemed to them almost a supernatural manifestation.[7]

The term "medicine line" represents a form of agency the Blackfeet Confederacy or Niitsitapi claimed by naming this phenomenon. Without physical structure, the border was a firm presence no different than the US/Mexican wall today. Both of these structures interrupt the flow of cultural practices of Indigenous peoples who have moved freely in our homelands in the Americas for generations. Most non-Native North Americans are not aware that this is an issue for all Indigenous Nations that have been bisected by these borders. To understand the issue, one must recognize the ongoing presence of discrete Indigenous nations within the Americas, instead of rendering Indigenous people/s as minority populations.

In North America, Indigenous leaders focus on treaties between Native nations and settler nations as defining specific boundaries. Treaties are not part of a Native political foundation but are part of the US, British, and Canadian legal systems. They are also acknowledged as highly problematic, the 1700s and 1800s being the timeframe when most treaties were authored. Native leaders assert an original intent within these agreements, but the US and Canadian legal system has reinterpreted their meanings.

These revisions have motivated Indigenous communities along the northern border to consider treaties as transnational, legally binding documents. The Anishinaabeg Joint Commission (Batchewana First Nation, Bay Mills Indian Community, Garden River First Nation, and the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians), in cooperation with the Center for the Study of Indigenous Border Issues, held a gathering in 2008 called "The Living Treaties Anishinaabeg Summit." The strategy at this summit was to evaluate the constant US/Canadian re-interpretation of "treaty rights" in settler nation courts in conjunction with traditional knowledge keepers, tribal historians, land claims researchers and Indigenous community members, who are directly impacted by evolving interpretations of treaties. For these communities the following treaties are significant: Proclamation of 1763, Robinson Treaties (1850), Bond Head Treaty (1836), Pennefather Treaty (1850s), Sault Ste. Marie Treaty of 1820, Washington Treaty of 1836, Detroit Treaty of 1855, the Jay Treaty, War of 1812, Treaty of Ghent, Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, and the Treaty of Niagara (1764).

Each community along the "medicine line" has a different set of treaties that represent a point in history when the US, Great Britain, and Canada negotiated with Indigenous peoples as "nations." For Indigenous peoples this relationship has not changed but this nation-to-nation[8] relationship is something that is not promoted within the US or Canada. This is the history and understanding that I grew up with as a citizen of the Tuscarora Nation. The Tuscarora are the sixth nation to join the Onkwehonwe, or the Iroquois Confederacy,

The sign marks the ancestral homelands of the Cayuga Nation in New York State

The sign is part of the continuing resistance by Upstate Citizens for Equity against the Cayuga's claim to their homelands

Five Nations, with the ancestral Onkwehonwe[9] homelands encompassing most of what is now New York State and southern Ontario, Canada. The "grape vine story" which is part of the oral history of the Tuscarora suggests that we were once part of the northern or elder brother Five Nations but separated to monitor the southern "border" of the Onkwehonwe territories and settled in what is now North Carolina.[10]

In 2013 it will be 300 years since my people, the Tuscarora, were forcibly displaced from our ancestral homeland in North Carolina. Today the Tuscarora could be described as a diaspora with communities in North Carolina, western New York State, Southern Ontario at Six Nations near Brantford, along with many people living outside of any of these territories. Every Wednesday night at the Tuscarora Nation School, less than 10 minutes from the US-Canadian border, a small group of scholars and community historians gather to discuss and unravel what is commonly referred to as the "migration." I've taken umbrage with the unexamined acceptance of the term "migration" in reference to one of the earliest and most bloodied dispossessions of an Indigenous people in the Americas. The Tuscarora Wars of 1711 to 1713 sent my people fleeing just like any war-torn refugee population. Our exodus north marked the colonial American landscape with towns and villages bearing the name Tuscarora.

Several accounts of our "migration" have made it into the historic record but I first became aware of our escape from North Carolina through the recollection my father, Eli Rickard, learned from his father, Clinton Rickard. The story my dad tells is the same one that scholars recorded from my grandfather and that is part of the historical record.[11] It is worth constructing this circular loop of the validation of local or community-based knowledge because it is so prevalent within most Native communities, history, and scholarship. Several years ago, I returned to the Tuscarora homeland in North Carolina and tried to set the story of our retreat into the landscape at Fort Neoheroka, one of our last strongholds. Our villages and people were either burned, or if captured were sold into slavery, or they managed to escape. I am descended from a group of Tuscaroras who escaped and fled north to seek shelter with our northern Onkwehonwe family. Horrific details of death punctuate the stories I've heard and read, but they will not be recounted here. My point is that 300 years later, the Tuscarora still remember the rupture of removal and still live with the residual effects of this kind of trauma.

Perhaps it is the long memory of this experience that linked my family with the efforts of the Cayuga Chief Deskaheh. Deskaheh played a pivotal role in his attempt to gain international recognition of Onkwehonwe nationhood or sovereignty at the League of Nations, Geneva, Switzerland in 1923.[12] He traveled to Geneva on an Onkwehonwe- authored passport, was denied access to a plenary session, and returned to the United States as an exile from Canada. Deskaheh never made it back to the Six Nations community at Brantford in Canada because he became ill, and due to the Immigration Act of 1924 Deskaheh's medicine man could not cross the border. He passed away at Tuscarora.

My grandfather was so moved by the journey and work of Deskaheh that he dedicated his life to fighting for our right to move freely in our homeland, or as he put it, to "fight for the line."[13] Along with other Onkwehonwe collaborators, the Indian Defense League of the Americas was formed and argued for the acknowledgement of the terms of the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain that, in Article 3, gave Indians the right to cross the border with their own goods at any time and, in Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent of 1814, which closed the war of 1812, restored this right to Indians.[14] This history is part of my personal narrative and I am not including it gratuitously. The work of Deskaheh and the IDLA has left a deep mark on the ongoing awareness of Onkwehonwe assertion of nationhood, and the negotiation of the US/Canadian border is a daily occurrence for our people. The photographs in the media projection of *Fight for the Line* (2012) in *Lines of Control* were part of the border protests conducted by the IDLA in the mid-20th century.

My own subjectivity as a Tuscarora is indebted to the Onkwehonwe, specifically the Cayuga, Oneida, and Seneca people, for sheltering us in our darkest moment. The Tuscarora Nation is grateful to have secured a land base in the "western door" of the Onkwehonwe with the elder brother Seneca Nation. Tuscaroras remain in the homelands in North Carolina but there is no formal relationship between the northern and southern Tuscarora communities. The Cayuga Nation sheltered the Tuscarora when we arrived in their territories as refugees in the late 1700s. A drive along Cayuga Lake tells the story of how the Cayuga were dispossessed and forcibly removed from their ancestral homelands. Signs mark this

trauma with a roadside marker for Cayuga Castle (Goi-o-gouen), or the last place that the Cayuga held the land; this is next to the marker of Sullivan's campaign, which details the military assault on the Cayuga in 1779; in turn this is next to the marker of the Indian Mound (site of a Jesuit mission). All of these markers are the familiar green signposts along any highway, but they witness ongoing colonial aggression. It continues today in the form of contemporary patriotic—red, white, and blue—signs advocating against Cayuga sovereignty by the Upstate Citizens for Equity, another sign on the colonial landscape of the Americas.

Therefore, it is with a certain irony that the Tuscarora today have a federally recognized "nation" territory in the United States, but the Cayuga Nation homelands are no longer in their possession as federally recognized Cayuga territories. The federal recognition part of this is significant but does not suggest that the Cayuga Nation does not exist. Rather, the Cayuga are a federally recognized people but without the "reserved territories" or occupancy of the homelands. The Cayuga still live in parts of their original homelands but, after a lengthy legal battle, the US courts have denied their claim to repossession as a federally recognized land base.[15] Today the Cayuga people live throughout the territories of the Onkwehonwe on both the US and Canadian sides of the "medicine line."

Indigenous ancestral territories are the interstitial spaces where assertions of borders through the problematic formation of "nations" are negotiated. The discourse of nationhood does not deter from the more profound understanding of our distinctiveness as Onkwehonwe, or original people (now a cliché), yet cosmologically central to the identity formation of most Indigenous peoples. This deeper "border" is plumbed through the reclamation of our languages.

A fictive green road sign anchors *Fight for the Line* (2012) in *Lines of Control* with a single-channel media projection containing images that randomly recombine and shift commentary. Why is the road sign a fiction? The sign placed in the Johnson Museum in Ithaca, NY, marks actual ancestral homeland of the Cayuga Nation, but denied by the US. The sign marking the Cayuga homelands is an artwork and not a political act of the Cayuga Nation or peoples.

The Cayuga, like the Tuscarora and Seneca, were forcibly dispossessed during the Sullivan Campaign in 1779. By 1807 what was left of the "Cayuga Reservation" was used by New York State as "military bounty lands for payment of veterans after the American Revolution."[16] Today, the Cayuga do not have a "nation territory," but live throughout the other Onkwehonwe communities. The Cayuga Nation went to court from the 1980s to 2006 to reclaim their ceded territories. The courts overturned an earlier decision and rejected Cayuga land claims on a legal technicality known as "latches." At present, there is little hope that the Cayugas will reclaim their homelands through the US courts. But, there is some hope. Last spring I attended a condolence of a Seneca chief at the Tonawanda Nation community. Within the Six Nations the Cayuga are identified as a "younger brother," with the Seneca, Mohawk, and Onondaga being the "elder brothers." It was enlightening to hear the Cayuga chiefs put through the entire condolence, or "raising up," of the chief using the Cayuga language. Throughout the territories of the Onkwehonwe, visual markers like road signs assert sovereign or nation borders. These signs are typically rendered in English and one of the Onkwehonwe languages, in this instance, Cayuga.[17] The vitality of the Cayuga language represents a profound renewal for both the people and their nation. The revitalization of Indigenous languages is what shifts the border from "lines of control" to "minds in control."

[1] "Abya Yala" means "Continent of Life" in the language of the Kuna peoples of Panama and Colombia. The Aymara leader Takir Mamani suggested the selection of this name (which the Kuna use to denominate the American continents in their entirety), and proposed that all Indigenous peoples in the Americas utilize it in their documents and oral declarations. "Placing foreign names on our cities, towns and continents," he argued, "is equal to subjecting our identity to the will of our invaders and to that of their heirs." See "About Abya Yala Net," *Native Web,* http://abyayala.nativeweb.org/about.html.

[2] For more information about the summit, see John Ahniwanika Schertow, Intercontinental *Cry*, http://intercontinentalcry.org/continental-indigenous-summit-focused-on-unity/.

[3] John Ahniwanika Schertow, "Intercontinental Indigenous Summit," blog entry, Jan. 30, 2012, http://intercontinentalcry.org/continental-indigenous-summit-focused-on-unity/

[4] Endorsement of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues took place at the Summit of the Americas II on November 10th, 2007, San Xavier, Tohono O'odham Nation. See http://indigenousbordersummitamericas2007.blogspot.com/

[5] Brenda Norrell, "Apartheid Wall on Tohono O'odham Nation Land,"
http://indigenousbordersummitamericas2007.blogspot.com/ (Nov. 16, 2007)
[6] Ibid.
[7] Sharon O'Brien, "The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty,
Economies and Families," *Fordham Law Review* 53 (1984): 315.
[8] For a discussion of the idea of Native nations within American see: Vine Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle, *The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1998)
[9] The term Onkwehonwe, meaning Original People in the Mohawk language, is more accurately used today to describe the Haudenosaunee or People of the Longhouse. Historically, the British referred to the Onkwehonwe as the Five Nations, then the Six Nations and Iroquois Confederacy. The six nations of the Onkwehonwe are the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora.
[9] Elias Johnson, *Legends, Traditions and Laws, of the Iroquois, or Six Nations, and History of the Tuscarora Indians* (Lockport, NY, 1881), 44-45.
[10] Barbara Graymont, *The Fighting Tuscarora: The Autobiography of Chief Clinton Rickard* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1970).
[11] Sotsisowah (John Mohawk), *Basic Call to Consciousness* (Mohawk Nation, NY: Akwesasne Notes, 1978), 19-26.
[12] Discussion with Clinton Rickard's son, my father Eli Rickard, who recalled the dedication that my grandfather, Chief Clinton Rickard, had for raising the consciousness of Onkwehonwe people and our right to move freely within our ancestral homelands. Inspired by the work of Deskaheh, Clinton Rickard founded the Indian Defense League of America in the 1920s. This discussion took place on Aug. 5, 2012, at the home of Eli Rickard within the territories of the Tuscarora Nation.
[13] See Graymont, *The Fighting Tuscarora.*
[14] As reported by the lawyer for the Onondaga Nation, Joe Heath, "The courts ruled that latches apply to the Sherrill and the Cayugas' cases by state that it would not be or just to NYS to find equitable resolution after 216 years of illegal occupation (the so called "treaties" made after the 1790 Trade and Intercourse act." See: http://www.onondaganation.org/news/2006/2006_0731.html July 31, 2006.
[15] Laurence M. Hauptman, *Conspiracy of Interests: Iroquois Dispossession and the Rise of New York State* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 107.
[16] Based on research conducted in January 2012 by Tuscarora, Mia McKie, a Cornell University student involved in the American Indian Program within the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. McKie reports: The signage used on the Tuscarora Reservation in Lewiston, NY reads "Skaru:rę' Kayeda:kreh". Skaru:rę' is translated to Tuscarora and Kayeda:kreh (Kayeta:kreh, using linguistic orthography) means "They live here." So, this boundary marker says, quite literally, that Tuscarora people live here.
To my knowledge, there are no signs for a Cayuga community in New York State like the one used at Tuscarora. The ancestral homelands of the Cayuga people surround the shores of Cayuga Lake in central New York. There are archeological findings in many towns and cities, including but not limited to Aurora, Canoga, Cayuga, Ithaca, Seneca Falls, and Union Springs. However, after the American Revolution, many Cayuga villages were burned, forcing a Cayuga removal to present day Six Nations in Brantford, Ontario. This is where most of the Cayuga-language speakers currently live and where the language has evolved. There are two dialects present at Six Nations, Lower Cayuga and Upper Cayuga; and there are two orthographies used between linguistics and community members, the Henry orthography and linguistic orthography. For this reason, there is no one correct way to say or write many Cayuga words or phases. Basic ideas transcend most spellings and dialects. The Cayuga people call themselves, Gayogoho:nǫhnéha:' or Gayogohó:nǫ', which means the People of the Pipe or the People of the Great Swamp. There are slight variations in reference to self between the Lower and Upper Cayuga dialects that are expressed in the Cayuga-English dictionary. To create a nation sign for the Cayuga, one might use the phrase "Gayogohó:nǫ' Odǫhwęjá:de'," which can mean Cayuga Nation or Country. However, after consulting with community members in Six Nations, the phrase given for Cayuga nation was "Hohnahstohgwadohwahnehs". This phrase uses the Henry orthography that was adapted in the Cayuga immersion schools and not the linguistic orthography present in the Cayuga dictionary and published articles. Although this phase seems to be starkly different from the Cayuga Nation phrase created from the dictionary, there are similarities in sound and pattern between the two.

Jolene Rickard, *Fight for the Line*



Sophie Ernst, *HOME: Zarina*

ZARINA HASHMI AND THE ARTS OF DISPOSSESSION

Aamir R. Mufti

The modern state, as Hannah Arendt once noted, is a hyphenated entity. It is an articulation of impulses that are at the very least in tension with each other, if not outright opposing in tendency. On the one hand, the nation-state points to the realm of the state, of law, constitutionality, and citizenship. On the other, it asserts the claims of community and nation, of the people, produced as a set of normative practices, social maginaries, and narratives of collective existence. Arendt was of course elaborating this idea in the context of her analysis of the Nazi state as a totalitarian state. The Third Reich, which handed over the realm of law entirely to the purported rights of the German people, was thus for Arendt the limit case that shone a sort of light on the constitutive instabilities of the nation-state itself as the normative state form of the modern era. As I have argued at length elsewhere, taking Arendt's formulation as a starting point, the nation-form, far from being a great settling of the relationship of people to place and to culture, must therefore be understood as a fundamental disruption and rearrangement of settled social relations.[1] Contrary, therefore, to the procedures of some of the most influential approaches to the study of nationalism—such as the works of Benedict Anderson and Partha Chatterjee—nationalization could be fruitfully examined from the perspective of the question of all that it renders non-national, those entire assemblages of practices and social imaginaries that it subjects to the possibility of uprooting and dispossession.

In this essay, I explore the possibilities for thinking about dispossession and aesthetic form through an engagement with the work of the Indian-born artist Zarina Hashmi. Zarina (she often uses only her first name in her professional life) is a singular figure within the contemporary international reception of artists from India and South Asia. Her career appears to be at an angle to those of other contemporary artists who have received international attention in recent years. Belonging to an older generation than the crop of artists from the region who have blazed a brilliant streak of celebrity across the international art firmament and found their way into galleries,



Figure 1, **Zarina Hashmi**, *Father's House 1898-1994,* 1994
Etching printed in black on Arches Cover buff paper, chine colle on handmade Nepalese paper. Edition of 25. Image size: 22 1/2 x 15 1/2 inches. Sheet size: 30 x 22 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.

museums, and auction houses in New York, London, and throughout Europe, Zarina has displayed a distinct and quieter sensibility. Her work displays a critical historical imagination that distinguishes it from much of the new global art. In particular, she takes language—the Urdu language, to be precise—as a site for the exploration of society as sedimentation of the historical process. As I hope to show, she interweaves this historical imagination with personal memory and autobiography, thus exploring the shifting locations of artwork and practitioner within and between different and divergent ways of configuring our relation to the past.

What does it mean exactly to speak of an art of dispossession? If art and literature throughout

the modern era have been inextricably tied to histories of national development, what does it mean to speak of certain works as being defined precisely by the lack of such frames of reference? If we take it seriously, there appears to be something paradoxical about this term, since as a psychic experience dispossession, understood as loss of an ancestral homeland, seems to consist precisely of a profound loss of frameworks of orientation. Can we assign stable attributes to experiences that imply the falling away of any permanent ground of signification and representation? Exile, alienation, and deracination have been pervasive themes in modern culture since at least the 19th century. Georg Lukács spoke of the modern condition itself as one of "transcendental homelessness," given form in such literary genres as the novel.[2] The presence of these themes in modern art and literature is not surprising for other, more mundane reasons as well, given the typically exilic, transnational, or cosmopolitan nature of movements and communities of artists and writers in the modern era, although we can never underestimate the ability of supremely national art institutions—from museums and academies of letters to official forms of art history and literary history—to reclaim such works for the national patrimony. But is it possible to speak of an art of dispossession in a more profound sense, an aesthetic practice concerned with the foundational unlivability of modes of modern life, with the dialectic of rooting and uprooting whose most emblematic and ubiquitous figure in our own times is the stateless refugee?

Zarina has lived and worked in New York for more than three decades, and she was one of the few South Asian artists to be included in the major feminist exhibition *WACK! Art and the Feminist Revolution* in 2007, as well as the Guggenheim Museum's *The Third Mind: American Artists Contemplate Asia, 1860-1989* in 2009. While she has worked in a variety of media and forms, at the core of her practice is printmaking, especially woodcut, but also etching.[3] Most of her works are line prints on handmade paper, often including calligraphic text in Urdu, one of the two forms of the split vernacular of northern Indian, of which Hindi is the other form. The prints often flirt with the indeterminate zone between representation and abstraction, and they contain citations that range from architectural plans to maps and even the Indo-Buddhist mandala. Her work is often categorized as diasporic, feminist, Islamic, Indian, or Asian American—but although each of these

Figure 2, **Zarina Hashmi**, *My House 1898-1994,* 1994
Etching printed in black on Arches Cover buff paper, chine colle on handmade Nepalese paper. Edition of 25.
Image size: 22 1/2 x 15 1/2 inches. Sheet size: 30 x 22 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.

rubrics captures an important element of her practice, none of them encompasses the full range of its complex significations. In fact, her work repeatedly escapes any such attempt to ground its social, regional, or civilizational identity and does not allow a settled filiation to any singular tradition. Her practice raises much broader issues concerning homelessness and dispossession in the modern world, issues that have major implications for contemporary art and critical thought today, inviting a new and compelling understanding of the history of uprooting in our times. While she evokes the violent partition of India in 1947—which was achieved through a massive rearrangement of populations, identities, and cultural and social imaginaries—in a series of remarkable elaborations of this distinctly modern "event" charged with the question of homeland and homelessness, the partition itself and its aftermath are placed in her work within larger and shifting constellations of planetary scope, the crisis of social fragmentation in modern India being shaken loose from its identitarian moorings.

While my focus in this essay will be on these

preoccupations in Zarina's work, I begin by a brief detour through the work of Mona Hatoum, the London- and Berlin-based artist of Palestinian origin. While the two share an interest in normalized forms of political violence, as well as a focus on exile and displacement, Zarina's work displays a formal sensibility dramatically different from that of Hatoum. Her woodcuts—made with roughly chiseled woodblocks, handmade paper, and rough, almost crude-looking lines—draw attention to the crafts elements of the work and to pre-capitalist forms of labor and modes of life as a whole, rather than the post-industrial and post-apocalyptic landscapes transplanted into intimate spaces that are the hallmark of some of Hatoum's most powerful installation work.

In Hatoum's iconic installation *Homebound* (2000), for instance, a room is littered with domestic objects such as a table, chairs, bare metal bed frames, various kitchen implements like colanders and a meat grinder, a sewing machine, a table lamp, and more, all of which seem to be connected by the electrical wire snaking between, around, and over every horizontal surface and hanging over the sides of table and chairs. That at least some of the wires are live is indicated by a number of flickering lightbulbs on the table and floor. Finally, the "room" is walled off from the viewer by a parallel series of exposed high-tension wires stretched across the entryway. The many objects and the details of their arrangement draw the viewer closer for a better view, while the wires—are they live with electrical current or not?—perform the reverse function by inducing vague physical anxiety. What kind of room is this? Is it currently inhabited or has it been hastily abandoned, and if the latter, by whom, and for what reason? The title of the work could suggest an abiding habitation, but who could be at home in this space where objects seem denuded of their conventional symbolic accretions and every inch of motion would require an assessment of peril? Or perhaps it suggests a rather different situation, a temporary dwelling hastily abandoned as a more permanent or originary and lost home has once again become accessible.

Hatoum was born and raised in Beirut in a Palestinian Christian family displaced in 1948. Herself displaced by the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, she went to London where she trained at the Byam Shaw and Slade schools of art and began exhibiting in the early 1980s. Her work has ranged widely across media and forms, from video and performance to sculpture, collage, found-object assemblage, and conceptual objects and installations. As noted by Edward Said, perhaps the most persistent strategy of Hatoum's work throughout her career is disorientation—the subtle displacement of everyday objects and contexts into *unheimlich* and even threatening scenarios. The piece *Untitled* (*wheelchair)* (1998) is still recognizable as the everyday object it evokes, but it is made strangely unfamiliar and uncomfortable by its hard metal seat, and the handles, which would normally invite us to engage our caring instincts and direct them toward the occupant of the chair, have been transformed into a pair of sharp knife-edges. The simultaneous feelings of anxiety and recoiling that this work seeks to produce in the viewer are a characteristic Hatoum gesture. In other works, ordinary objects are transformed through changes of scale. In *Paravent* (2008), a three-panel kitchen grater is blown up to resemble a screen or room divider, but our recollection of the sharp edges and jagged protrusions on a standard kitchen grater makes this a less-than-appealing piece of furniture. In *La grande broyeuse (Mouli-Julienne x 21)* (2000), Hatoum achieves a different effect altogether. An old fashioned, hand-cranked food slicer and shredder, while utterly recognizable as an ordinary and familiar object, hovers over the viewer like a strange, menacing creature from some other world.

In Said's words, an "abiding locale is no longer possible in the world of Mona Hatoum's art which, like the strangely awry rooms she introduces us into, articulates so fundamental a dislocation as to assault not only one's memory of what once was, but how logical and possible, how close and yet so distant from the original abode, this new elaboration of familiar space and objects really is."[4] The title of the Hatoum show at the Tate Britain for which Said wrote the essay, *The Entire World as a Foreign Land*, is taken from Said's work, or, rather, from a quotation from Hugh of Saint Victor, the early 12th-century theologian, philosopher, and mystic associated with the Abbey of Saint Victor in Paris, that appears in several places in Said's writings: "The person who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign place."[5] Said himself had encountered the passage in Erich Auerbach's famous essay "Philology of *Weltliteratur*," which Said had translated into English in the late 1960s.[6] It becomes in his



Figure 3, **Zarina Hashmi**, From the portfolio *Atlas of my World*, 2001: *Atlas of My World IV*
Woodcut with Urdu text, printed in black on handmade Indian paper. Mounted on Arches cover white paper
Sheet size: 25.5 x 19.5 inches. Image size: 16.75 x 13.5 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.

writing a means to produce an account of critical practice and intellectual life more broadly as an unsettled and unsettling activity, refusing identitarian structures as its permanent abode. Hatoum's art, Said writes, embodies a "belligerent intelligence." It evokes a landscape that is "hard to bear . . . like the refugee's world, which is full of grotesque structures that bespeak excess as well as paucity."[7]

Zarina's work too may be said to evoke devastated social landscapes, but these landscapes are dotted, we might say, with the ruins of historical monuments, unlike Hatoum's post-apocalyptic wastelands that are littered with the strangely deformed objects of everyday life. Although Hatoum's art also puts into play the work of memory, the recollection of the way things were, it is in her case the memory, housed in the individual body, of the experience of conventionalized and normative objects and spaces, as opposed to the historical memory that is jogged in Zarina's works. They recall for us the recurring instances of political violence across the planet in recent decades, from India's partition in the middle of the 20th century to massacres in such places as Srebrenica and Jenin in more recent years. Her work provides a catalog of ruined cities, frayed societies, fragmenting states. Her sensibility is an unapologetically exilic one, a quiet but persistent claiming of a homeland that has nevertheless been put profoundly in question. She provides a critical perspective on nation-states as the universal political form of our times, the social crises and conflicts they seem to repeatedly generate, and their marginalization and victimization of those social groups that are deemed to be non-national peoples.

Arendt argued over six decades ago that the emergence of stateless populations as a mass phenomenon in the 20th century was a highly symptomatic political event, the stateless demonstrating in their very material existence the alienability of those "human" rights that had been the charter of (Western) modernity since the 18th century. Arendt's analysis was perspicacious about the outlines of the new world, the global system of nation-states, that was only beginning to emerge from the ashes of the European genocide and the coming collapse of the colonial empires, and highlighted the paradox at the heart of this emergence:

> After the war it turned out that the Jewish question, which was considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved—namely, by means of a colonized and then conquered territory—but this solved neither the problem of the minorities nor of the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the stateless and rightless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people. And what happened in Palestine within the smallest of territory and in terms of hundreds of thousands was then repeated in India on a large scale involving many millions of people. Since the Peace Treaties of 1919 and 1920 the refugees and the stateless have attached themselves like a curse to all the newly established states on earth which were created in the image of the nation-state. . . . For these new states this curse bears the germs of a deadly sickness.[8]

Arendt thus placed the destruction of Palestinian society, and the installation of the logic of majoritarianism in Palestine, within a larger, global frame, identifying a structural link between this event and the resulting dissolution of society in the subcontinent that is known as the partition of India. Arendt's analysis of statelessness leads us to confront the paradox that dispossession is a feature of the putting into practice of what we may term possessive or proprietary theories of culture and language—precisely those ideological forms that coalesce in the nation-state and that have acquired worldwide dissemination as the nation-state has become the normative political form of the modern era. It is these slippages between home and homeland—slippages that are canonical to politics and culture in the modern era—that I am concerned with here.

I have argued at length in my book, *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture,* that the so-called Jewish question of post-Enlightenment society in the metropolis must be understood as an early and in fact *exemplary* emergence of this familiar, ubiquitous, and "symptomatic" crisis of modern society, which I have called the crisis of minority, and that the "Muslim" question in late colonial India is an instance of its colonial reemergence and transformation. The two artists whose work I am examining here allow an extension of this set of concerns into the contemporary, postcolonial moment. Each had her formation in a social group affected by the ultimate manner of

"resolution" of these historical "questions." The partition of India and the disappearance of Palestine, which took place within a few months of each other late in the fifth decade of the 20th century, are contemporaneous events in more than a merely chronological sense. Together they can be seen as marking the inability of the modern system of nation-states to establish the nation as the universal form of political community except through massive upheavals and uprooting: the partitioning of a country and an entire social fabric, accompanied by communal violence of holocaust proportions in the former instance (that is, in India); and organized genocide and displacement of survivors to a foreign land, with the consequent uprooting of its own native population, in the latter (that is, in Europe and Palestine). We might say that these enormous and unprecedented upheavals of the mid-20th century are never too far from either artist's concerns.

Dwellings have been a major theme in Zarina's work over the last three decades. Even the word "home" itself appears repeatedly in both the titles of individual pieces and in exhibitions of her work, as in *Homes* (1981), a work in molded paper that depicts a haunting series of identical house-like cavities on what appear to be stilts (or are they legs?), and *Roofs* (1982), also in molded paper, a grid of pyramidal forms that evoke the roofs of a cluttered old city shimmering in the blazing sun. In recent years, she has explored this concern with dwellings in woodcut prints, including various experiments in imaging houses she herself, or members of her family, have inhabited at various points in their lives. This is the case with *Father's House 1898-1994* (Figure 1), which takes the form of an informal plan of a house, in which each of the rooms, spaces, and even plants and trees around the perimeter are identified in Urdu: "Mother's room," "Father's room," "the long room," "bougainvillea vine," "kitchen," "storage room," "boundary wall," "lime tree," "henna bush," "guava tree," etc. In a large number of prints, such architectural plans are reduced to nearly abstract geometric forms (see Figure 2, *My House 1937-1958*)—nearly, because the representational element of the architectural drawing continues to be operative, however attenuated it may have become through the formal reduction that is also a reduction of function. It may be that this is a visual equivalent of reductio ad absurdum, the syllogistic process by which a familiar, seemingly logical proposition is shown to be its opposite, self-contradictory, or an absurdity. More certainly, however, we might say that this tension between abstraction and representation seems to function as a means to highlight the unfamiliar always lurking in the midst of the familiar, the uncanny or *unheimlich* in the midst of the *heimlich*. And this movement toward abstraction leads this exploration of literal places for dwelling and not-dwelling toward abstract notions of home, dwelling, displacement, belonging, and not belonging. Her work expands the meanings of house and home to an exploration of the nature of modes of collective and historical habitation and the meanings of homeland itself. As we have seen, these are homes stripped bare of the symbolic appurtenances of comfort and belonging, or homelands that are denuded of dominant ideologies of hearth and home, devoid of any trace of *Gemütlichkeit*.

So far as I am aware, all of Zarina's "architectural" prints are "plans"—there seem to be none that reference elevations, for instance.[9] What the plan as a form makes available is the footprint of the dwelling and its internal organization. It is a sort of map of a building. In a large body of recent work, she uses the map itself as a visual form in order to explore concerns that may be said to be geographical, territorial, and social at the same time. This is true of a portfolio of prints, *Countries* (2003). Another series of six prints, *Atlas of My World* (2001), consists of minimal line-image "maps" of countries and regions of the world that have in one way or another been significant in the artist's life. In one, the outlines of Western European countries are clearly delineated, their names written in Urdu. Another (Figure 3, *Atlas of My World IV*) draws our attention to the tortuous, conflicted history of India and Pakistan and to the border separating the two countries by the layering of an enlargement of the border line on top of a map of the post-Partition subcontinent, creating what almost appears to be a twisted umbilical cord both separating and connecting these two supposedly distinct nations. Its existence in the larger image seems a mystery. Is it above or below the image of the two countries? Is it tied down somehow or free-floating, both physically and in its significations? It appears to have no definite beginning or end, or at the very least seems to continue beyond the nation-state frame that tries to contain it.

Another print from 2001 evokes this second print, though it is not formally a part of the same portfolio. Called *Dividing Line* (Figure 4), it consists simply of this winding and twisted line,

Figure 4, **Zarina Hashmi**, *Dividing Line*, 2001
Woodcut printed in black on handmade Indian paper
Edition of 20. Sheet size: 25.5 x 19.5 inches. Image size: 17 x 12 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.

Figure 5, **Zarina Hashmi**, From the portfolio ... *These Cities Blotted into the Wilderness, (Adrienne Rich after Ghalib),* 2003
Baghdad. Woodblock printed in black on Okawara paper and mounted on Somerset paper.
Sheet size: 16 x 14 inches. Image size: 7.25 x 7 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.

without any explicit reference to the distinct national geographies it instantiates—a historically and socially dense geography brought to the brink of abstraction. The territorial line evoked here is of course known historically as the Radcliffe Award, named for Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the English barrister who was, we might say, its "draftsman." The story of this cartographic event has repeatedly been told, including by W. H. Auden, in a remarkable poem from 1964 titled, simply, "Partition." This "dividing line" was initially conjured up in an isolated and locked room in the (Armed) Services Club in the hill station of Simla, the Viceroy's summer capital, in the summer of 1947, away from the stifling heat of the plains. But its implementation on the social and territorial bodies of an entire subcontinent in the following weeks and months meant the uprooting of perhaps as many as 15 million people and the death, in the midst of a communal holocaust, of as many as 3 million.

Zarina's image is a gesture of staggering economy. This density of historical experience and of human suffering at all levels of society—ongoing human suffering over six decades after the fact, we might add—is condensed to a knotty and undulating line twisting its way across a blank surface. What exactly does the line divide? What manner of space, what kinds of habitation, lie on its either side? When and by whom can it be said to have been drawn? It is questions such as these concerning the identitarian logics that are foundational to the modern world, colonial as well as postcolonial, that are raised by this quiet yet powerful image.

In the series *. . . these cities blotted into the wilderness* (2003) we find another sort of highly stylized exercise in mapmaking, or more precisely, a series of spatial attempts to engage with the fate of a number of cities around the world that have been ravaged in recent decades by war, mass violence, and social dismemberment. Each image is quite distinct in its procedures, once again flirting in various ways with abstraction but drawing attentively from the particular historical situation of the city that is its subject. In *Baghdad* (Figure 5), the city appears as an arrangement of fluid black forms, like a collage of cutouts laid out adjacent to each other in an abstract pattern on a yellow ground. Is it the silhouette form—*hāshiā* in Urdu—that is being mimicked here, or the urban master plan, or perhaps the aerial photograph? This last possibility of course is the most ominous one, given the historical context of the Anglo-American invasion of 2003. Does the print represent the city coming into view, for instance, of an approaching Coalition bomber? If so, the image would evoke a suspended moment of calm before the inevitable devastation. As viewers, are we being made to share the viewpoint of the

Figure 6, **Zarina Hashmi**, From the portfolio ... *These Cities Blotted into the Wilderness, (Adrienne Rich after Ghalib)*, 2003
Srebrenica, Woodblock printed in black on Okawara paper and mounted on Somerset paper.
Sheet size: 16 x 14 inches. Image size: 7 x 6 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.

bomber? Judith Butler has shown that during the first Gulf War the ocular abilities of the then-novel "smart-bomb" technology, extended through live feeds into the television sets in our living rooms, helped reproduce and reinforce the phantasm of the all-powerful, "surgically" effective, imperial subject.[10] The spectacular callousness of the attacks of 9/11, as I have argued elsewhere, could be viewed as a mimicking of the monumentality of this imperial spectacle and an attempt to punch a hole through that phantasm.[11] Zarina's image can be seen as an invitation to consider this entangled set of possibilities in the production of imperial war-as-event as well as our own insertion into the event as (viewing) subject.

In another print in this series, *Srebrenica* (Figure 6), we encounter a very different set of visual strategies. The relationship to the map here seems even more tenuous. We encounter an organic black shape, edged by what looks like a dotted line. Inside this form row upon row of small rectangular shapes are packed in. Is this a stylization of a remarkably orderly urban grid or, given what we know about Srebrenica's fate during the Yugoslavian wars, a huge hole in the ground full of coffins laid out in neat rows going on seemingly forever? The city had been declared a "safe zone" for refugees by the United Nations when, in July 1995, the so-called Srebrenica massacre of about 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys occurred at the hands of Serbian and Bosnian Serb forces, while a contingent of 400 Dutch United Nations troops was present in the city. Is the dotted perimeter a reference to the porousness and failure of this protective cordon? In *Jenin*, another print from the series, the perimeter, consisting of a series of thick and impermeable lines, seems the very opposite of that in *Srebrenica*. The enclosed space gives the impression of being under erasure, like a piece of fraying burlap or fabric with deep gashes. It is a depiction of a tightly enclosed city whose boundary becomes more and more defined and impermeable as its interior undergoes a process of dissolution. Is this a reference to the Israeli use of aerial bombing and bulldozers to level broad stretches of Jenin city and its overcrowded refugee camp during the so-called Battle of Jenin in April 2002 in order to create access for Israeli armor?

A final image from this series is titled *New York* (Figure 7). The least detailed image in this series and also the most recognizable, it is nevertheless perhaps the most elusive. Two narrow yellow lines bisect the image from top to bottom—the unmitigated darkness of the black ground broken by the thin parallel lines of light. The fate of downtown Manhattan on 9/11, which the artist experienced firsthand, is therefore included in this series of prints cataloging devastated cities, their populations subject to the ravages of mass violence motivated by imperialism, militarism, genocidal nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and terrorism.

Figure 7, **Zarina Hashmi**, From the portfolio ... *These Cities Blotted into the Wilderness, (Adrienne Rich after Ghalib)*, 2003
New York, Woodblock printed in black on Okawara paper and mounted on Somerset paper.
Sheet size: 16 x 14 inches. Image size: 7.25 x 5.5 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.

While her prints retain a subtle and tenuous representational quality, often they verge on abstraction. In fact, the interplay between these two possibilities, and the tension between them, is a characteristic feature of the work. And while this interplay of abstraction and representation implies, on the one hand, the absence of any *explicit* narrative element, on the other it leads, in the words of an interviewer, to repeated "*invitation* to create interpretive narratives."[12] There is something of the quality of the verbal riddle to these visual exercises, but a riddle stood on its head. This is a riddle to which we already know the answer, which has been provided by the artist—for instance, in titles or in Urdu text in the images themselves—but which we must now

laboriously work at in order to uncover the links that connect the visual clues to the already known secret they contain. In Zarina's work, mapmaking is employed in an aesthetic practice directed against the claims to totality embodied in the modern state, exposing and foregrounding the residue of the state: that which is necessarily left over as a result of its totalizing projects. How, then, are we to understand the range of these works, citing as they do such visual practices as architectural plans, maps, and aerial photographs? They are works about image-making, first of all, about image practices of various sorts. To be more precise, they are place-images, in a double sense, images of "places" of certain sorts but also images about the imaging of these places. In short, they are concerned with the symbolic fabrication of place, the production of the places of human life.

A final set of prints we may consider here is the 2004 series titled *Letters from Home,* which contains a strong autobiographical element. These images are based on handwritten letters from her sister in Pakistan, letters that were written at moments of personal grief, such as the deaths of their parents, but given to Zarina only later, during visits to her family.[13] Most of these prints have undergone a double printing process: a relief print from a metalcut of the letter is overprinted with a woodcut image or frame. *Letters from Home* explores the repeated experience of loss inherent in that impossible commonplace of Indian and Pakistani Muslim experience—families split between two rival and enemy nation-states. Zarina was born in India before Partition into a family of middle-class Muslims. Her family was of Punjabi origin but had settled in the town of Aligarh in the Hindi-Urdu heartland in the early decades of the century. (The town is itself of some significance in *Letters*, and I return to it below.) Segments of the Muslim middle class and elites of this region have historically been linked to the demand for a separate Muslim homeland in the subcontinent. The partition of India, however, which had been imagined as a final settling of the place of this north Indian Muslim culture—and of the practices associated with it, above all the Urdu language and literature—resulted instead in its homelessness on both sides of the border: as the culture of an increasingly marginalized minority in India and of migrants and refugees in Pakistan, where large numbers had resettled during the massive violence that accompanied Partition.

Zarina's own family history diverges from this larger narrative, because her family remained in India, only leaving for Pakistan a decade later, in the late 1950s. Thus her conception of herself as a displaced, overseas, or "diasporic" Indian is complicated by the fact that soon after her departure from India, her familial link to the country was broken altogether when her family was transformed into Pakistanis. Unlike much art that may be said to have a "diasporic" relation to India, therefore, the point of her work is not displacement to the United States or the West more broadly. Instead, this more familiar "diasporic" dimension becomes simply the occasion or means for a perception and understanding of that other, more foundational experience of dispossession. It is this strange disappearance of the homeland, an acutely experienced dispossession at the individual level, that links up repeatedly in her practice with dispossession as an uncanny and constantly repeated experience in the modern world.
The two prints from *Letters from Home* I examine in some detail, nos. II and III (Figures 8 and 9), take as their basis the first and second pages, respectively, of a letter from her sister in Pakistan informing the artist of the passing of their father. In the first, the print of the letter has been overlaid with a second image, a black-line frame with a profusion of squiggly lines suggestive of a map of some sort. Urdu text in the bottom right-hand corner of the frame identifies this as a map of the town of Aligarh and its surrounding areas; the artist has said that this image is based on a 19th-century map of the city.[14] This dense layering of both historical and autobiographical allusions requires some disentangling. Aligarh is, first of all, the city in which Zarina was born and raised and lived through her college years—and it would likely be a small and provincial town in a forgotten corner of northern India except for the presence of the Aligarh Muslim University. The name Aligarh, of the town and the university, is one of the most overdetermined signs in modern Indian Muslim history. The institution was founded in 1867 as the Anglo-Mohammedan Oriental College, with the explicitly stated goal of dragging the Muslim elites of north India reluctantly into the modern world by giving their sons a modern, colonial education. In the wake of the British suppression of the Great Uprising of 1857, known to colonial historiography as the Sepoy Mutiny, the aim was to transform this now seemingly decadent and stagnant culture, obsessed with memories of its former status as the social elite of the long-defunct Mughal

Empire, into a modern service elite for the British colonial government in India. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the founder of Aligarh the institution and of the larger social and cultural movement for reform that surrounds it, can be credited more than any other thinker and public figure with a redefinition of Indian Muslim identity to the exclusion of Indian nationalism.[15] He is a complex and contradictory historical figure, admired and even revered for his progressive attempt to revive and modernize a seemingly dying culture yet reviled for introducing the religious factor into the emerging discourse of Indian national identity.[16] In the decades following its founder's death, the university outgrew the (colonial) loyalism to which he had tied it, becoming a seat of opposition to British rule, but also, at the same time, a site for the production of a separatist Indian Muslim identity and a center for the demand for Pakistan.

Which brings us to the next print in this series, and Zarina's personal link to this complex cultural, social, and political history: the artist grew up on the campus of Aligarh Muslim University, where her father, Sheikh Abdur Rashid, was a professor of history and the provost of one of its residential colleges, Sir Syed Hall, named for its founder. The woodcut print overlaid on this second page of the letter from home is in fact a depiction of a 19th century outline plan of Sir Syed Hall, including the main quad of the campus and the rectangular structure that encloses it. The perimeter buildings are reproduced in the print as elevations, showing the double-arched length of the façade. On a deeply subjective level, the prints perform the work of mourning occasioned by the news of the loss of her father, but it is a belated performance, given the letter's own displaced epistolary function. (The letter was never sent.) They are an attempt to recall the world that the father had been led to abandon decades earlier. But the very semiotic force of "Aligarh" as a historically meaningful constellation brings in another, more collective register, which does not so much intrude on this performance of personal grief and mourning as fit alongside it in some sort of pattern, like those visual riddles where an image may be interpreted in two very different ways. The father's uprooting from the homeland echoes the slow dispossession of "the Muslim," both persons and problematics—including the entire cultural heritage produced in the Urdu language—from its historical moorings, in a series of what may be described as synaptic exchanges in these works between individual and collective circuits and registers. The letters from home are thus from a place that has never been the artist's home; in the prints the letter from Pakistan is overlain with traces of a place of more originary filiation.

This is part of the significance of the ubiquitous use of Urdu calligraphy in Zarina's printmaking. The Urdu text, inserted and interwoven into the images, produces a powerful sense of loss—linguistic, literary, and cultural. As I have argued at length elsewhere, the overall social condition of Urdu as a linguistic and literary formation is one of homelessness, even in Pakistan, where, despite being long established as the official national language, it fails the test of indigenousness to which it is subjected from to time, since it can be said to be the "native" language of only a small minority of north Indian origin, whose social base is entirely urban in nature.[17] And in India, of course, a self-described community of speakers and readers has long been in decline, with the language carrying the taint—and of course nostalgic aura—of an "aristocratic" and "feudal" Muslim past. Zarina's use of Urdu text highlights this condition of homelessness, the unsettled nature of its place in the world. As linguistic signs these calligraphic elements are at the same time seemingly transparent—naming certain elements in the images (as in *Father's House*) or the images as a whole (as in the portfolio *. . . these cities blotted into the wilderness*)—and highly cryptic and elusive, not simply for the non-Urdu reading viewer. In what art-historical framework should we place this exercise in the articulation of visual artwork with written language? Should it be considered alongside the Orientalist use of Asian writing systems, or is it an exercise, pure and simple, in the traditions of "Islamic" calligraphic art?

For art publics in the West, this use of Urdu text must of necessity recall the Orientalist tradition of rendering Middle-Eastern writing forms as arabesque, coding them as non-code and thus placing them forever beyond the possibility of decoding. Some of the post-Said debate about the claim to descriptive realism that attaches traditionally to the Orientalist canon has focused precisely on this rendering of writing as arabesque—conventions that are still very much in use in a degraded form in such popular visual media as the political cartoon.[18] In Zarina's prints, contrary to this Orientalist practice, the calligraphy enables a dense double text, simultaneously historical and autobiographical—

Figure 8, **Zarina Hashmi**,
From the series *Letters from Home,* 2004,
Letters from Home II, Portfolio of eight woodblock and metalcut prints on handmade Kozo paper and mounted on Somerset paper
Edition of 20. Sheet size: 22 x 15 inches. Image size: 12 x 9 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.



Figure 8, **Zarina Hashmi**,
From the series *Letters from Home,* 2004,
Letters from Home III, Portfolio of eight woodblock and metalcut prints on handmade Kozo paper and mounted on Somerset paper
Edition of 20. Sheet size: 22 x 15 inches. Image size: 12 x 9 inches
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York.

coded as the relation to the father's life, which intersected in illuminating ways with the larger currents of a nation's history. The Urdu calligraphic elements of Zarina's prints thus function as a repudiation of the Orientalist conventions, where incommensurability is reduced to an absence of meaning. Zarina's prints invite exploration of the mutual translatability of heterogeneous cultural positions within the now globalized circuits of culture and power. More concretely, they draw our attention to the complex and twisted (but by no means unique) history of a culture, a historical intelligence and imagination produced in a specific language that is now permanently on the verge of disappearance in its historical homeland.

In conclusion, let us return briefly to Hatoum in order to pose once again the question about art and dispossession. Hatoum has long resisted being typecast as a "Palestinian artist," rejecting a search for political messages linking her work to the Palestinian national struggle for collective rights. She speaks instead of formal concerns and an interest in defamiliarization. And with few exceptions, (dispossessed) Palestine seems to be missing from her works entirely. In what sense, then, may we speak of her work as a treatment of dispossession, and of the dispossession of Palestine specifically? Hatoum takes as her medium the psycho-physical disorientations that threaten to turn the commonplace objects of everyday life into phantasms. Objects typically appear in her work removed from their habitual social environments and inherited, conventional contexts. In *Marrow* (1996), for instance the viewer is led to wonder from what social environment this strange yet familiar object has been removed. What macabre transformation has it undergone in this process of extraction? What kind of physical force might have reduced the object, which we would expect to be made of hard substances such as steel and wood, to a tangled mass that gives to the slightest touch? This menacing vulnerability draws our attention to the missing persons who may have lived their daily lives with and around these everyday objects. We might say that Hatoum's work is a phenomenology of objects as well as bodies under duress, even if the bodies are, strictly speaking, missing from the artworks. In this

transformation, if (dispossessed) Palestine survives or exists at all, it is not as a *single* or particular place on the earth, but potentially *every* place.

The horizon of Zarina's work too may be said to be the entire planet. But, unlike Hatoum, Zarina appears to be drawn to the historical contours of language—to the question of textuality. She seems concerned with the slow accretion of meaning in language and therefore with a history of a longer *durée*, viewing dispossession as deeply connected to, and performed in, language. In the midst of the frenzied and much celebrated arrival of India (and Indian art) into globalization, her work quietly invokes a lost India, as well as lost *possible* Indias and their relation, which remains subterranean and counterintuitive for the most part, to a catalog of other places, moments, and constellations of dispossession in the world. Her work expresses a minoritarian and exilic relation to society and the world, staging a series of affiliations with similarly fraught social and political events and situations worldwide. It thus stages a critique of the structure of feeling that Said has referred to as the "quasi-religious authority of being at home among one's people."[19] We might say of Zarina and Hatoum that each produces a distinct visual language for an unredeemed, secular, and *damaged* life, a life lived on the verge of disappearance but with a strange resolve and repudiation of oblivion.

This paper originated as my Clark Lecture at the Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute in spring 2009. I am deeply grateful to colleagues at the Clark for providing me with that energizing research atmosphere and to Michael Ann Holly, Keith Moxey, and Marc Gottlieb for asking probing questions on that occasion. My thanks also to Andrea Gyorody for her capable and uncomplaining research assistance. Finally, I am humbled by Zarina Hashmi's generosity—many thanks to her for correcting my mistakes, and for a lovely afternoon and evening in her studio spent poring over her prints. Published earlier in Saloni Mathur ed., *The Migrant's Time: Rethinking Art History and Diaspora* (Williamstown: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2011).

[1] See Aamir R. Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). For Arendt, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 3rd ed. (1951; repr., New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1979).
[2] See Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*, trans. Anna Bostock (1920; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); and Linda Nochlin, "Art and the Conditions of Exile: Men/Women, Emigration/Expatriation," *Poetics Today* 17, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 317-37.
[3] Zarina trained in the 1960s and 1970s at Stanley William Hayter's renowned Atelier-17 in Paris and with Toshi Yoshida in Tokyo.
[4] Edward W. Said, "The Art of Displacement: Mona Hatoum's Logic of Irreconcilables," *Mona Hatoum: The Entire World as a Foreign Land* (London: Tate Gallery Publishing, 2000), 15.
[5] Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 335.
[6] See Erich Auerbach, "Philology and *Weltliteratur*" trans. Maire Said and Edward W. Said, *Centennial Review* 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969 [1952]): 1-17.
[7] Said, "The Art of Displacement," 17.
[8] Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 290.
[9] I shall return below to an important exception to this rule.
[10] See Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations," in *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange*, ed. Seyla Benhabib et al. (New York: Routledge, 1995).
[11] See Aamir R. Mufti, "Reading Jacques Rancière's 'Ten Theses on Politics': After September 11th," *Theory and Event* 6, no. 31 (2003).
[12] Ranu Samantrai, "Cosmopolitan Cartographies: Art in a Divided World*," Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* 4, no. 2 (2004): 168. Emphasis added.
[13] See "Letters from Home," in *Zarina Hashmi: Counting 1977—2005*, exh. cat. (New York: Bose Pacia, 2004).
[14] Ibid.
[15] See David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).
[16] Both attitudes toward him are expressed, for instance, by Jawaharlal Nehru in his canonical account of the rise of Indian national consciousness out of the long sweep of Indian history, *The Discovery of India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 343-48.
[17] See Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony*.
[18] See, for instance, the pioneering study by Linda Nochlin, "The Imaginary Orient," in *The Politics of Vision: Essays on Nineteenth-Century Art and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 33-59.
[19] See Edward W. Said, "Introduction: Secular Criticism," *The World, the Text and the Critic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 16.

Tom Molloy, *Borderline*

INTERVIEW WITH IRIT ROGOFF

Hammad Nasar

Irit Rogoff is a theorist, curator, and organizer who writes and researches at the interstices of the critical, the political, and contemporary arts practices with particular reference to issues of colonialism, cultural difference, and performativity. She is the author or co-author of numerous seminal texts, and is a professor in the Department of Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, a department she founded in 2002. Her work across a series of new "think tank" postgraduate programs at Goldsmiths focuses on the possibility of exchanging knowledges across professional practices, self-generated forums, academic institutions, and individual enthusiasms.
Her relationship with the *Lines of Control* project goes back to 2006/7 when she supervised my Clore Research Fellowship at Goldsmiths, and I would like to acknowledge the formative role her input and ideas have played in the development of the project.

This discussion was recorded in London in December, 2011.
- HN

Hammad Nasar: I want to start with a reference to *Terra Infirma* [Irit Rogoff, *Terra Infirma: Geography's Visual Culture* (London: Routledge, 2000)] and pick out a couple of ideas that you specifically grounded your project in: "the epistemological inquiry that stresses difference," and the "dislocation of subjects and a disruption of collective narratives." Both of these were cornerstones for me in thinking about *Lines of Control*. And I want to ask you—looking back with the distance of more than a decade since the publication of *Terra Infirma*—where you are now in looking at both those ideas.

Irit Rogoff: I think that *Terra Infirma* was grounded in a critical engagement with two forces that seemed to me to be very detrimental to our ability to envisage the world anew—which is always the bottom line of any project for me—and that was nationalism and identity politics. And so the "epistemological inquiry that stresses difference" was a way of thinking about how to engage with questions of difference—not through identity but through produced bodies of knowledge and ways of knowing that are grounded in a particular kind of experience but that don't harden into a collective identity. Something with which one can then identify, producing lines of division based on identity, identification, empathy with direct experience, and exclusion of those who didn't have that direct experience. It really didn't seem to me to be a way to get into a much more pluralistic world, which was what we were hoping for.

The other part was a lifelong wariness of nationalism that has to do to a large extent with my own biography, but also with the evils done in the name of nationalism around the world. As I was writing *Terra Infirma,* the war in Yugoslavia was going on—another example of the horrors of nationalism and identity politics merged into one. And so at the time (I was writing the book in the late 1990s) I could quite easily identify what one needed to be critically engaged with if one were to move on. But also, and that's where it got interesting for me, that nationalism and the kind of identity formations that went with it were deeply grounded in a whole series of knowledges, and that those knowledges were direct results of colonial mindsets and colonial world maps. Geography as we inherited it in the late 20th century was really a colonial project that constantly mapped out the view from the center of a colonial empire outwards, towards its peripheries, and then through those kinds of mechanisms of mapping, proceeded to regulate the relations of subjects to places. And so there was a way in which colonial attitudes refracted through prisms of widely respected knowledges, such as geology and cartography, defined relations of subjects and places via relatively unexamined sets of criteria because they had somehow been legitimated through empirical knowledge.

HN: So in a way, what you are describing is the corruption of bodies of knowledge.

IR: I don't know if I would call it corruption, but I think that these questions had to be prised out of the bodies of knowledge, while not in any way expressing any consciousness of their foundations within a colonial heritage and a

colonial mindset. The heritage might have been pushed aside, but the mindset hasn't. The best place in the world to talk about cartography is still Oxford. So it hasn't shifted. That was the series of questions that *Terra Infirma* grappled with. But since that time, literature, film, and a huge array of cultural and social projects have informed our practices in interesting ways. It is a different moment now. It's the moment of globalization. It seems that those old questions that I started with a decade ago, I can almost invert. I can almost upend them. And so instead of subjects being forced into place and identity through bodies of knowledge, I am experiencing almost the exact opposite.

For example, this past summer at the Venice Biennale, I spent most of the time in the Roma Pavilion, which was a very interesting project, and I think it was only the second time in the history of the Biennale that Gypsies have had some kind of representation. And they, very interestingly, did not do an art exhibition. They did three days of testimonies. I tried to be there as much as I possibly could. And it was totally interesting, because rather than the geographical and cartographic bodies of knowledge that form Europe in a rather violent way—allocating particular spaces or non-spaces, or permissions or lack of permissions—their mobility and local engagements created the possibility of writing a new cartography of Europe.

When you sat there and listened to what they were calling "testimonies," the testimonies were by actual Roma people, but also covered every kind of activity that engaged with them in different locations. So architects, urban planners, anthropologists and filmmakers, traffic wardens—an array of voices that were pragmatic, and slightly more conceptual engagements on the ground. And suddenly the Roma with their mobility—the way they affect European urbanism, the way they redefine waste land within an urban setting, the way they show up the limitations of a grid or an infrastructural basis for an urban inhabitation—become a place from which to rewrite cartography, rather than being victims of an aggressive and violent cartography that always relegates them to the margins of non-belonging, non-rights and non-participation.
This is one example of how the last decade has been fantastically rich in enabling and empowering people interested in these questions (as we are) to think not purely in terms of the struggle with top-down powers that define everything, but with bottom-up knowledges, partly experimental, partly theorized, that allow us to rethink maps of what we think we know. This is one development that I think is absolutely superb, and the other is that huge conundrum that we call globalization, which I am really just starting to try to understand. This has to be done in a different way, because the models that we have available to us for reading globalization are largely economists' models—labor-driven models, capital-driven models—that have to do with the movement of bodies and labor and goods and finances, the spread of multinational production and multinational finance. Obviously, this is a necessary body of knowledge; but at the same time it doesn't quite allow us to know the world from the perspective that we are interested in. I have been starting to think about globalization in terms of other criteria. So we started a new MA program this year [at Goldsmiths] called Global Arts.

HN: I remember many years ago you were thinking about calling it International Art.

IR: Yes, I know, it has become necessary to call it Global Arts because it has become necessary to somehow intervene within the debates of globalization and to insist on a really different register. And it's tough, because it's politically such an important and urgent topic, and the scale of it is so large and it's so difficult to get one's head around that without being totally abstract.

HN: So how does one teach Global Arts?

IR: This is what I have been thinking about. First of all, how to begin to move it in other directions—to be not so economics-driven, finance-driven, labor-driven, goods-driven; instead, to create models from a perspective I am trying to call *affective regimes* or *regimes of affect*. Which is to marry subjectivity with something more structured, more institutional, more engaged with actual power and influence. What I don't want, and what tends to happen in the art world, is that the economist model becomes the greater reality. A friend of mine, an economist, always calls it the Greater Reality Model. You can always announce that yours is the greater reality because it has more direct impact on the material conditions of people's lives. I don't want a division between the economist model as a greater reality, and the margins of

subjectivity and feeling. To me that seems a very disempowering division. And it also relegates culture and the arts to a purely reactive position. Finance, economy, industry, labor, migration—they do what they do, and we react to it. We don't want to be in a reactive position. There are horrors in the world, which we have to take on board, but that doesn't mean that we are reduced to being reactive.

I started thinking about this notion of affective regimes of globalization and how one could build these up in an intricate model that is not purely empirical—that is made up of emergent realities in different parts of the world, along with a set of textures. And then to apply that model to start thinking about the art world that is moving artworks around the globe. This, for me, is the least interesting part of that world, but there is a set of local schemes around development and gentrification that are linked to it. So there is art that gets collected around the globe. It then meets up with a set of laudable or not so laudable local demands for development, urbanization, and gentrification, and cultural diplomacy (of wanting to enter the sphere of civilized nations, when you yourself have quite a dodgy track record in human rights or censorship). Art finds itself in these odd nooks and crannies, and it can negotiate that, in what for me is an uninteresting way, by saying that it will collaborate only with laudable projects that are beyond reproach. Or it can become a kind of fertile ground for things to happen. This kind of cultural globalization, which is partly contaminated, and partly just import-export with many points in between—that interests me.

Something else that interests me is the notion of trans-identification: the possibility of identifying with something that is not your identity or your experience or your knowledge of the world or your positionality, and taking it into another context. Which, I think, is one of the things that happens all the time with globalization. There is a really interesting set of mobilities, for example, around television and film melodrama coming from emergent cultures—India, Egypt, Turkey, Latin America—that are then shown all over the world, except in the West, and give rise to incredible models of trans-identification.
When I was a child in Israel, the woman who looked after me was Iraqi. She was part of an immigration that came in the 1950s. And so she had been torn out of a really immersed life within Arab culture. In Israel, she was of course barred from seeing Egyptian films, Iraqi films, whatever else she would have seen in Iraq. So she took me to see Indian films in the afternoons. There was a film with Shashi Kapoor called *The Nomad* [*Awara* (1951)], which I could sing from beginning to end at the age of five, in Hindi! (Laughs) ... because this woman took me to see them.

HN: Yes, I have had Chinese engineers singing and whistling Indian tunes to me in the unlikely setting of a Swiss business school on Lake Geneva.

IR: So melodrama becomes this extraordinary site of trans-identifications, where certain kinds of hardships and fairly traditional narratives find voice, and these are interesting as notions of both popular and high culture. Or the story I told you earlier about the Roma pavilion at Venice that thrilled me. My experience was not on the level of empathizing with Gypsies across Europe and their real suffering, but as somebody interested in geography and cartography, whose understanding of where you map from was changing quite dramatically through this experience. Here we have the relational geography of Europe. Gypsies are almost everywhere. One could map Europe through the Roma rather than through ethnic identities, national identities, or post 19th-century borders. They could link to migration maps, they could be a whole mapping model of their own, and so this is a kind of trans-identification, which is not the melodrama model. The melodrama model is trans-identification on a level of hardships and experience, but the Roma-model is trans-identification at the level of perceiving, or of knowing something.

HN: But in a way, the Roma model is a model of exception. I remember having a conversation in the early 2000s with a cultural producer around issues of identity politics. And particularly at this moment—post September 11 in the US and post July 7 London bombings in the UK—where faith and race started to conflate, where the color of your skin trumped the color of your passport. And the comment that came back was, "No, no, identity politics is so over! It's so '80s." But you know, one could argue that identity politics has never had as much bite as it has right now. Whether you look at the Roma, or whether you look at ability to get artists to come to the UK for residencies, or look at quotas for Indian engineers

in Silicon Valley.

IR: I would argue that migration politics (which is what we are immersed in here right now) and identity politics are not the same. Behind identity politics was the coalescing of emergent minority identities, with certain claims on the world. What we are experiencing now are strategic and calculated neoliberal models that are about preserving the resources of Europe for Europeans. It is very obvious that Europe needs a large number of migrant workers to survive, in terms of its labor force, but doesn't wish to recognize that. And it is cynically producing migration policies that have to do with not sharing resources and not acknowledging prior relations elsewhere.

And it leads me to the third thing I want to say about globalization: It is not that I actually know how to do any of this. I am starting. I am starting very nicely in the context of a class, with people from all over the world, as our class used to be, and we start to figure it out. But what is really important to me—and I am struggling with—is that the discourse on globalization consistently privileges circulation and speed of mobility and has lost its links with the histories and theories of colonialism.

One of the things I am trying to figure out is how to re-introduce post-colonial theory into the discourse of globalization, but in a different way, because it needs to serve other purposes. Precisely what are we talking about? Let's say you have an incredible set of calculated, cynical, and strategic migration policies that don't acknowledge any previous links and relations of Europe with anywhere else in the world. Now post-colonial discourse opened that up and created long lines of shared histories, for example, the wonderful body of work by Amitav Ghosh, all his books and in particular his *Ibis Trilogy*. He is working at the level where language breaks apart and shows how you can't have English without Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, and Chinese. It just doesn't exist as an internationally circulating language.

This whole notion of the King's English in the realities of colonialism is a joke. And so what he's doing is something incredibly valuable: He is showing that you cannot ethnically cleanse language. Within language you can't make the separations that you are trying to make now through nationality, citizenship, migration policies, rights, and exclusions. To me this speaks of a need to bring back those long lines of entanglement, but to bring them back in a way that is far more complex, far quicker in its circulations and adaptations. I think that in the early phases of post-colonialism, the divisions between the colonizers and the colonized, were very hard and fast, and they served as a kind of base for post-colonial ethics, where the colonizers had to acknowledge colonial history. That's a phase that we don't need to go back to. But the deep entanglement—of these interlinked knowledges, inhabitations, languages and imaginary vocabularies—is essential to have within the discourse of globalization.

HN: I am just relating this to the work of *Lines of Control* where one of the streams we look at is the impact of colonization on the colonizer's identity. This is the question of what it means to be British. If you talk about globalization, the British East India Company was perhaps one of the first great multinationals. And if you accept the idea of claims—of legal claims—for reparations [for damage] that European nations applied to each other in conflicts, than there is of course a claim on Britain by all those who suffered physically, financially, and psychologically from the manner in which what we think of as Britain was built up. Amitav Ghosh's work, his *Ibis Trilogy*, lays bare the insidious supply chain of the opium trade and sketches out the sheer scale of the fortunes that were ploughed back into Britain (and not just Britain).

Part of the problem of Britishness being defined, or undefined or ill-defined, and everybody reaching to nebulous things like *freedom* as defining values, is around not recognizing or misrecognizing the *Indianness* that is integral to being British. And I use Indianness as a short form to looking at all these colonial claims, India being the biggest example. So you can be English, Welsh, Scottish, and Irish, but you can't be British unless you recognize your Indianness. The question that then strikes me is: Where do you go from there? How do you make something like that productive as a cultural practitioner? If the role of the cultural practitioner is to be more than just reactive, what we have done is looked at the problem, and it sounds provocative and interesting, but this affect lasts for about 30 seconds. Then what does one do? How does one animate it?

IR: I think that at the heart is maybe the need to adjust trajectories of power relations. For example, in our Global Arts course, one of the things we do is examine a whole set of exhibitions around us as case studies—exhibitions whose subject matter is, in a way, the new realities of a globalized age.

HN: Can you give some examples?

IR: There is this kind of discovery exhibition, like *Indian Highway,* [Serpentine Gallery, London, 2008-9] or *Unveiled: New Art from the Middle East*, [Saatchi Gallery, London, 2009] and, of course, an endless number of exhibitions of contemporary Chinese art. They don't interest me very much as art exhibitions, but they do interest me in the sense that I can read in them a whole set of negotiations around emergent power formations.

They are really about vibrant emergent economies that also have within them emergent art worlds that are new markets, whose newly rich are also deeply integrated into the cultural life of wherever it is that we're living in the West, so that it is very important to have a certain relation with them. This seems to me to be a very interesting model of globalization. Under the aegis of the voyage of discovery, what you have is the negotiation of a whole new set of power relations, which is really the subject of the exhibition. How does the art world in London and the powerful economy of India (with its new class of art collectors, gallerists, and curators) negotiate relations with a place like London or anywhere at the heart of Europe? That is what the exhibition is really about.

We have been thinking about a series of case studies on artistically less generative, less interesting models. But then also looking at some incredibly interesting models like the Istanbul Biennale (2009) curated by What, How & for Whom/WHW [the Zagreb, Croatia-based curators' collective]. WHW tried to put forward a kind of geography of the world through the reach and influence of communism. Not just pure colonialism, but also all of those countries in the Middle East and the Caribbean, and in Africa, that were not colonies but through special relations and . . .

HN: Spheres of influence?

IR: Yes, through operating spheres of influence were able to bring students to study in the Soviet Union, become acquainted with certain kinds of revolutionary or social realism, art forms, and value systems, and which then filtered back. It was a remarkable exhibition and it did a huge amount of work. For example, it connected the Soviet State with all kinds of new social movements post '60s, like Neo-Marxism and Marxist-Feminism all over the world. And mapped out extraordinarily complex geographies that challenge the awful legacy of the Cold War: the binary opposites between communism and capitalism, totalitarianism and democracy.

It is very important for me to look at case studies of exhibitions, because I think they allow us to begin looking or producing another modus operandus around globalization, another reading of its operations and another way into it.

HN: At the moment it seems like this is a hypothesis that you're going to test.

IR: We are working on it! Right now we have all those elements at work in the course, and if we don't quite know how to tightly integrate or weave them together, we will learn that. But what I know is that there are certain things that we absolutely insist on not losing, primarily postcolonial discourse (but in a different role than what it played in the '90s). And we also have to try to understand what these exhibitions are doing. There are so many of them, they are gigantic, they cost a lot of money, they take up a lot of imaginative space.

HN: Parallel to these alternative geographies of the Roma and the exhibition circulation, I want to turn to *hard* geographies—and I know you're not fond of objects, but let me describe one to you.

IR: (Laughs) No, no I want the record cleared here: I have no dislike of objects whatsoever. I dislike their privileging as the sole expression of art.

HN: I stand corrected. I am going to describe an object to you. It is by an Irish artist, Tom Molloy. He has taken commercially available little globes and painted on their surfaces with layers and layers of white enamel paint, and he has painted over everything apart from the manmade lines.

IR: Which are borders.

HN: Yes, which are borders. There are no markers for oceans, landmasses, anything. The only marks on this little globe are the manmade borders. And as you walk around globe, and as I did in a collector's house, I was really struck by the elegance of this gesture. The line seems to be engraved, because there are all these layers that were sanded down, so it is like a polished object, but the borders are buried. And of course giving the density of these lines, you can imagine what becomes of Africa, or the Middle East, or Europe, which come looming out of this globe. And I put this together with the work of Jerry Muller, the American historian, who has argued, "whenever the ugly head of ethno-nationalism is raised, partition is the least-worst option."

IR: Yes, you quoted him in your text. And I was puzzled by that. I wasn't entirely sure if that wasn't a bit simple. What do you think?

HN: It is very simple. But perhaps that's what makes it so alluring. It is what is happening if you go look empirically at the hard realities. And the hard realities are about Sudan and Kosovo and Palestine, and this *privilege* that the nation-state still grants for the people who live in it. This is the world that we now function in, where certain privileges rest within nation-states, certain privileges move beyond it and we're stuck in trying to occupy both these realms (i.e. of operating within and beyond the nation) so we have to navigate both, in a way.

IR: Yes, and I think you're right in insisting on what you call hard geographies because the idea of ripped-apart lives or the conditions of almost imprisonment that they dictate are in fact realities faced by millions of peoples. The problem is that neither the meta-theoretical nor purely lived experience are ever enough. You have to go back and forth.

There is a wonderful moment in Ursula Biemann's *Sahara Chronicle*, which is a really exemplary piece of work, I think. It thinks of the Sahara as so many inhabitations and movements. So what is considered a blank—because nothing can take place there, without water—is actually teeming with extraordinary experiences in mobility, for which we have no category and no proper name, because they don't belong to any nation-state. She has a long interview with a very remarkable man, who is Tuareg and was one of the leaders of the Tuareg rebellion against Morocco, was armed to the teeth by various supranational powers, but now is using his knowledge and his hardware to smuggle people across the Sahara. And it is not a rebellion gone cynical; it is another way of undoing things. It is very interesting in that it is a business but also another way of destabilizing things.

Sahara Chronicle is full of incredibly interesting things. There is an interview with a woman from Mali who says Europeans have brought stability to the borders by limiting the movement of non-Europeans. She was talking about the fact that in order to stabilize borders in Europe and make them more impregnable to migrants from Africa, the movement inside Africa has become extremely restricted at the behest of the European Union. So movement inside Africa, which was very fluid, where people could cross borders without passports, and families that had been ripped apart through colonial impositions were able to stay in contact with one another, can no longer do so. And so you realize that the cost of your borders is not borne by you: It is not you standing in a queue to show your passport to an immigration officer at Heathrow; it has to do with the virtual imprisonment of people in other countries, moving not necessarily towards Europe but inside their own continent because they are bearing the cost of your impregnable borders. Because the easier it is for them to move towards a point of departure to Europe, like North Africa for example, the less secure are your own borders.

So these are for me complex geographies that require the lived experience and the meta-theoretical knowledge, all the time, together. And I don't think you can talk just in terms of hardship or just in terms of bodies of knowledge produced. But to go back to the Roma, I was thinking, and not in a romantic way at all, what if they are the real Europeans? What if we start from a point of departure that says they were the real Europeans? They have multiple presences in histories across Europe (and very long ones, hundreds and hundreds of years): their languages, cultural customs, and relations to landscapes. It is not about them having rights and not being excluded, and a certain kind of humanity of behavior towards people, and so on. What if we flip that around?

HN: That is an alternative model.

IR: It is an alternative model, and it requires a huge amount of adjustment, because it is about inhabitation rather than ownership or identification. "Inhabitation" is really important to me. I need to put it at the center of discussion all the time. So, all of this is making up the way I want to think about globalization, as a series of affective regimes.

HN: Inhabitation is interesting, because again—and you will forgive me the need to sink anchors into objects—there is a work that has been developed as part of this project by the Indian photographer Gauri Gill. During a residency in Kabul, she accidently came across the Sikh and Hindu community of Afghanistan. She later found a member of the same community in her native New Delhi, by chance. And over the course of several years she has—through assembling photographs taken in Kabul, in New Delhi, and then through testimonies of people, their own photographs, and workshops with children—looked at this shift in the habitation of people who have been living in Afghanistan for hundreds of years, as traders, who speak Dari, and who have moved to India because they are ostensibly Indian, but live without passports. There is a wonderful little line in one of the photographs, "When I sleep, I dream of Jalalabad." Their kids are called Kabulis. You are going back to this idea of inhabiting in-between-ness.

IR: This was something we really fetishized in the 1990s: in-between, hybridity . . .

HN: Yes, this whole Homi Bhabha . . .

IR: Yes, and I think I know why it was attractive. It was attractive to me as well, but I feel a need to move beyond it. And I think that inhabitation interests me because it's another way of being in place, one that doesn't depend on ownership, belonging, or identification. It creates a huge amount of facts and textures on the ground. The problem with hybridity and in-between-ness was, it was always absolutely geared and linked to the subject, but I think with inhabitation, what you got is foods and textiles, sounds and literatures, and stuff that starts circulating out of inhabitation. And it is there but it is not there, and it is not the product of ownership, of legitimacy, and it is very hard to identify with for somebody outside of its particularity.

HN: And how does this play with one of the other things that you talked about in *Terra Infirma*, this idea of "zones of disidentification" or "No man's land." Because in a way that is much more about a place and that, too, could be inhabited.

IR: I think it is. Anshuman Dasgupta as part of his Ph.D. is working on a series of borderlands, within Pakistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere. And it is yielding some very interesting things. What is so interesting is that we are so ingrained in our understanding of borders—precisely what you call Lines of Control—as tools of division and containment. In every way, they produce divisions between entities and they contain those entities on both sides, without allowing them to mix. And actually border inhabitations, as zones of dis-identification, are where the fault lines of that division and containment start to produce a whole set of other things, quite rich and interesting. In a funny way, people pay less attention to this, to being on this side or that side of the border; because it has economies, because they're porous, because of weird little things that float in and out of both sides. So even if the subject—the legitimated, passported, citizenized subject of a particular given identity—can't move, God knows other things will, like in Amar Kanwar's *A Season Outside*. There, the rice sacks still move.

HN: Yes, the Kanwar reference is interesting. I don't know if you've come across a piece of writing called *Toba Tek Singh*. It's by the Urdu short story writer Saadat Hasan Manto, and Kanwar refers to it, as did Nalini Malani in her piece, *Remembering Toba Tek Singh*. It is a very short piece that has yet to find a good English translation. It is set only a few weeks after the Partition, when as part of the division of assets and peoples between the two nation-states, India and Pakistan come to the exchanging their respective populations of lunatics. So the story is set in a particular asylum in Lahore where a Sikh lunatic is being taken to the border. It describes the predicament of how people understand what is India, what is Pakistan. They ask themselves, "If I was in India before, how am I now in Pakistan? And where is Toba Tek Singh?" That is the name of a town, which from its name you would imagine to be in India, but it is in Pakistan. And this Sikh man, who is being sent across the border, refuses to go, and plants himself in No Man's Land. The story ends with him dying on the spot. This is also I think the central spirit that very much infuses Kanwar's *A Season Outside*.

IR: Yes, that's wonderful. I think it is a wonderful story about two different logics that are trying to integrate and of course can't. You could take it all the way to Deleuze's notion of schizo-analysis. It is the counter logic, it is the one that uses irrationality, confusion and disorientation, and so on, in order to produce another logic, not the hegemonic one. So it is a wonderful example. But I think also the business about zones of identification are the kind of practices that escape identity and escape regimes of control, and bleed in funny ways across areas that look so polarized, and so policed. As long as dis-identifications are not just geographical, they are also spheres of activity, of intellectual work, that is interesting. For example, I've completely lost interest in the notion of interdisciplinarity, which seems to me to be like a grouping of nation-states, more or less. And I think only in terms of *undisciplined* work, not transdisciplinarity, interdisciplinary or super-disciplinary, just undisciplined work, because that is where a zone of dis-identification takes place. You don't spend your life saying, "In sociology we do this, but in anthropology we do that; in literary criticism this, but in art history that." You get on with it. And you produce an undisciplined field and that is a zone of dis-identification and immensely productive.

HN: I love that idea of the *undisciplined*, and perhaps that is a good jumping point to talk about what art does. What does cultural practice do in this undisciplined way to think through these notions and be alive? Let me anchor this again in your previous writings: the work of "art at its best is not to objectify, not to pretend to speak to some international audience, nor to pretend to be doing some kind of social work or reporting or ethnography." It's an articulation that art is some kind of multifaceted tool and one can never understand whose hand it ends up in, or whose hand it is most useful for. But what this avoids doing, is saying what it is. And I wonder if it is productive to try and actually say what it can do.

IR: Well, I wouldn't want to say what it is, because I don't want to be pushed to the wall with definitions. One of my greatest preoccupations at the moment, I have just started literally this week, is called "The Art World." It is a mapping project that tries to understand all that circulates and operates under the aegis of art. I think to a certain extent it is a word that has lost its meaning completely, because it stretches from some sacred, prized objects of the western canon and the global art market in some fancy museum, to 10 people conducting a reading group with smudgy Xeroxes in a basement. Both of them are art practice. And I can't negotiate the distance between them. I have a need now, to just map it out and show the immense plurality of practices that constitutes something called the Art World. So you know, making objects and organizing and conversing and reading, publishing, disseminating, writing, researching, it's all art. So one can't say what it is, because I know it to be 20,000 different things.

What it can do is address a more interesting question. For me, and I can only speak for myself, one of the things that it's been able to do is to draw me into problematics through producing a curiosity. It seems to me to enable stimulating curiosity through direct lines of approach, such as the study of world politics or world economics or the study of migratory movements or the flow of resources that I wouldn't necessarily be that interested in. I can't see myself sitting and thinking for hours about the movement of oil around the globe, but when I see Ursula Biemann's *Black Sea Files*, I begin to understand the way in which that flow of oil, in this case through a new pipeline that's bringing oil from the Black Sea, is crossing a whole series of countries, and that locally, as it gushes through the pipeline, it affects a community's life and landscape and practices; so it is operating as a global economy, but it is also operating in a whole series of micro-political shifts on the ground. That is the kind of composite curiosity that really interesting art practice can produce.

HN: You are describing art as an example of an undisciplined practice.

IR: Yes, art for me, at its most interesting, is completely undisciplined practice. And what I've loved about the last decade is that it has become more and more undisciplined. The level of permission that people give themselves, to deal with urgent and important issues in the world through myriad unorthodox methodologies, is thrilling. The writing, re-writing and further re-writing of landscapes with different levels of meaning, significance and knowledge—that is something art can do.

I collaborate with Relli De Vries in Tel Aviv, who is a landscape architect, geologist and artist—someone else with a whole bundle of knowledge.

And she has done a couple of projects that are absolutely fantastic because they produce interesting confrontations between inherited material, knowledge and realities, and imaginative possibilities.

She has one project, in which she takes the region of the eastern Mediterranean, which colonialism divided very much in the way Africa was divided. The Berlin Congress divided the Middle East along the lines of longitude. So if you look at the map of the Middle East, it's lines of longitude that make up the borders of the emergent nation-states in the wake of the British and French Empires. As somebody who is deeply involved in geology, she is trying to counter that geography with another one of latitude that stems from the Syrian-African fault line, which is a continental rift. The entire region is also split horizontally through the Syrian-African fault line. She producing really interesting material: models of the fault line, what it cuts across, the things that it connects, which in terms of *realpolitik* are worrying entities. I find this full of possibilities, and it gets me into questioning continental rifts and seismic fault lines at the level of the imagination, at the level of political possibilities, and I think that is really exciting.

She has another brilliant project about a plant called Akkub. Zionists studied it, classified it, made an endangered species out of it, and classified it as a "bad" weed. Now it is a very popular plant in the Palestinian kitchen, apparently it tastes a bit like an artichoke, and the reason it's a bad weed is that during its period of seeding, it detaches itself from its roots and becomes a tumbleweed, so it is non-containable, it crosses borders, does what it wants. It won't stay in place. And she has been studying it and the way in which Zionist horticulturalism has taken it away from the Palestinian population, because it is a preserved and endangered species, and so you can't pick it. She did a wonderful exhibition about it, where one of the exhibits was something she took from the news. In Israel, there is something called the Green Commando, which polices endangered and conserved species of wildlife. So it runs around unpopulated landscape and makes sure that no one is picking or transplanting.

HN: So it is a force.

IR: It is some kind of government department and they run around in these green jeeps and they have uniforms and are called the Green Commando. And so they have caught a bunch of Palestinian housewives, you know in long peasant dresses, running around the hills of Samaria, picking the Akkub, and without the slightest sense of irony, they stand there and yell at them to go home! (Laughing) You know, the occupier force in their native land is preventing them from picking their native plant—and asking them to go home! So she has made this plant the site of so many dynamics from the Zionist project of classifying fauna and flora, and thereby anchoring it to a Jewish tradition, denaturizing it to the occupation of Palestine, to military rule—one little plant. These are the things that an art practice can do, that for me are just thrilling, and provide ways into questions that privilege something else.

HN: And also it goes back in a way to a corollary of creating lines of control. While they are, of course, about the urge to separate and contain, they also create the almost irresistible urge to cross. And in a way the Akkub seems like a model for how lines of control can be crossed. And one of the things that it is about is trying to relate a position, which is not legible to people in a way that it perhaps can become legible. And there are so many of them. Palestine-Israel is one, and if you think about Emily Jacir's work—the work we are showing at Cornell will be *Sexy Semite*, which if you recall has ads placed by Palestinian women in the personal pages of New York's Village Voice newspaper, looking for Jewish mates so that they can exercise Israel's "Right of Return" law.

IR: It's a very funny work!

HN: But let's now go back to the new course you have launched, Global Arts. What does that mean for the Geographies course. Is that still running?

IR: Yes, but it's become the core course for Global Arts and this is where we are exploring the questions about affective regimes that I was describing.

HN: If we look at your practice within the academy, there is Geographies, there is this Global Arts, there is the Curatorial/Knowledge [M.Phil./Ph.D. programme], these past 10 years, do you see Geographies slipping away or becoming subsumed? I am asking in the sense of looking back at those things we started with—the epistemological enquiry that stresses difference,

dislocation of subjects, and disruption of collective narratives.

IR: They are there, but I think that partly out of connections to whole sets of artistic and literary and social practices, I think I have been able to slightly get out of what now feels maybe a bit confining and a bit narrow. As I was doing this work, I also came across a lot of things that were happening around me and I learn from them all the time. I became aware of the really interesting and complex work that activist networks were doing in Europe around borders—how they inhabited borders to turn them into academies, to use them not by bringing knowledge from the outside to the border but just by using the border situation. There is this enormously rich archive of things currently happening that make the border more . . . not just about human despair or lines of division and control. So when you experience that, then you can't go back to nation-states and the way they cut off from one another. Because it is too narrow and too limited; there is more going on. I probably won't lose these things but they start relating to everything else in different ways, and they get renewed through this new relationality.

Right now I am thinking about a huge body of work on education. And maybe it is work that we can't go on with given the demise of institutional or educational structures that we are living through, because it was about how to take questions from the university or from a more formal world of knowledge production and position them elsewhere, and see if they do something else—address other people, rearticulate themselves, elicit other kinds of answers, other kinds of engagements. They comprised a series of exhibitions, forums and publications, and it went on for a really long time. And now I have a desire to not go back to that—partly because I think our realities have changed.

It's too soon for me to figure out what our new realities are. But we are just starting a new project called Global Education. I am trying to understand the degree to which educational practices of reading and writing, seminars, teaching, publishing and raising questions, have become an absolutely integral part of liberation, revolutionary, and protest movements across the globe in the last year and a half. Everywhere we look—in Tahrir Square, even in bunkers in Libya—there is some kind of an educational project going on. There are people lecturing and holding seminars or publishing little readers; and seeing this as a way not just to shrug off a regime but to rearticulate themselves and to arm themselves with new knowledge, to understand the world differently through what they are doing.

And this is enormously interesting, if you go to the Occupy camp at St. Paul's [Cathedral] you would not believe the amount of educational activity that's going on there: daily newspapers, daily lectures and seminars, an extraordinary amount of reading and writing going on everywhere. There is a place just around the corner here, that's the occupation of an abandoned UBS [the Swiss bank] office building and it looks like Goldsmiths. There are classes and seminars and people lecturing, tape recorders, somebody is talking and somebody is transcribing. The '60s is probably when this kind of thing happened last. But from everything I read about the student movement and global movement in the 1960s, there was one model, which was privileged as a way of taking over from capitalism and the military-industrial complex—a kind of Neo-Marxist model. That is not true now. There isn't just one model. There are different situations in different places that people are protesting: totalitarian regimes, profound injustice, rampant capitalism and others. There are different situations linked in an interesting way, but not sharing one single . . .

HN: Ideology?

IR: Yes, ideology. They are sharing all kinds of values, one of which is self-education as a way into globalization, and this is very interesting to me. I've been thinking about this for a few weeks now and gathering my partners in different places in the world and thinking what kind of formats it might take. I think it should be anything but a book: so that nothing gets lost, and so that emergent relations between them renew things. I'm sure you know this from your own work. You are doing this or that project and they seem disparate, you are interested in them, but you can't quite see the connections; and then suddenly a world of connections emerges. And that's where I am at the moment—suddenly connections are emerging between my projects dictated by events in the world. And that is a very interesting, thrilling, place to be.

HN: It seems like a very good place for us to stop.

Daren Kendall & Gaby Wolodarski building
Noa Lidor's *Wailing Wall*

Photography: Bernard Yenelouis

NO MAN'S LAND / EVERYBODY'S LAND

Nicole Wolf

A short series of documentary works by filmmakers based in India, and held at Cornell Cinema in conjunction with the exhibition *Lines of Control* at the Herbert F Johnson Museum of Art, spring 2012.[1]

> Last night I dreamt of this river. Come monsoon and it swells with defiance. Playful, unruly and rebellious it refuses to circumscribe the land on its either side. It runs amok upsetting all and assuming nothing except its own freedom. Seeing it make a mockery of its given role of a boundary, even I want to re-draw my maps every season.
>
> From *Temporary Loss of Consciousness*, at the Padma River, India-Bangladesh Border

No Man's Lands / Everybody's Lands presents a short introduction to the prolific filmic responses towards the politics of lines being drawn, manifested and violently fought between people, lands, practices of belief and ways of being. The legacies of partitions have occupied South Asian documentary filmmakers particularly during the last 10 years and in the vogue of trying to find adequate narrative and aesthetic forms to address very current communalist politics and state violence. The non-fiction films were chosen not only for their specific contributions to those dense cinematic interrogations but also for their defiant gestures. In their approach, their narratives, and their audiovisual ways of speaking these films counter, ignore, or redraw dividing lines and thereby follow directly, and indirectly, Saadat Hasan Manto's literary proposal of a "no man's land"—a refusal of a given logic and order of the sensical and the non-sensical.

Temporary Loss of Consciousness (Monica Bhasin, 2005) works with and expands upon this conceptual starting point by interrogating the unruly movements and permeabilities of lines, both politically and in the form of the film's poetics. As an essayistic exploration, Bhasin's work foregrounds the personal through narrative recollections and descriptions of current ways of living migrant lives, while consciously addressing the fragility of the testimonial itself and the problems posed by its standing in for the truth of critical events. The film's experimental negotiation between the multiple legacies of the 1947 Partition paves a path to speaking audio-visually about the more recent carnage against the Muslim population in Gujarat in 2002.

Way Back Home (Supriyo Sen, 2003) gives an exceptional account of the Partition of 1947 by epically weaving a nation's history through the personal memories of the filmmaker's parents. Triggered by their return to a home that they left 50 years ago, Sen's parents relive their experiences in the present and evoke the depth of dormant recollections that impinge, often unspoken, onto the fabric of peoples' everyday lives. The journey-like character of the film engenders reflections on the relations between landscape and history, the fabrications of national borders, and what constitutes each person's sense of life sustaining relations.

Tales from the Margins (Kavita Joshi, 2006) and *Word Within the Word* (Rajula Shah, 2008) each enact defiance. Joshi cautiously presents the female body's residual strength without further repeating a mediatization that makes a spectacle of resistance. In this way, the camera does not perpetuate violence, but brings into the audio-visual experience the power of the will to sustain a political choice.

Shah, on the other hand, enters a dialogue with life philosophies that are seemingly far from the realities of contemporary urban life. She affiliates otherwise disparate elements—rural and urban contexts, experiences of different generations, and varied educations and occupations—through a visual language that sets these on an equal ground. A philosophical and meditative cinematic experience on the value of equality that carries a quiet, yet powerful political narrative.

[1] This series is an excerpt and extension of a larger program presented at Peace Niche and T2F in Karachi (see details: http://www.t2f.biz/no-mans-land/), on the occasion of *Lines of Control* in Karachi (January 2009). Many thanks go to Green Cardamom for making both programs possible.

FILM SCHEDULE

7:15pm - February 21st – Film Forum
Schwartz Center

Way Back Home / Abar Ashibo Phire
Director: Supriyo Sen
English (subtitled), 120 min, 2003, India

In 1947, after a protracted struggle, India achieved freedom at the cost of dividing the nation in two, thousands of people were killed in the wake of violent communal riots, and millions of people became refugees. The director's parents too had to leave their ancestral home for an unknown future. After more than 50 years they are returning to their homeland in Bangladesh. The film is about this journey and addresses the complexity of memories and the sense of history that arises from personal recollections. *Way Back Home* expands the personal into a collective and shared memory.

4:30pm – March 1st
Willard Straight Theatre

Temporary Loss of Consciousness
Director: Monica Bhasin
English (subtitled), 35 min, 2005, India

Criss-crossing the boundaries of internal and external spaces of people living in exile, the film explores the ideas of borders, boundaries, limits, and forbidden areas to touch upon migrant conditions in the world today. It locates itself in the Indian subcontinent, and tracks the Partition of India of 1947 into post-colonial/partitioned times. The film is constructed via the juxtaposition of several elements: found footage of Independence/Partition 1947; abstractions of abandoned spaces or places of refuge; and constructed narratives of refugees who speak of longing, belonging, home and honor, loss and betrayal, boundaries and crossings. The film gives voice to some of the most affected communities in the region through their own spoken languages.

This film emerged, not just from a desire to express the trauma and disjunction of people experiencing political borders, but as a means to visually express and resonate with their emotional landscape.

Tales from the Margins
Director: Kavita Joshi
English (subtitled), 23 min, 2006, India

Twelve women disrobe publicly on the streets of Manipur in protest; for more than six years a young woman called Irom Sharmila has been on a fast-to-death demanding justice, kept under arrest, and forcibly nose-fed. Why are the women of Manipur using their bodies as their battlefield? Manipur is a state in India's Northeast region, ravaged for decades by insurgency and violence. The Indian government has attempted to crush the insurgency through its military might while shielded by undemocratic laws. Yet little is heard about Manipur and its troubles across the nation's landscape. This is a place that mainland India has marginalized and that the world has forgotten. The film finds a sensitive and poetic language to address the distressing human rights situation in one of India's borderlands, while honouring the extraordinary protests by its women and their commitments to achieving justice and peace.

7:15pm – March 6th - Film Forum
Schwartz Center

Word Within the Word / Sabad Nirantar
Director: Rajula Shah
English (subtitled), 74 min, 2008, India

The film looks at how the Word resonates in and out of ordinary lives across centuries. Beginning from an everyday cloudy monsoon morning in the city of Bhopal, it travels to Malwa, Madhya Pradesh, the hub of tribal India and the second home of Pt. Kumar Gandharva, one of the greatest musicians of our time and known for his renditions of the Bhakti mystic Kabir's poetry and philosophy. Here, within the fast altering fabric of a challenged rural life, we encounter common people, age-caste-gender regardless, fighting hard to earn a square meal daily, yet keeping music alive at the bosom of a gnawing fate. Far beyond the scope of any intellectual resolve it is at once a refusal to die, and more significantly a bid to seize eternity from historic annihilation. *Word Within the Word* is a crucial gateway to the India we are fast forgetting, one that is difficult to classify and categorize but simpler to understand if you hear its common folk talk. *Sabad Nirantar* creates a human landscape, an Everybody's Land, within which one can aspire to come to terms with one's contemporary dilemmas stemming from learned responses to fragmented dreams.





Sophie Ernst, *HOME*

PROPOSALS FOR A MEMORIAL TO PARTITION

Murtaza Vali

Commemorating history's largest mass migration, one that was marred by horrific violence, is a somewhat tricky proposition. First, there was no clear distinction between perpetrator and victim as both "sides" raped and killed and were raped and killed; guilt and victimhood were hopelessly intertwined across newly formed borders. Second, the violence was not delimited, temporally or geographically, but unfolded over more than a year and at various sites across a large swath of the Subcontinent. As such, there was no *single* traumatic event. Given these conditions, it is not surprising that a memorial to Partition currently does not exist. And given the multitudes affected, a *single* memorial will always be inadequate.

Central to this project of collective mourning and remembrance is the vexing question of whether such trauma allows for commemoration, and if so, how? Clearly a memorial in the traditional sense—a monument grand in scale, mired in nationalist claims, and firmly rooted in place and time—is insufficient for an event marked by death, dislocation and the severing of deep ties to land and community. Any memorial would have to attend to the fact that trauma resists representation and, as such, is easily elided, can only be alluded to, and though repressible is bound to return eternally. In an attempt to address these historical lacunae this project collects "Proposals for a Memorial to Partition" from artists, architects, writers and other cultural practitioners. By gathering together many such proposals this project hopes to uncover the matrix of political, psychological and physical conditions that determine and limit the specific forms a memorial for such an event must take.

My idea of what might constitute a proposal, let alone a "memorial," is expansive. A proposal presents limitless potential and endless possibility. It is preliminary, speculative, tentative, a suggestion, something put forth; and this exploratory nature of the proposal is key. The solicited proposal can describe a "memorial," or function as a "memorial" itself. It can include an idea, action or ritual. It can be made up of image, text, or some combination thereof. The image or text used can be original or appropriated from archives, collective and/or individual, historical and/or contemporary, popular and/or national.

In keeping with this open-ended spirit, the sorts of proposals sought are not definitive, not monumental in scale or rhetoric but, instead, present more modest, sketchy, ad-hoc, and even ephemeral gestures. Conversely, some might tend towards the overly elaborate, baroque even, veering toward the utopian, visionary and absurd, like the idea of a nation itself. Above all, the hope is that they will be traitorous, unsettling the hegemonic narratives and ideologies of nations somewhat cynically built atop the death and suffering of millions, by indicating how affiliations of all sorts—family, friendship, love, ethnicity, religion, language, politics, party—often transcend national boundaries. Simultaneously, some will serve as monuments to the sorts of exceptional figures brought forth by Partition: the refugee, the migrant, the exile, the denizen and even possibly, the nomad and the cosmopolitan, who are all guilty of forms of treason, forgoing affiliations in search of better lives elsewhere. And as such, the forms these proposed monuments would take would be as unsure, precarious, dislocated and de-territorialized as the lives of those they commemorate.

The six "Proposals for a Memorial to Partition" presented here are the first batch of what will be an eventual multitude, a collective gesture towards excavating the traumatic underbelly of nation-building in the Subcontinent.[1]

[1] This project's first iteration appeared in *Manual for Treason*, a multilingual publication prepared for Sharjah Biennial X (2011). I extend my gratitude to Rasha Salti, Haig Aivazian and Nida Ghouse, the biennial's curators, and to the Sharjah Art Foundation, for their support.

Fahd Burki, *Bequest*

Fahd Burki, *Sovereign*

KARACHI

Shezad Dawood

Proposal for a TV mini-series of 3 Feature-length episodes (270 mins, HD, colour, archival newsreel footage and Super 16mm—with saturated colours and a flourescent night time palette to allow different formats to blend)

KARACHI traces the rise and fall of Lala Rhukh, a Karachi gangster who arrived as an orphan in the 'City of Lights' post-Partition—one of hundreds of thousands of Urdu-speaking migrants or Muhajirs from various parts of the Subcontinent. Karachi, now one of the world's largest cities, is the birth and burial place of Pakistan's founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who settled there post-Independence. It has been wracked by political and ethnic violence, particularly since the 1980s, due to tensions between Muhajirs and native groups.

The story begins in the 1970s, an era of idealism and liberalism, with the first part seen through the eyes of Lala's youngest son, Younus. The country's young, indolent rich dance the night away at clubs. Bhutto senior, who, through the decade, seems to increasingly pander to the growing power of militant Islam, is executed in the turmoil of General Zia's military coup. Meanwhile, Lala, in his 30s, quickly ascends through the ranks of organised crime, from ordinary backstreet currency trafficker to right-hand man of crime lord Shehryar 'Babu' Khan. The first episode ends with Lala being sent to negotiate a heroin and arms deal in the un-policed zone at the border of the North-West Frontier Province.

Shifting to the 1990s, the second installment opens on Lala's ignominious murder of the now aged and ailing 'Babu,' consolidating Lala's power, his position further strengthened by the backing of the tribal warlord Sarwat Abdullah. This era presents new challenges to the tense power-broking in Karachi. Islamists start to gain popular support amidst the corruption of the second Bhutto regime. A new wave of specifically Pashtun immigrants arrive in the city and are either employed as guards or manservants by the city's elite or drift between Islamist factions, organised crime and the drug trade. This last convergence allows the alliance between Lala and Abdullah to take advantage of the new shifting and volatile ethnic mix in the city. Prostitution, kidnapping and extortion are rife. And while Lala descends into his own private hell of opium and black magic—frequently calling on the powers of divination of the old seer and witch Bilquis—he is forced into an uneasy alliance with the young, vitriolic preacher Shah Abdul Ghani once Abdullah dies and the tribal lands he controlled are in upheaval. This sequence closes with the relatively rapid conversion of Younus to religious radicalism, ending in his methodical dousing of his motorbike (a gift from his father) in gasoline, and setting it and himself alight in an act of martyrdom and ritual purification.

A shot of flames, the aftermath of a bombing in present-day Karachi, opens episode three. A third 'Bhutto' government is in power, with Asif Zardari serving as regent for Bilawal Bhutto, the son of the assassinated Benazir. Karachi has gone to hell. Gunfights and drive-bys between warring political factions are commonplace. Shah Abdul Ghani now wields tremendous power, despite his perverse sexual appetite (always behind closed doors but accompanied by blood and the bleats of lambs). Lala, meanwhile, regularly grieves by Younus's graveside, making a weekly stoned pilgrimage there with various henchmen. As the episode progresses Lala is forced into a power struggle with his eldest son Hamza, who is played off against his father by the seemingly un-aged witch Bilquis. It turns out her son was the first victim of Lala's rise to power and she wants an eye for an eye. Her plan backfires as Lala, much to his own surprise, kills Hamza when he, in a moment of weakness, comes seeking forgiveness from his father.

The final sequence shows Lala going off the deep end in an opium-induced vision of hell: haunted by the many he has killed as he is led, by a travelling circus troupe of midgets and leering transvestite dancing girls, to his ghastly fate—an eternity spent in the service of the devil—accompanied by an intense and affecting slide guitar score.

Shilpa Gupta, *100 Hand-drawn Maps of India*



The quote from Faiz Ahmed Faiz's poem 'In Search o
The brain is carved from pink marble and is 4 meter

f Vanished Blood' is translated by Agha Shahid Ali.
s long. The quote is in copper inlay.

Nalini Malani, *Memory Aid*

MAPPING OBSCURA
(memory and place)

Yamini Nayar

mapping obscura is a mobile memorial, a camera obscura that travels through landscape and into communities. Visitors are invited to enter the camera to compose photograms, arranging objects of personal significance against a background provided by the camera's shifting interior projections.

Traditionally, a camera obscura is a box or room with a lens embedded in one wall, through which an inverted image of the outside world is projected onto the camera's interior. *mapping obscura* is constructed from a large wooden shipping container with a lens installed in its ceiling. Through this lens, continuously shifting images of the sky are projected onto the interior floor.

Visitors to *mapping obscura* are asked to bring objects of personal history—snapshots and mementos—into the space. Working under a safelight, visitors arrange these objects atop a sheet of photo paper placed on the camera's floor. Once the lens cap is removed, the solid and opaque objects obscure parts of the image of the sky above projected downward onto the photo paper. The exposure fixes each particular constellation of objects as an array of blank, negative spaces, a series of hard-edged, graphic elements against a background of shifting views of the sky. However, the variable layering of objects and unexpected traces of light leaks during exposure are integral and expressive aspects of the process. Visitors may make as many photograms as desired, adapting their arrangements to the amorphous projections, to the subtle shifts in light within the room.

Objects are containers for memories. The associations for a given object are subjective, multiple and fragmented, and parallel the transience of personal memories. Yet, collectively, we recognize objects as placeholders for the past. In this way, memories take shape.

The images produced in *mapping obscura* attempt to cast memories, carried in objects, onto a sense of place. Details may be blurred or lost but the contours of the past etch themselves in different ways onto a shifting landscape. The memorial, and its resulting photo works, explore this tension and ambiguity, creating punctuated moments located somewhere between that which is fixed and that which is elusive.





Yamini Nayar, *mapping obscura* (sample images)

Seher Shah, *Cross Conference Scheme*

Seher Shah, *Cross Conference Scheme*

Image courtesy Project 88, Mumbai, India

Bani Abidi, *The Distance from Here*



Artists

Bani Abidi

Bani Abidi's practice is deeply concerned with state apparatuses and how power is performed upon civil society. Using the conventions of narrative filmmaking in documentary cinema, she constructs fictional moments that interrogate familiar happenstances—a traffic jam, a queue, a news bulletin—and highlight the ways in which social boundaries are enforced.

Security Barriers A-L

Presented as a series of diagrams labelled A to L, these are digitally rendered drawings of the various types of eponymous "security barriers" that appeared all over the Pakistani city of Karachi in the years following the War on Terror (2001-present). Designed to deny access and visually obstruct, as tools of "deterrence," they follow the familiar conventions of road traffic signage but are designed to contain and control the threat of targeted terrorist attacks.

This veritable catalog of objects from concrete slabs to shipping containers, stripped to their basic forms, highlights both their practicality—outside the British High Commission the slabs that protect from car bombs are also planters—and also their absurdity—one is designed so that cars are stopped while pedestrians can walk through. The work also hints at a more pernicious possibility. While increased control and surveillance challenge the civil liberties of common citizens and increasing inequity contributes to an increase in gated and secured enclaves, these designs could serve as prototypes for other cities across the world suffering similar security concerns. Even the shipping container, otherwise a symbol of international trade, can be repurposed to protect a street, in this case near the recently decommissioned US consulate.

The Distance From Here

The Distance From Here is part of a body of work—*Section Yellow*—that looks at the visa process, particularly referencing the tragic human consequences of the controlling and policing of national boundaries. While citizens of the "North" have enjoyed increased mobility, the citizens of the "global South" endure arduous queuing with their hand-filled forms in neat plastic folders in order to perform simple journeys—to visit a son, to attend university or get a job, to get medical treatment, to go on holiday to Disneyworld. While capital flows and takes flight at will, labour is increasingly restricted from natural movement.

The anxiety of following the directions correctly, or worse, of being rejected if a requirement is not met, is palpable in the space Abidi recreates: the waiting areas of an unnamed embassy in South Asia, perhaps India or Pakistan (whose draconian internal border controls have split families for generations). The queue begins outside, marked by clean yellow lines, where entrepreneurs make a buck from the tedium of waiting by providing notarization services or passport photos. Abidi often uses carefully selected props in her work, and here cheap elasticated neckties illustrate the difference between who the applicants are and who they are required to be in order to pass through the security gates. The areas they obediently walk through, the waiting in the sun, the final wait for a number to be called—is perhaps reminiscent of other more harrowing images of bodies in single file. And then comes the final heart-thumping moment when a request is either accepted or rejected. Once inside, the wait becomes interminable as applicants settle into purgatory, and the camera examines details and small gestures that both humanize the individuals and also draw attention to their loss of control over their destinies, and their resignation to the ritual humiliations that so many residents of the world are subject to.

Two of Two

Also from *Section Yellow,* these dual images serve as vignettes that highlight terse yet emotional moments from lives directly affected by forced restrictions on travel. A couple that cannot meet, the distance exemplified by windows in two different architectures, two different lights. A lost application form and a man who, on principle, will not file a fresh one. A suitcase unpacked for a journey that cannot be completed. In simple strokes, these combinations of image and text evoke believable personalities and their frustrations. While the torment of exiles and émigrés, or even of refugees and illegal immigrants, have often been explored in literature and the visual arts, perhaps more ordinary disruptions and discomfort are captured by these straightforward images of inanimate objects.

Nada Raza







Security Barriers A-L, 2008

The Distance From Here, 2010

The Distance From Here, 2010

Two of Two, 2010





THE DISTANCE HAD STARTED WEIGHING HEAVY ON THEIR RELATIONSHIP







Francis Alÿs

Francis Alÿs originally trained in architecture and urbanism, and this comes through in his artistic projects that examine the limits of the world as we live in it. Using deceptively simple interventions—such as walking with a paint can dripping paint in a line and leaving a traced line through the city of Jerusalem (*Green Line*, 2005)—he is able to open a space to reflect on absurd, impractical, and unjust boundaries and measures that are difficult to challenge directly. He is aware of the power of poetic and gestural movements, and performs these in several of his works, offering allegorical acts rather than formalism or explicit critique. His own presence in his works often serves as a reminder of simple human will and agency. His choice to live and work in Mexico is often interpreted as part of his practice.

The Loop was developed for the 1997 edition of *InSite,* a biennial "dedicated to the realization of bi-national collaborative arts partnerships among non-profit and public institutions in the San Diego-Tijuana region." The exhibition invites artists to produce commissioned projects in response to the urban space of the border region between the United States and Mexico.

Alÿs commenced a journey from Tijuana to San Diego without crossing the actual border, and instead took more than a month to trace a course around the Pacific Rim. The exhibited work consists of a globe sitting high on a shelf, banded by a loop. The red band refers to both his circuitous journey and the way in which our experience of geographical movement is contained and heightened by the inaccessibility of the object to the viewer. Visitors are offered a postcard, which provides both a route-map of his journey and a souvenir of its absurdity.

The Loop, 1997

The other side of the postcard is a photograph of the sea with a gently curving horizon, mirroring the spherical shape of the globe and accompanied by a few lines of text that explain the circular nature of the journey. It includes a gentle caveat, or perhaps a provocation: "The project remained free of all critical implications beyond the physical displacement of the artist."

The money that was intended for his artwork was instead used on a month's time in airplanes and airports in a belated state of flux. In notes to a friend that he emailed as he traveled, the artist writes, "The journey is shifting from a vain arty joke to a sentimental quest for redemption."

Reading through the log of cities that he traveled through with the ease of a European tourist or business traveler (Hong Kong, Tahiti, Rangoon, Vancouver) the irony is heightened when you consider that the wide arc of mobility that he draws around the Pacific Ocean is in order to circumvent a nearby border.
In spite of the discomfort of the larger journey, his position remains one of tremendous privilege, as he is able to meet visa requirements for these nations and pass through airports and transit lounges freely. An ordinary citizen from many of the countries he passes through would not be able to trace this journey at all, or with the same ease. The difficulties that Mexicans face in attempting to enter the US, and the elaborate processes of border controls generally, are quietly interrogated by Alÿs' modern odyssey, a journey that is completely impractical, but forms an elaborate artistic gesture of performance and protest.

Nada Raza

The Loop, 1997



Sarnath Banerjee

Sarnath Banerjee's work is anchored in the graphic form and finds expression in various platforms—as graphic novels published by mainstream commercial publishers, as tableaux of drawings and texts in art gallery contexts, and as animated films screened at film festivals. These different media all give voice to a singular aesthetic style that evidences no hierarchy between text and image, and favors offbeat, quirky, irreverent vignettes of sometimes-overlapping, sometimes-discontinuous mini-narratives that delve into the Indian urban condition. Banerjee's vigorous and raw style of drawing has been traced to the Kalighat style of popular painting in his native Bengal, and his subjects vary from the banality of the middle classes to arcane pockets of knowledge. His most recent and critically acclaimed publication, The Harappa Files, is an umbrella project that, in the words of the artist, is a "gigantic survey of the current ethnography and urban mythology of a country in the throes of great hormonal changes."

For *Lines of Control*, Banerjee has produced a drawing-based installation on the life and milieu of legendary South Asian wrestler Ghulam Mohammad Baksh, aka Gama Pehelwan (1882-1963). For more than a century in India and Pakistan, Gama's name was synonymous with strength. He was considered the finest exponent of the Persian style of wrestling (pehelwani) and remains the only known example of a professional wrestler who remained undefeated throughout his career. Although undefeated in the pit, Gama was displaced during the Partition. After several failed attempts at businesses and losing his children to various diseases, the great Gama died uncelebrated in a government hospital in Lahore (Pakistan), with no money except for a small pension provided by an unlikely Marwari benefactor from Calcutta (India), a member of a famous business family who himself once harbored the desire to become a wrestler—the famous industrialist G. D. Birla.

Banerjee's work takes the form of a collection of notes and journals from the archives of N. K. Mazumdar, "an indigenously trained historian of strength," which looks at both the exercise regimen and nutrition of Gama, and tracks the fortunes of his business ventures and those of his benefactor. Productively mixing fact with fiction, Banerjee takes a sideways glance at the interconnected histories of India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey through the unlikely lens of wrestling and the brand of masculinity that its exponents infused into the wider consciousness of people in the subcontinent.

Hammad Nasar



The Gama Nama

In 1950, a somewhat malnourished youth from Bengal enrolled in the Department of Nutrition and Food Chemistry in a university located in the heartland of present-day Haryana. His aim was to pursue a Ph.D. with a dissertation on the history of cholesterol in undivided India.

N. K. Majumdar's research into "The cultural history of low-density lipoprotein among wrestlers of pre-partition India" was conducted by looking at the dietary records of wrestlers. In time, he would narrow his research to the nutritional habits of one particular wrestler, Ghulam Mohammad Bux (Baksh), known as Gama Pehelwan, a wrestler who reached legendary status during his lifetime. The lure of Gama Pehelwan was so strong that five years later young Majumdar had abandoned the nutritional aspect of his project and become a full-time investigator of the myth of Gama.

From the outset, the project faced tremendous birthing pains. Even deciding on the title took NKM a good

many years. During this time, his interest in food chemistry waned as he became more fascinated by the life and rituals of his subject. As could be expected, a scholar abandoning a rather dull piece of research on the history of cholesterol for the more glamorous cultural anthropology of Indo-Persian wrestling, did not sit well with the academic establishment. Gama's name was synonymous with strength and virility among men of a certain generation in India and Pakistan, and therefore NKM's committee of supervisors considered the project too "popular" for serious academia. Only after much struggle and by renaming his project, Gama and the post-colonial construction of masculinity in modern India, did NKM manage to re-enroll in the department, and it took him nearly a decade to earn his doctorate.

The university, which was largely known until then for its agrarian scholarship, achieved a degree of international notoriety when Majumdar's papers were finally made public in the 1970s.

In 1991, as a young student of chemistry, the author of this report stumbled upon a transcript of NKM's papers. After some consideration, he put them away in order to focus his attention on the more ribald aspects of modern biochemistry. Several years later and after unsuccessful attempts at reviving his inglorious career in scientific research, the author resurrected the NKM papers. He reinterpreted the text and commissioned an artist to diagrammatize aspects of NKM's findings. This reinterpretation resulted in an encyclopaedia-like document of surprising lucidity that scans the life, times, and cultural influences of the great Gama.

Included in this exhibition are fragments from this collection, loosely called *The Gama Nama* (The Story of Gama).

On August 22, 1998, the renowned historian of strength and wrestling, academic Prof. N. K. Majumdar left for his heavenly abode. It took many years before government authorities got around to short-listing him for national awards.

He left behind a precious pile of indigenous scholarship. Chief among them, *Strong Men Down the Centuries*, has been out of print since 1978.



The Gama Nama, 2011



Kali Patang

Nirmala

Bhairavi

Chaiti

Indra

Padmini

Ragini

Strawberry

Rustam

Gulab

Agni

Malhar

Vandemataram

Tiger


Darakht

The Scissors
and other historic moves
in Indo-Persian wrestling
دین دین الهی
The Gama prayer book
by

Rustam-e-Zamana
by

Great Gama
and
the construction of
South-Asian masculinity

Farida Batool

Farida Batool often presents her photographs as sequences of moving images, employing the commercial technology of layered lenticular printing that allows images to be sandwiched together so a viewer can experience two or three variations of an image by moving the eyes across it.

An early work of this kind by the artist, *Line of Control* (2004) is an arresting image that at first appears to be an aerial view of a deep valley or chasm splitting a landscape. On closer inspection, it becomes startlingly apparent that the dark crease in the image is the separation between a male and a female body pressed tightly in an embrace. As the viewer changes his or her position, the image shifts to reveal the couple's hands coming together or moving apart.

Likening the landscape to a human body is a literary trope that appeared often in 19th century writing, especially in describing the topography of newly discovered lands. In imperial European rhetoric, the gaze of the explorer either cascaded over the contours of an essentialized or feminized landscape, or it enframed the native body, often perceived as animal or hyper-erotic, as a naturalized part of its habitat.[1] India, for instance, was considered to be feminine in colonialist thinking.

Batool's portrayal of brown-toned, naked bodies in an amorous embrace suggests the potential for human acts of defiance, the ability to resist the colonial lines of division that resulted in the formation of India and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Kashmir.

While this gesture may be interpreted as poetic or even literal in certain contexts, it is appropriate to point out that nudity in numerous public cultures is increasingly taboo, and therefore this image has the potential to shock. Conservative social and political ideologies thrive along the same divisive lines that gave birth to nations, encouraging discriminatory ethnic and religious groupings. In Batool's *Line of Control,* the erotic embrace is a transgression across these boundaries, a fertile act that could lead to the conception of new possibilities.

Nada Raza



Line of Control, 2004

[1] David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993)

Line of Control, 2004

Adam Broomberg & Oliver Chanarin

Mini Israel, 2006

Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin work collaboratively on projects that are realized as gallery exhibitions and/or print publications. Critically engaged with the burden of representation inherent to lens-based practice, they deploy the methods of documentary research to mine social and political histories. Their work is sometimes field-based, as in *Chicago (2006), The Red House (2007),* and *The Day Nobody Died (2009).* They also create art through excavations of archival material, as in *War Primer 2* (2011), their recent reinterpretation of Bertolt Brecht's 1955 archive of newspaper clippings.

Broomberg and Chanarin came across Mini Israel, a tourist attraction near Ben Gurion airport, while on a shoot for their project, *Chicago*. The artists had been allowed rare access into a replica of an Arab city in the Negev desert used as a theater for military rehearsals by the US and Israeli armed forces. This short video invites a contrapuntal reading, documenting a staging of a slightly different kind that seems less threatening, yet provides incisive insight into a nation's idealized notion of itself.

Exploring the Mini Israel representation of the quintessential Israel, Broomberg and Chanarin move their camera through the diorama as if it were life size, suggesting that belief in this version of the world necessitates a kind of tunnel vision, blocking out the larger realities outside.

As the camera takes us on a tour, it becomes evident that we are in a simulated world, similar perhaps to the Dutch attraction of Madurodam or even Legoland. Mini Israel's website proclaims, "See it all . . . Small!" and replicates in miniature many popular tourist destinations in Israel, presenting a model version of the model nation-state. Historical monuments and state buildings, modern urban architecture and tiny mechanical recreations of the transport systems and the recreational options residents enjoy, have been portrayed in detail. A couple tans by a pool, skiers enjoy the slopes, a football match is in progress and the crowd in the stadium performs a wave. There are plastic Arab figures too, praying en masse in Jerusalem while Jewish pilgrims stand bowed before the Wailing Wall. This is a 3-D picture postcard world, which in its promise to capture "it all" has even included cranes and buildings under construction, capturing the relentless industry and development required to create both the real, and in this case artificial, landscapes that characterize the urban vistas of Israel.

Checkpoints and barriers, the walls and lines that divide and displace, and the ammunition and military presence that make this perfect world possible, have not been included in this idealized miniature world. Perhaps these are not visible to the model-makers, or more likely deemed not relevant or suitable in this context, which is meant to inspire wonder and national pride. Soldiers appear, solemnly raising the flag while a plastic audience rises to the national anthem. Throughout the video, fragments of patriotic songs are heard in the background. However, signs of decay and the intrusion of nature can be observed even in this synthetic mise en place. The colored plastic signage on trucks and buses is starting to flake and peel, and as a solitary Arab figure stands on a sidewalk, large black ants pour through cracks in the ground.

Nada Raza

Mini Israel, 2006

Muhanned Cader

Muhanned Cader's drawings, paintings and collages echo Dadaist practices in their combination of marks and shapes, with fragments of images acting as ready-mades taken from nature or culled from magazines and art historical sources. Cader edits, combines and overlaps these ingredients to create works that transform the meaning of the original documents, often throwing up playful and uncanny juxtapositions and allusions.

In *Loudspeaker* (2006), commissioned for the inaugural Singapore Biennial, Cader used the image of a hand held loudspeaker to stand for the power represented by those who wield it. Through a process of witty abstractions and transformations, the mouth of one loudspeaker sprouts a preacher's beard, while another grows a serpent's tail. In *Coded and Loaded* (2010), he arranged groups of delicately crafted hieroglyph-like drawings into what resembles a multi-part jigsaw puzzle. The constituent shapes were drawn and mapped from images in printed matter—including Coomaraswamy's *Medieval Sinhalese Art*, *Artforum* magazine, *Infinite World of Fantasy Art*, *The Map Book*, and *Giotto to Durer*—and suggest an alternative narrative to art history: one that can be constantly rewritten through rearrangement.

His more recent work, *Flag I* and *Flag II (Unawatuna Beach, Sri Lanka* and *North Uist, Outer Hebrides, Scotland)* (2010), takes landscape painting beyond the literal representation of an observed natural scene. This is part of Cader's ongoing, two-decade long project of exploring the representation of landscape. *Flag I* and *Flag II* are painted on aluminum sheets, which correspond in size to the stipulated standard dimensions of international flags. The three bands of color allude to earth, water and sky, and to the tricolor design of the flags of numerous countries, but also represent a formal investigation into color field painting. The two paintings reference photographs the artist took in his travels in Scotland and Sri Lanka.

Today, thousands of tourists flock to places known for their "picture postcard" views, for example, Sri Lanka's photogenic coastlines. Cader strives to go beyond the clichés of commercialized landscape paintings aimed at tourists in order to create works that represent his own emotional response to the land. His paintings also hint at an underlying politicization of territory, acknowledging that throughout history land has been acquired or taken from indigenous dwellers by those with greater wealth or power. Cader wishes to reaffirm the human relationship to the land, which for him is a universal sign for all people living on the earth. *Flag I* and *Flag II* is an attempt, in the artist's words, "to spill the landscape out of the frame."

Hammad Nasar

Flag I and *Flag II (Unawatuna Beach, Sri Lanka* and *North Uist, Outer Hebrides, Scotland),* 2010

Duncan Campbell

Duncan Campbell unpacks recent social, cultural, political, and economic history by marshalling archival video material into hybrid formats to create a blend of documentary, fiction, and film-essay. His more recent works frame subjective historical explorations through the lens of specific biographical narratives. His chosen subjects for these narratives share a certain "off the beaten track" appeal: Northern Irish activist/politician Bernadette Devlin, who was the youngest-ever member of British Parliament; American entrepreneur John DeLorean, creator of the iconic gull-winged sports car immortalized in the film *Back to the Future;* and most recently, Hans Tietmeyer, the economist who served as the president of Deutsche Bundesbank, the German central bank. The works that "feature" them are not straight bio-pics; they serve as vehicles for exploring a certain time, place, or trajectory, through different models of historiography.

In *Bernadette* (2008), Campbell presents us with a portrait—his portrait—of Bernadette Devlin, who was elected to the British Parliament in 1969, at the age of 21. She combined a career in parliamentary politics (representing Mid Ulster) with street activism, and served six months of her term as MP in jail for her role in the occupation of a Catholic area of Derry. She emerges, unsurprisingly, as a contradictory figure—brilliant orator, champion of class solidarity, and flag bearer of a certain radical chic.

Campbell's choice to fashion his "portrait" largely from archival footage obtained from varied sources in England, Ireland, and America reinforces these contradictions, and underlines the difficulty of cobbling together a "truth" from multiple realities, a "messy" form about which the artist writes:

Bernadette, 2008

> I want to faithfully represent Devlin, to do justice to her legacy. Yet what I am working with, are already mediated images and writings about her. What I produce can only ever be a selection of these representations, via my own obsessions and my desire to make engaging art of her. My film is an admission of limitation, but I have too much respect for Devlin for it to be an expression of nihilism or irony. I am striving for what Samuel Beckett terms, "a form that accommodates the mess." I want to broaden the scope of the film to include this space and tension, which is typically excluded or concealed, and that is the reason for the overlapping strands in the film.

Hammad Nasar

DAAR

The Red Castle and the Lawless Line, 2011

Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, Eyal Weizman, Nicola Perugini

The Red Castle and the Lawless Line

In 1993 a series of secret talks held in Oslo between Israeli and Palestinian representatives inaugurated what was later referred to as the Oslo Process. Among its provisions, this process defined three types of administrative territories within the West Bank: Area A under Palestinian control; Area B under Israeli military control and Palestinian civilian control; and Area C under full Israeli control. When the process collapsed and the temporary organization of the occupied territories solidified into a permanently splintered geography of multiple separations and prohibitions, a fourth territory was suddenly discovered.

Existing in between all the others, this fourth territory was the width of the line that separated the others. Less than a millimeter thick when drawn on the scale of 1:20,000, it measured 5.5 meters in real space. This new, meandering strip of a zone, everywhere to be found, started interfering with the absurd legal geography produced by the Oslo Agreements.

Battir, west of Bethlehem and one of the best preserved and continuously inhabited villages in the West Bank, was the place where, at the end of 2009, the thickness of the line acquired a legal and political meaning for the first time. Regavim—one of several organizations of Jewish settlers that started lately to invert the "NGO and human rights culture of the pro-Palestinian left" in campaigning for "the human rights of settlers" and in "documenting their violations"—filed a petition against a Palestinian house, parts of which, they claimed, transgressed into Area C, under Israeli control. In a petition submitted to the Israeli High Court, the group demanded to the occupying authorities to demolish the house, or at least those parts of it that protruded into Area C. If there is a settlement freeze, they cunningly demanded, and if this freeze is enforceable on Jewish colonies in Area C, it should be "democratically and equally enforced." The house was, of course, not a simple house, but was nothing less than a castle built in neoclassical style in carved limestone and paid for by an eccentric US-based supermarket millionaire, originally from Battir. Its prominence on the landscape made it a clear target.

The petition triggered a process of producing new maps, each arguing for the precise location of the line in relation to the village's buildings, their gardens, and fields. The legal team hired by the owner of the house located the line, surprisingly, in the middle of the house. Rather than beyond the line, the house was rather within it! Geopolitics acquired an architectural dimension in the sense that its problems bore on architectural scale and notations. This meant that the line had to be zoomed into, and when zoomed into, the line defined a wide strip that occupied much of the interior of the house, stretching between the bathroom, across the stairwell and through the living rooms. The case is still debated and our project is an intervention into its unfoldings.

The complex territorial patchwork created by the Oslo Process meant that the lines dividing Areas Bs from Areas Cs are everywhere to be found: They circumscribe the edges of all towns and villages. A series of other legal disputes started to inhabit this line wherever it went. The line shaved close to a football stadium. In Burin, south west of Nablus, the line separating Areas B and C traversed the middle of the large Salman Al Farisi mosque, near el-Bireh. Sixty-two percent of

this building is in Area C, 16 percent in Area B, and the rest of it is on the line.

Meron Benvenisti first asked the question, "Who owns the thickness of the line?" apropos the improvised cease-fire line drawn with grease pencils in 1948 by Moshe Dayan and Abdullah Al Tal on a 1:20,000 map resting on the scorching hood of a military jeep. A variable thickness of two to four millimeters on the map, distorted by the stones and dirt underneath the paper, materialized into and has ossified to become an ambiguous legal space whose thickness in real space constitutes a long territorial strip between forty and eighty meters wide.

Our project delves into the thickness of this line, then follows it along the edges of villages and towns, across fields, olive and fruit orchards, roads, gardens, kindergartens, fences, terraces, homes, public buildings, a football stadium, a mosque and finally a large, recently built castle. Within this line is a zone undefined by law, a legal limbo that pulls in, like a vortex, all manner of forces, institutions, organizations and characters that operate within and around it.

Political spaces in Palestine are not defined by its legal zones, but operate through legal voids. Investigating the clash of geopolitical lines onto the domestic space of a house, and operating on the margin between architecture, cartography and legal practice, we seek to bring up a legal case that calls for an anarchic regime of political autonomy to inhabit this line. With Areas A, B and C already claimed by different forms of cooperating governments that rule the West Bank, the thickness of the line might become an extraterritorial territory, perhaps "all that remains" of Palestine, a thin but powerful space for potential political transformations.

www.decolonizing.ps





Iftikhar Dadi

The *Stereotypes* series by Iftikhar Dadi is a set of digital images set in lightboxes that examines the imbrication of religious and national typecasts commonly expressed in South Asia. The series focuses on artifacts and strategies of popular culture to understand how such ideas are prevalent in everyday life, and continue to acquire new forms in emerging media.

In *Muslims are meat-eaters, they prefer food containing salt. Hindus on the other hand prefer a sweet taste* (1997), Dadi displays an arrangement of a box of sweets, where one out of its six rows is replaced by pieces of raw meat, and whose borders are composed of stereotypical color schemes and motifs. In discussing this work, he has alluded to a constant motif repeated in the education system and media while he was growing up in Pakistan: that the idea of Pakistan was predicated on a completely separate identity for the Muslims of India and that their distinction went beyond belief to food, language, and dress, hence justifying the creation of a new state. However, the title is not new; it is drawn from the century-old work, *Lucknow: The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture* by the Urdu writer Abdul Halim Sharar (d. 1926), which describes the exquisite customs of the fabled city of Lucknow before the arrival of the British. Dadi's work suggests that ideas of difference may have longer and more diversified genealogies that those attributed only to colonialism's "divide and rule" effects.

I at least, have never seen or heard of such wonderful people, 1997

Popular illustrated comics and novels in South Asia, such as the *Amar Chitra Katha* series, have also largely naturalized notions of difference that are seen as both historical and essential. In the work *I at least, have never seen or heard of such wonderful people*, Dadi borrows a panel from a Pakistani graphic novel that illustrates the adventures of the Arab general Muhammad bin Qasim (d. 715), who had conquered parts of Sind, and is considered a heroic figure in official Pakistani historiography. The panel incongruously depicts Brahmin priests praising the conquerors as remarkably upright characters. Needless to say, such ideas of character difference and myths of origins are prevalent—prominent Pakistani families trace their roots to Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia or the Arab Middle East rather than to India, while many Hindu nationalists in India also assume this to be true, and thus consider the Muslim presence in South Asia to be characterized by its invasive foreignness.

Iftikhar Dadi

Muslims are meat-eaters, they prefer food containing salt. Hindus on the other hand prefer a sweet taste, 1997

Anita Dube



Anita Dube trained as an art historian and critic before establishing her own artistic practice. Dube was a member of the Indian Radical Painters and Sculptors Association (also known as the Kerala Radical Group) and wrote their manifesto *Questions & Dialogue* (1987). Her artistic practice was catalyzed, at least in part, by the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya (1992) and the anti-Muslim riots that followed. Her independent, largely self-taught and critically engaged approach to art making is reflected in her interest in a variety of disciplines from paleontology and archaeology to jewelry design and performance. She has, in the words of Douglas Fogle (in the online catalog for *How Latitudes Become Form)*, forged a "conceptual language that valorizes the sculptural fragment as a bearer of personal and social memory, history, mythology, and phenomenological experience."

Her sculptures and installations deploy found objects from diverse sources ranging from the industrial (the foam used to pack electronic equipment), craft (velvet), the body (bones) and the readymade (ceramic eyes) to explore themes of personal and collective loss, and address socio-political issues through metaphor. In *Silence: Blood Wedding* (1997), for instance, she sensuously draped real human bones in red velvet, beads, sequins and lace to mark the site where death and desire intertwine. In *Kissa-e-Noor Mohammed* (2004), the video documentation of a performance, Dube is attired in the garb of Noor Mohammed, her professed male alter ego who, during the course of the video, transforms from an amiable and affable man into the cliché of an aggressive fundamentalist.

In *River/Disease* (1999; reconfigured 2009), Dube uses the enamel eyes that commonly decorate temple sculptures of Hindu deities, to present a stylized rendition of the five rivers that give the Punjab (literally "five waters") its name. The work evokes multiple and varied associations. Punjab was the province split into two between India and Pakistan where the greatest bloodshed took place at Partition. The river thus represents the migration of people – from nation to nation, from country to city, from oppression to dreams. The river Indus, which these rivers flow into, is also recognized as the source of South Asian civilization – its name reflected in the very identity of India or *Hindustan* (the land of the Indus). Access to water and the damming of South Asia's rivers is a flash point between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China and is seen as the source of future conflicts. The use of the eyes draws reference to notions of the gaze as *darshan* (the reciprocal experience whereby worshippers receive a blessing from the deity or divine being they are beholding), and to the Indo-Persian concept of *nazar* or the "evil eye."

The ceramic eyes do more than merely decorate; in some Indian sculptural traditions the eyes invest a sculpture with divinity, and therefore the application of eyes are a final ritual act in their consecration. Dube's work references the symbolic meanings of eyes in the subcontinent, as bearers of divine or evil gazes, and thus resonates with the capacity of rivers to give life, but also to carry disease and death.

Hammad Nasar

River/Disease, 1999/2009

Taghreed Elsanhouri

Ethnic diversity and arbitrary borders are typical characteristics of postcolonial African nation-states. Created in the aftermath of the infamous European "Scramble for Africa" (1881), most African nation-states do not translate into real coherent groups with homogenous identities, senses of belonging, ethnicities, and cultures. Ethnic groups are often divided by artificial political boundaries. The postcolonial condition in Africa (and especially Sudan) has been marked by inequalities in power sharing and access to wealth, further intensified by corruption, wars, and oppressive military rule. This condition has been aggravated by natural disasters, civil wars, and the failure of corrupt ruling elites to manage diversity and address issues of inequality in wealth and political rights. As a consequence there has been much internal migration and displacement of rural populations; states were created that eventually failed, such as Somalia and Liberia; and countries have been split into independent entities, as in the case of Ethiopia/Eritrea and most recently, Sudan.

Our Beloved Sudan (2011) is Taghreed Elsanhouri's latest feature-length independent film, a documentary that tells the story of the political destiny of the Sudanese nation from birth in 1956 to eventual partition in 2011. Juxtaposing a personal narrative with a larger social commentary, the filmmaker seeks to understand how the world reached the inevitable conclusion to partition Sudan and the Sudanese people's coming to terms with this. The central event of the movie is the countdown to a self-determination referendum (for Southern Sudanese) on whether the country will remain united or break apart. The gap in understanding between North and South is apparent in their divergent aspirations as well as in narratives about self and history. In the North citizens and politicians clutch at the hope of unity, and in the South the dream of an independent fatherland becomes more assertive every day. The film invites key political figures to reflexively engage with the historical trajectory of the film while observing how an ordinary mixed-race family is caught across the divide of this monumental event and tries to make sense of it. Elsanhouri is omnipresent in the film, her voice reflexively witnessing the moment of secession, observing as well as engaging with it, asking how her "beloved Sudan" arrived at this point of division and how to make peace with it.

Sudan in 2 (2011), created from unused footage of *Our Beloved Sudan*, highlights the plight of populations affected by the split of Sudan as a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and the eventual referendum of January 2011 that called for the right of self-determination for Southern Sudanese. Among these populations are the nomadic groups who live in the borders between the North and South. Arab Al-Selaim (considered northerners) and the Dinka (of southern Sudan) have seasonally moved into each other's territories in search of water and land for grazing their cattle and livestock. For centuries, they have interacted, even intermarried, creating a peaceful, mutual mode of co-existence. Now, Southern Sudanese who have lived most of their life in the North have been forced to move to the South. The film includes a series of scenes and interviews with scores of people standing in the naked sun, surrounded by their furniture and lifetime belongings, while waiting to be transported to the South. Interviews with major Sudanese politicians, such as Hassan al-Turabi and Sadiq al-Mahdi, who talk about border issues in voice-overs, are juxtaposed with the fears, hopes, and dreams of the Arab Al-Selaim people and South Sudanese returnees.

Salah Hassan

Sudan in 2, 2011

Our Beloved Sudan, 2011

Sudan in 2, 2011



Our Beloved Sudan, 2011

Sudan in 2, 2011

Sophie Ernst

Sophie Ernst grew up of German parentage in the Netherlands and has developed her practice of art through an extended process of personal exploration and travel in the Middle East and South Asia. She has an abiding interest in projecting video onto sculpture—where the interplay of both media allows her to toy with complex interlayering of contexts, references, and temporalities. An extended work in process, *HOME* focuses on three important regions: remainders of the partition of South Asia in 1947; the exodus of Jews from Iraq during the mid-20th century; and the displacement of Palestinians by Israelis. Over the years, Ernst has interviewed artists and writers, amassing a rich set of archives in transcripts and audio and video formats.



HOME: Gulzar, 2008-11

The works in *HOME* consist of an architectural model of a house, usually a floor plan and environs, which the artist renders in neutral architectural building materials. The model has walls of various heights but the roof is often omitted, and it is based directly on drawings that are created either by the interviewees themselves or by consulting their older relatives. The drawings are rendered by artists, architects, and scholars of urban life—who possess a deep understanding of the relation between recollection and description of a lost space as lived experience and its representations.

The model remains in constant tension with the drawing, since the drawing is projected onto the model as a video image. The drawing remains dynamic, continually worked over by the interviewee and punctuated throughout by his or her voice—pointing at various aspects of the drawing, folding or moving the paper, or incorporating artifacts, such as photographs. All these attest to the veracity of the drawing in relation to memory in order to find a secure ground for a place long lost. By contrast, the model acts like a mute sponge, absorbing this overflow of affect through its detached and neutral materials. The model itself appears to be a strange and unstable object, shuttling uneasily between wanting to become a finished model and turning into an archaeological ruin of an ancient building that consists only of broken or partial foundations.

No archive can possibly attempt to represent even a fraction of the colossal losses that have been experienced in South Asia alone, where the partition of 1947 rendered at least 10 million people almost instantly homeless, commonly from neighborhoods and areas they understood to be theirs for perpetuity. The toll was enormous in many registers, from destruction of life and property to the very loss of belonging to a *socius*. Unacknowledged publicly, this continues to exert a major force on political and social relations between India and Pakistan, as well as in numerous communities in the Middle East and beyond.

The various artifacts that comprise *HOME* thus create an indexical relation to the enormity of displacements that have been experienced by millions in South Asia and the Middle East. But *HOME* also possesses an effective and activating charge, transferring the stuff of memory into drawing, and from there to an even more concrete object—the 3-D model. However, the journey from memory to physicality, aided by a fragment of video narrative, also acknowledges that the past cannot be lived in its fullness, and that the world one faces today necessitates both remembrance and forgetting.

Iftikhar Dadi

HOME: Sami, 2008-11

HOME: Zarina, 2008-11



HOME: Senan, 2008-11

Gauri Gill

Gill works along several discrete lines of visual enquiry through a documentary photographic practice that deals with broad issues of human survival. She has been engaged in a decade-long study of people living in marginalised communities in Rajasthan, India. Her work has also covered issues as diverse as the markers of urban change and migration in both South Asian and North American settings.

What Remains looks at the displacement of the Afghani Sikh and Hindu communities from Kabul to Delhi over successive waves of migration, in order to question notions of identity, home and belonging. Sikhs and Hindus have been living in Afghanistan since 1520. Beginning in 1978, when the Communists took over Kabul, many of them fled and more followed as the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated. Before 1992, there were more than 50,000 Hindus and Sikhs in Afghanistan, mainly based in the towns of Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ghazni and Khost. Today that number has dwindled to approximately 2,000. Many Afghani Sikhs and Hindus now live in the West Delhi neighbourhood of Tilak Nagar. Their presence has been expunged from the Afghan constitution, yet many are still waiting for Indian citizenship.

This collaborative photo- and text-based installation consists of Gill's photographs, taken in Kabul and Delhi; photographs taken by members of the Indo-Afghani community on their visits back to Afghanistan (with extracts from interviews that Gill conducted digitally inscribed on them); and texts by some of the children within the community, drawn from writing workshops she conducted at the Khalsa Diwan Afghan Hindu-Sikh Refugee Association school in Tilak Nagar.

Gill's images from Delhi are a window into contemporary life for this community in India. The Kabul photographs are more sobering, both in their monochromatic tones and in the absence of people. Their focus is on a city ravaged by war and empty of the bustle of daily life—buildings are damaged by bombs, and there are odd, striking notes of modernity in the form of designer chairs in a modern restaurant, or saplings waiting to be planted outside a new building complex. This photographic ensemble, together with "postcards" of images with written memories taken directly from the Indo-Afghani community, strikes a poignant note, juxtaposing present day Afghanistan with harrowing memories and historical facts.

What Remains explores the dilemmas the Indo-Afghani communities face in belonging and being accepted. As a Khalsa Diwan member points out, "In India they say you are Afghani, in Afghanistan they say you are Indian."

Hammad Nasar

What Remains, 2011

What Remains, 2011















Shilpa Gupta

Untitled (There is No Border Here), 2005-06

A pioneering new-media artist from South Asia, Shilpa Gupta has engaged with art in its participatory, interactive and public dimensions for more than a decade. She has persistently mapped the power of social and psychological borders to define public life. Her work makes visible the incommensurabilities of the emerging national public sphere in India. These include gender and class barriers, religious differences, the continuing power of repressive state apparatuses, and the seductions of social homogeneity and deceptive ideas of public consensus enabled by emerging mediascapes.

Gupta has created a number of projects that map the effects of the 1947 Partition. She was one of the artists who spearheaded the *Aar Paar* project (2002-2004), which sent works by various artists across the India-Pakistan border to be displayed in everyday public spaces. And in her work, *In Our Times* (2008), which consists of two microphones at the ends of a pole that swings back and forth, the 1947 inaugural independence speeches by Jinnah of Pakistan and Nehru of India—both suffused with hope—can be heard. The work leads one to reflect on the similarities and differences of these two visions, and to question the political decisions in which both leaders were implicated.

In *100 Hand-drawn Maps of India*, the artist asked 100 ordinary people to draw the map-logo of India by memory. People drawing the map are mentally faced with their uncertain comprehension of the borders of India itself. For instance, many of the maps incorrectly include the island of Sri Lanka as part of modern-day India. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out, the internalization of the bounded national map form is one of the key ways of symbolizing the modern nation-state, and one of its most potent forms is the "map-as-logo."[1] The map logos in Gupta's project support Anderson's thesis, but their dramatic variations also suggest that India is popularly imagined in diverse ways that do not fully conform to its official borders.

In the installation, *Untitled (There is No Border Here)* (2005-06), the artist has created a flag made with letters formed with yellow tape of the sort used by police to demarcate crime scenes. The tape bears the text "THERE IS NO BORDER HERE," which creates a productive tension with the flag that is itself rendered in a poetic text composed by the artist:

> I TRIED VERY HARD TO CUT THE SKY IN HALF, ONE FOR MY LOVER AND ONE FOR ME. BUT THE SKY KEPT MOVING AND CLOUDS FROM HIS TERRITORY CAME INTO MINE. I TRIED PUSHING IT AWAY, WITH MY BOTH HANDS, HARDER AND HARDER BUT THE SKY KEPT MOVING AND CLOUDS FROM MY TERRITORY WENT INTO HIS. I BROUGHT A SOFA AND PLACED IT IN THE MIDDLE, BUT THE CLOUDS KEPT FLOATING OVER IT. I BUILT A WALL IN THE MIDDLE, BUT THE SKY STARTED TO FLOW THROUGH IT. I DUG A TRENCH, AND THEN IT RAINED AND THE SKY MADE CLOUDS OVER THE TRENCH....

Flags are emblems of nation-states, whose borders are created and patrolled largely by violence and surveillance, and especially in postcolonial societies, have served to divide historically linked regions and communities. The work offers a counter imaginary to official nationalisms that invariably strive to posit borders and divisions as natural and eternal.

Iftikhar Dadi

[1] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 175.

I TRIED VERY HARD TO CUT THE SKY IN HALF, ONE FOR MY LOVER AND ONE
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MADE CLOUDS OVER THE TRENCH. I TRIED VERY HARD TO CUT
THE SKY IN HALF.





100 Hand-drawn Maps of India, 2007-08

Zarina Hashmi

Letters from Home, 2004

Zarina has worked in a variety of media and forms, at the core of her practice is printmaking, especially woodcut, but also etching. The prints often flirt with the indeterminate zone between representation and abstraction. Her practice raises broader issues concerning homelessness and dispossession in the modern world.

Dwellings have been a major theme in Zarina's work. In recent years, she has explored this concern in woodcut prints, including various experiments in imaging houses she herself, or members of her family, have inhabited at various points in their lives. This is the case with *Father's House 1898-1994* (1994) which takes the form of an informal plan of a house, in which each of the rooms, spaces, and even plants and trees around the perimeter are identified in Urdu: "Mother's room," "Father's room," "the long room," "bougainvillea vine," "kitchen," "storage room," "boundary wall," "lime tree," "henna bush," "guava tree," etc. These are homes stripped bare of the symbolic appurtenances of comfort and belonging, or homelands that are denuded of dominant ideologies of hearth and home.

Dividing Line (2001) consists simply of a winding and twisted line, without any explicit reference to distinct national geographies. The territorial line evoked here is of course known historically as the Radcliffe Award, named for Sir Cyril Radcliffe. This "dividing line" was initially conjured up in the Viceroy's summer capital, in the summer of 1947, away from the stifling heat of the plains. But its implementation on the social and territorial bodies of an entire subcontinent in the following weeks and months meant the uprooting of perhaps as many as 15 million people and the death, in the midst of a communal holocaust, of as many as three million. Zarina's image is a gesture of staggering economy. This density of historical experience and of human suffering at all levels of society is condensed to a knotty and undulating line twisting its way across a blank surface.

Letters from Home series (2004) are based on handwritten letters from her sister in Pakistan, letters that were written at moments of personal grief, such as the deaths of their parents, but given to Zarina only later, during visits to her family. *Letters from Home* explores the repeated experience of loss inherent in that impossible commonplace of Indian and Pakistani Muslim



Travels with Rani, 2008

Letters from Home, 2004



experience—families split between two rival and enemy nation-states. Zarina was born in India before Partition into a family of middle-class Muslims. Her family was had settled in the town of Aligarh in the Hindi-Urdu heartland in the early decades of the century. Segments of the Muslim middle class and elites of this region have historically been linked to the demand for a separate Muslim homeland in the subcontinent. The partition of India, however, which had been imagined as a final settling of the place of these Muslims—and of the social and cultural practices associated with them, above all the Urdu language and literature—resulted instead in their homelessness on both sides of the border.

(Excerpted from the essay by Aamir Mufti, "Zarina Hashmi and the Arts of Dispossession")

Travels with Rani maps the places that Zarina visited with her sister, against a background composed of the names of the places they traveled to written in Urdu. Although their trips took them to both India and Pakistan, the artist has deliberately left out the border in her diagram. Urdu, written in the *nastaliq* style of Persian script, was widely used by Muslims in India until Partition, when it became the official language of Pakistan, and its usage in India declined. About this the artist has written:

> I chose Urdu not for the beauty of the calligraphy or the exoticism of its aesthetics. I was placing my work in a historical moment, capturing a time when one wrote and read in Urdu. Urdu was born in Delhi; Amir Khusrau called it Hindawi, the language of Hindustan. Now we are witnessing the slow death of this language in the same city.

Ellen Avril

Emily Jacir

Emily Jacir's art practice explores the complex reality of being Palestinian. Her work often takes the form of open-ended multi-media projects that bear witness to the present moment through personal or collective action. Jacir raises questions about traversing borders and about belonging, while pointing to a series of Palestinian "lacks"—of home, mobility and liberty. The question of liberty, as framed in her work, is particularly acute, as she herself exists in a parallel world of relative liberty thanks to her US passport.

In *Where We Come From* (2001–03), Jacir used this "freedom of movement" to complete simple requests made by Palestinians denied access to their homeland by dint of their identification papers (subsequent tightening of borders by Israel would have made this project impossible). The tasks she undertook ranged from eating a particular dish at a favorite restaurant to laying flowers on a mother's grave to paying a phone bill. She later exhibited the written requests with photographs of herself performing the tasks. Powerful in its poetics, the work suggests a condition of incurable exile—one whose symptoms can be addressed but whose root cause seems distant and unreachable.

This condition of exile is directly and more spikily addressed by Jacir's work in this exhibition—*Sexy Semite* (2000-2002). This project took the form of a collaborative intervention that was in itself a political action. Jacir invited a circle of Palestinians living in New York City to place personal ads in *The Village Voice* newspaper seeking Jewish mates for marriage as a means of returning home utilizing Israel's "Law of Return," which is applicable only to Jews:

> You stole the Land. May as well take the Women! Redhead Palestinian ready to be colonized by your army. You: Jewish, Hot, Strong. U take me home + I'll let you win.

The work combines pithy, sharply directed humour that plays on the linguistic and ethnological origins of the word "Semite," which refers to various ancient and modern people originating in Southwest Asia that share the Semitic family of languages, including *both* Hebrew and Arabic. The ads peppered the public realm over a period of three years—their number and reach over time serving to amplify their impact. And in a post-September 11 New York environment consumed by terrorism and security concerns, a number of American publications (including the *New York Post*) were alarmed by the subversive nature of the ads—ascribing kidnapping or other terrorist motives to those who placed them—everything in fact, except for seeing this campaign as the conceptually subtle, politically provocative piece of art that it was.

Hammad Nasar



at 212-475-5555, press 3.

PALESTINIAN FLAMENCO DANCER

GREAT SMILE WARM HEART

HERPES, GOODWOMAN, ISO

Sexy Semite, 2000-2002

Ahsan Jamal

Kaho Na Pyar Hai, 2006

Ahsan Jamal trained in the contemporary neo-miniature style of painting that has famously emerged from the National College of Arts in Lahore. Jamal's technical skills as a draughtsman and painter match the acuteness of his observation. His work, often in the form of portraiture, combines social commentary with a gravity of detail that not only captures the descriptive qualities of his subjects, but also their particular idiosyncracies.

Kaho Na Pyar Hai (2006) takes its title from a popular Bollywood movie, a teasing line that loosely translates as, "Do say its love?" The work consists of four pairings of miniature portraits of military officers from opposite sides of the India-Pakistan border. Jamal has produced several series of comparative portraits that stand as visual taxonomies to subtly critique the superficiality of using appearance as a basis for discrimination. He paints in a realistic style rather than in the flatter form of the conventional Indo-Persian miniature. His miniaturized portraits are similar to identity photos in their detail, perhaps copied from official photographs. The artist devised the round format based on coinage and currency, a reference to the value of the individual.

The circular form was also used by the 16th century German painter Hans Holbein the Younger for keepsake portraits of nobility. The few surviving samples are considered masterpieces of the art of limning, a technique derived from manuscript illumination. Miniature circular or oval paintings on ivory also became popular in the Mughal courts for easily disseminating the likeness of the monarch. Small replica miniatures on bone are still sold as souvenirs in South Asia today.

Presented in sets of two, the portraits are organized to suggest that this is a comparative study, a game of "spot the difference" to those familiar with cultural distinctions within to distinguish the Sikh from the Muslim, the Indian from the Pakistani. But they all are also men of South Asian origin in uniform, and a few generations ago would have fought on the same side in the British colonial army. An additional, darker undertone is suggested: The likeness of an officer, especially in the form of a portable memento, connotes that such keepsakes might be memorial portraits of fallen heroes in a border conflict that has been sustained for over a generation.

Nada Raza

Kaho Na Pyar Hai, 2006

Nadia Kaabi-Linke

Study for *All Along the Watchtower*

Nadia Kaabi-Linke's practice can be read as a kind of documentary sculpture, creating an indexical relationship with the world and people around her. Her works have made visible such everyday phenomena as the bodily traces of people waiting at bus stops and scrapes of paint chips from various city walls, which she suspends in the air to create new cartographies. On a more somber register, an ongoing project, *Impunities*, involves creating an impression of the physical marks left on the bodies of women who have suffered domestic abuse.

Kaabi-Linke's recent work, *Flying Carpets* (2011), combines two characteristic modes of practice, indexicality and participation. It was realized after winning the confidence of dozens of street vendors, many of them illegal immigrants in Venice. These vendors display their wares on pieces of cloth that they spread over the steps and footpath of a bridge. When authorities arrive, the cloth is quickly folded and converted into a satchel and thus "flies" away along with the vendor and his wares. Working with vendors, the artist carefully outlined the shapes of several overlapping cloths over a period of time, and she then faithfully reproduced their exact shapes in aluminum outlines. Black threads suspended this assemblage of minimalist-looking sculptural forms, tracing shapes of signs of inhabitation on the bridge by the migrants that Kaabi-Linke has rendered visible as ghosts. *Flying Carpets* is representative of her work in that the artist strives to create aesthetically arresting forms for her conceptually rigorous practice. The combination of black thread and polished metal is visually seductive, and it also creates evocative shadows, creating multiple sensory and phenomenological experiences for viewers as they look up at the work itself and also examine the shadows cast on the floor by the skeletal metal assemblage.

All Along the Watchtower (2012) was created as a site-specific work at the Johnson Museum of Art. This piece, which spans much of the floor and rises to a height of 18 feet in the largest gallery, continues the concerns of the artist in *Flying Carpets* by rendering the shadow of absent forms visible. The missing structure here is an enormous hunting stand, such as those placed in fields and forests to hunt wild animals. However, the artist recognizes the formal similarity of the hunting stand with the edifice of watchtowers at prisons and borders, including those erected at the Nazi concentration camp at Auschwitz. The artist states:

> When visitors step into the empty gallery space and see the shade of an object on the ground and walls, they will immediately try to connect the visual shape to a real object. Perhaps they will recognize the hunting stand; perhaps they will remember the construction of a watchtower. In any case, they will search for what is lost—and for the observer. This awkward situation recalls for me the experience of panoptical surveillance systems, which have become part of our everyday life. Monitoring devices and structures are ubiquitous, but they are hardly visible. We can never see who is observing us behind our computer-screens, or behind the camera lenses in public spaces. *We feel observed without seeing or knowing the observer*.

The conflation of the hunting stand with the watchtower suggests that human beings under surveillance are constantly under threat of being stripped of their humanity, and of being seen as no more that a wild animal that can be hunted without rights, or even without mercy. In Giorgio Agamben's terms, such a human is reduced to the condition of a "homo sacer," or in a state of "bare life," one that can be simply extinguished without legal, ethical, or humanitarian consequences.

By placing this work inside a gallery, the artist has disrupted the normal visual and bodily relationship that audiences have with works of art. The artist notes that inside a museum, audiences usually possess the authority of observation and vision, but upon experiencing *All Along the Watchtower*, "suddenly they find themselves embraced by the evident shade of a non-visible apparatus of surveillance. The observers switch to the role of the observed animals in relation to the real but missing hunting stand—or they will feel like prisoners when they recognize the visual form as the shadow of a watchtower."

Iftikhar Dadi

All Along the Watchtower, 2012

Amar Kanwar

Amar Kanwar's is a distinctive voice that through the medium of film looks critically at structures of power and how they impact the lived experience of oppressed peoples. While his explorations are refracted through the lens of personal history and anchored in South Asia, the issues of division, violence, resistance, memory and justice he addresses are not geographically specific.

Kanwar's carefully developed and nuanced understanding of the power of film, with its capacity to transmit multiple narratives of image and sound, and its ability to communicate in multiple registers to multiple audiences, is used to telling effect in his trilogy–a mixture of documentary, poetic travelogue, and visual essay.

A Season Outside (1997) is a personal meditation on the nature of violence and resistance in the face of ethnic and religious conflict. It begins and closes with the "ritual celebration of separation" by border guards at the Wagah border between India and Pakistan, and is accompanied by the artist's poetic and powerful narration. Using Gandhi's *satyagraha* doctrine (the pursuit of truth through non-violent means) as a line of enquiry, Kanwar searches—from the fratricidal history of India's partition to the exilic existence of Tibetans, via the banal everyday violence of one toddler bullying another—for a strategy for intervention that can prevent people from "arming their truth."

To Remember (2003) can be seen as a portrait of Birla House, the site of Gandhi's assassination in 1948. Birla House is part museum, part shrine, attracting hundreds of visitors paying daily homage to Gandhi, as Father of the Nation. It is these visitors' interaction with the photographs and objects that the silent film ostensibly records. But the film, punctuated by short and enigmatic textual references to Gandhi (*Alas! Mohan Das, son of Gujarat*) and his Hindu nationalist assassin Nathuram Godse, also operates as a frame through which to examine the Gujarat of Gandhi being the site of the brutal communal violence in 2002, where the state was found to have been complicit in a pogrom against Gujarat's Muslim community.

A Night of Prophecy (2002) cuts between multiple narratives that navigate India's fault lines of caste, class, religion, ethnicity and nation in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Nagaland, Manipur, and Kashmir. It features songs of protest, sung in the vernacular, as its only narrative. Collectively the poets sketch a state of mind somewhere between the despair that confronts them on a daily basis, and the hope implicit in raising their voices.

Hammad Nasar

A Season Outside, 1997
There is perhaps no border outpost in the world quite like Wagah, the border between India and Pakistan—an outpost where every evening people are drawn to a thin white line and probably anyone in the eye of a conflict could find him or herself here.

A Night of Prophecy, 2002
Is it possible to understand the passage of time through poetry? And if that were so, even for one special moment, would it then be possible to see the future?

To Remember, 2003
An assassination, a gallery, the smell of death, and a silent curse.

Noa Lidor

Noa Lidor's sculptures, drawings, and installations are characterized by a diverse array of everyday materials, including dough, salt, thimbles, flutes, Braille paper, and plaster cast nipples—which suggest an interest in tactility and embedded content. However, her work thwarts these instincts: Bells don't ring, flutes can't be played, and even texts (often in Braille) can't be read. These failures of communication and connection serve as poetic metaphors for what the artist calls an "existential longing to break free."

Lidor's *Wailing Wall*, made of salt licks with bells embedded in them, is at least partly inspired by the eponymous monument in Jerusalem. She was fascinated by the idea of a physical place absorbing so much grief. The salt in the wall references, of course, the residue from tears, but also the natural and human-made phenomena of the region, including the Dead Sea and the separation barrier around Palestine.

The bells themselves are embedded in pairs, alluding to the twinned fates of the peoples trying to live on the same piece of land. Depending on the distance at which one views them, the bells appear as tears or bullet holes. And as they are firmly embedded in the wall, they are muted—unable to ring because of how they are placed—but in Lidor's words, "longing for sound or movement." As she says:

Wailing Wall can be read as expressing grief over separation on many levels: between an individual and his or her own feelings and livelihood (as in the mental state of depression), between an individual and a longed-for omnipotent presence of God (the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem being worshipped as a relic of the broken-down temple), between individual people misunderstanding and hurting each other, and also between peoples who live together on the same piece of land and are at war. *Wailing Wall* came from a notion that all these separations are somehow connected.

Wailing Wall, 2012

Hammad Nasar

Photography: David O. Brown, Johnson Museum

Mario Mabor

Mario Mabor's documentary film *The Rabbaba Man* (2010) focuses on the daily life of Sudanese instrument maker and amateur singer Mohamed Mudir, who goes by the name Haraka. The film sensitively portrays Haraka as he makes the rounds on his bicycle, marketing *rabbabas*, traditional string instruments, that he makes from recycled materials. To sell his instruments, Haraka has improvised the singing of a repertoire of popular Sudanese songs for audiences and visitors in the markets, and he accompanies the singing on one of his own *rabbabas*.

Haraka is a retired soldier of the national army who originally came from the southern part of Sudan but has settled with his family in Khartoum, the capital of the Republic of the Sudan, or North Sudan, renamed since the Sudanese civil war and the secession of the South. Haraka lives in Um Badda, a locality on the outskirts of the capital where people largely come from rural or marginalized parts of the country, including the South, Darfur in the West, and the Nuba Mountains, and where they live side by side with the northern poor.

Through the film's dialogue, scenes of family life, and Haraka's daily interactions, the film demonstrates the instrument maker's considerable sense of assimilation into the Arabized culture of North Sudan. He has mastered Arabic dialects and has given his children Arabized names. Hundreds of years of the movement of people across Sudan, intensified by civil war, especially the North-South war, has led to massive internal displacement and migrations that, ironically, brought different ethnicities together in spite of the discriminatory policies of the ruling elites who failed to manage the ethnic and religious diversity of Sudan or deliver equality and fair power-sharing among its different regions. That failure eventually resulted in the division of the country into two nations in 2011. Individuals such as Haraka, who have lived most of their lives in the northern part of Sudan, now face the difficult choice of returning to their original regions, of which they are no longer a part, or living with more discriminatory policies as a result of the institutionalization of the split between North and South.

Using a single camera, the film moves between private and public spaces to contrast the life of Haraka at home with his family and children, and in the market, where he interacts with customers and shop owners who are familiar with his presence. In a simple but subtle manner, the film also uses dialog spoken in varieties of Sudanese Arabic dialects, to demonstrate the enormous ethnic and cultural diversity among the urban population and, in the process, deconstructs the binary opposition between North and South that is common in the western press and popular media. Although the film was made prior to the official separation of North and South Sudan, it anticipates the tragic consequences of the division on the lives of individuals such Haraka, who find in art-making solace from their harsh poverty and marginalization.

Salah Hassan

The Rabbaba Man, 2010

Nalini Malani & Iftikhar Dadi

Bloodlines was produced in 1997 as a collaboration between Bombay-based artist Nalini Malani and then Karachi-based Iftikhar Dadi. Malani was born in Karachi in 1946 and moved to Bombay (now Mumbai) a year later, in 1947. As a leading artist, she has played a principal role in the artistic investigation of the Partition and its legacies. Dadi, who was born in Karachi, has long been interested in a productive and collaborative relation between art, craft, and informality in South Asia. His parents were based in Bombay and traversed the new border to Karachi after the Partition. The crossed trajectories in the biographies of these artists are emblematic of the dislocated experiences of innumerable others.

Malani and Dadi first met in 1996 in Copenhagen, and they subsequently decided to collaborate on *Bloodlines* to offer a version of history at variance with the official celebrations of India and Pakistan on their 50th anniversaries of Independence and establishment as nation-states. The work remaps the borderlines created by the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, which was appointed to demarcate the Partition and was headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who was given only five weeks to complete the task and had never visited India before, nor had he any knowledge of its complexities. Enormous bloodshed and dislocation followed the demarcation.

Both the 1997 version of *Bloodlines* and the more recent ones were produced in Karachi by embroidery professionals who work in *zari*, the traditional metal-wrapped threads used to embellish Indian and Pakistani garments.

In the essay, "Art on the Line: Cartography and Creativity in a Divided India," by historian Sumathi Ramaswamy, in James Akerman's forthcoming collection, *Mapping the Transition from Colony to Nation*, the piece is described thus:

> A striking instance of cross-border collaboration is the mixed-media installation, *Bloodlines* (1997), the joint work of Nalini Malani and Iftikhar Dadi, updated in 2008. Taking head-on the fraught Radcliffe Line that divided up their former familial homes and dislocated their families, the artists see the work as "a protest against the present situation, yet also concerned with the urgent possibility of looking beyond." Across 16 panels, they use thousands of gold, blue and crimson sequins to dramatically materialize the 1947 border that created two nation-states (and the subsequent 1971 creation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan), the red of Radcliffe's pen also the red of the blood that has flowed across this terrain since that foundational act. In Dadi's words, "*Bloodlines* is a Martian landscape, mapped with detached scientific objectivity by the Radcliffe Commission, an arbitrary line of demarcation soaked with blood." By re-signifying the color red thus, Malani and Dadi's *Bloodlines* reminds us of cartography's implication in the bloody violence that followed the drawing of the Radcliffe Line.

Iftikhar Dadi

Bloodlines, 1997 (refabricated 2011)

Naeem Mohaiemen

An artist and writer interested in the relation between art, history, and activism globally, Naeem Mohaiemen is especially concerned with the complex genealogies of resistance movements in South Asia. His installation, *Kazi in Nomansland* (2008) consists of two parts. One part comprises three sculptures made of stamps from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, each honoring the celebrated poet and activist Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899-1976). The second consists of a set of narrow horizontal prints that isolate the bold, accusatory eyes of the poet.

Nazrul Islam is possibly the only person recognized with this philatelic honor by the three states of South Asia, and Mohaiemen's project situates the paradox of the poet's life in the aporias of South Asian nationalism.

Born and brought up in poverty, Nazrul Islam was unable to finish his higher education; nevertheless he became a prolific poet and singer and contributed new directions in Bengali poesis, beyond the dominant contributions of Rabindranath Tagore. Nazrul Islam's outlook was marked by a deep humanism and drew from both Hindu mythology and Muslim devotionalism; but he was highly critical of prejudicial and sectarian religiosity on both sides. Beginning in the early 1920s, his writings and activism became suffused with a powerful revolutionary consciousness and an uncompromising anticolonialist stance. This overflowing life force was, however, tragically struck with a mysterious affliction starting in 1942, which rendered him unable to speak or write for the remainder of his life, a period of more than three decades. He inhabited the world in his silence, living in Calcutta, except for the last four years of his life that were spent in Bangladesh.

Nazrul Islam's haunting silence provided a convenient cover for the three nation-states to make their own specific claims on his legacy. India celebrated the poet due to his secular humanism and his residence in India. Pakistan recognized him as a "Muslim" poet partially as an attempt to displace "Hindu poet" Tagore from East Pakistani sensibilities. And with the founding of Bangladesh in 1971, he was honored as a national poet of that country.

With his values of boundless "love, liberty, and equality" (as outlined in a recent study by Priti Kumar Mitra[1]), the poet would hardly have countenanced a reduction of his world to the borders of *any* nation-state. Mohaiemen crops various portraits of the poet to isolate his eyes, which now appear as a repository of protest against his situation, which he was unable to express in words. The tragic later decades of Nazrul Islam's life thus also serve as emblems for the state of affairs we inherit today, where divided nation-state formations work to shape and constrain one's speech and imagination.

Iftikhar Dadi

[1] Priti Kumar Mitra, *The Dissent of Nazrul Islam: Poetry and History* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 302.

Kazi in Nomansland, 2008

Kazi in Nomansland, 2008

Memory Loss. In New York, I met a psychologist whose uncle had been in the Ranchi asylum with Nazrul. Now researchers say it may have been Pick's disease that caused dementia. I can imagine Ranchi snapped remaining headwires.

Pak Sarzamin. And now government of Pakistan has put you on a stamp. A country you have never set foot in after '47. Soviet authors continue to visit you in India. Countries barter to lay claim on you. Sometimes better to die young.

Bangabandhu. A new country invites you on a state visit, later the visit becomes permanent. Your family in Kolkata is puzzled, won't he be coming back. Well he seems happy. But I can't talk, how do you know how I am.

Assassination. In 1975, Bangladesh's leader is killed in a military coup. Now the poet is transferred to PG Hospital, his world shrinks. He looks confused in that portrait with nurses. What is happening, why won't anyone tell me.

National Poet. Nazrul's burial is a fiasco and a jubilee. I look at General Zia's sunglasses covered eyes at the funeral and shiver. Did Zia imagine the next grand funeral would be his own, five years later. Shattered body flown back from Chittagong.

Tom Molloy

Tom Molly's work delves into how global conflicts, historical fault lines, American hegemony, and present political tensions are represented and mediated through the circulation of images. He frequently takes narratives and images from popular and everyday sources—the Internet, stamps, money, maps, iconic photographs, and literature—and transforms them into drawings, sculptures, and installations. His work is often marked by simplicity of means and a high degree of skill, but it is executed in ways that do not loudly proclaim his remarkable facility with the processes of production. Rather, his is a quiet art of seemingly modest interventions and apparently minimal gestures, underpinned by a sharp conceptualism. It is also a slow art—often the product of a long, laborious process of intricate and repetitive construction. This carefully crafted modesty is also reflected in his one-word titles, whose ambiguity often makes them a point of departure when searching for the meaning of the tropes he investigates.

In *Borderline* (2007), Molloy has worked on the surface of a small commercially available globe to remove everything other than the man-made borders between nations. The surface is largely white, produced by applying layer upon layer of white enamel paint in the course of several weeks, with a vigorous sanding down of the surface after each coat. The only traces of color are the lines that now appear to be etched on the surface of the globe.

These colorful lines draw our eyes to consider this mostly blank globe in different ways. For instance, the dense network of lines that divide most of what we can still recognize as Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe immediately raises questions about the manner of their creation, making us ponder the dissolution of empires in Europe and the messy process of decolonization elsewhere.

Contact (2010) is a traditional (not digital) gelatin silver contact sheet made with one roll of 35mm film. Molloy photographed on a single roll of film 36 high-quality seminal images from the history of war photography and then printed the contact sheet in the darkroom.

As an object, the contact sheet functions as a storyboard, presenting an implicit narrative of a history of violence that mirrors the history of the hand held camera. But it would be impossible to take this narrative at face value because historical events are out of chronological order: We are led from Robert Capa's iconic WWII images, to the Armenian Genocide, to a *lingchi* (death by a thousand cuts) photograph from China at the turn of the 20th century, to Derry, Ireland in 1972 at Bloody Sunday and then back to WWII again at Auschwitz. In the words of the artist, "This reflects how we see history as a confusion rather than how it's normally presented in a neat chronological package." *Contact* suggests that persistent and widespread violence is the structuring and perhaps necessary prerequisite of modernity itself.

Hammad Nasar

Borderline, 2007



Borderline, 2007

Contact, 2010

Rashid Rana

Rashid Rana works primarily in digital media, using archival photographs that he accumulates and then pastes together to form larger composite images. The viewer is first drawn in by the significance of the large composite image, which is often an appropriated reference. But Rana's practice can be best apprehended by focusing on the micro images that he chooses as his digital palette or building block. The dichotomy between the composite and its building blocks generates narrative tension, with the grid that meshes the two providing structural scaffolding. The grid entered his practice through multiple influences, investigations into the frameworks and forms of miniature painting, the use of the grid in commercial billboard painters he collaborated with, and through the formal modernist investigations of his late teacher, Zahoor ul Akhlaq.

In *All Eyes Skyward* a nearly life-size image of a crowd is mirrored, reflecting back upon itself at a 90 degree angle. The photo-installation operates on dual registers: It is immersive at close range but must ideally be viewed first from a distance and then as the viewer draws closer, the image shifts from monumental to miniature scale. As the title suggests, we see a crowd waving flags at a national parade, looking up towards a spectacle above them. The image is from a national day parade in Pakistan, the kind of event at which the military forces display their might and firepower on floats bearing missiles and tanks. After the troops have marched past, the parade ends with a crescendo as air force pilots perform the obligatory flyby, low enough for the crowd to feel the force of the jet engines.

When the work is seen up close, the beloved heroes and heroines of Indian cinema emerge from tiny frames, portrayed in digital stills culled from popular films of the 1980s. In the context of post-partition India-Pakistan politics, the subtext reveals an ironic take on didactic attempts of the state apparatus to control and define popular culture. The moment that Rashid has fixed, transformed, and reflected back onto itself is one that suggests rapture and submission, with all faces raised toward a higher power. The work as a whole refers to a generation in Pakistan that was exposed to the dogma of the military state which defined India as the enemy from which they had liberated the nation and from whom the state had to be defended, thus justifying both the military's inordinate share of the national economy and its presence in domestic politics. In private, however, the popular cultures of the two South Asian nations never quite divorced and VHS tapes were smuggled across the border, trading the glitz and dance of Indian cinema for the more literary television series of Pakistan. Most citizens of Pakistan who grew up in the last few decades, whether in the country or its diaspora, can identify with characters such as Amitabh Bachchan's angry young man, or felt entranced by Rekha as she danced as a courtesan, or saw Gabbar Singh as the ultimate villain. *All Eyes Skyward* is not a paean merely to the power of cinema, but to shared fantasies, even across a heavily patrolled border.

Nada Raza

All Eyes Skyward During the Annual Parade, 2004



Raqs Media Collective

Jeebesh Bagchi, Monica Narula & Shuddhabrata Sengupta

The hybrid practice of the Raqs Media Collective is as expressively poetic as it is rigorously analytical. A Raqs work, like a move in an ongoing chess game that anyone can enjoy, can be strikingly simple in appearance and execution and yet driven by an immense complexity of motives. Raqs follows its self-declared imperative of "kinetic contemplation" to produce a trajectory that is restless in terms of the forms and methods that it deploys, even as it achieves a consistency of speculative procedures.

The collective is equally comfortable with ambitious installations and with works in minor media, and its work may be found as readily in large museum galleries as in the pages of little magazines or on a website. The members enjoy playing a plurality of roles, often appearing as artists, occasionally as curators, sometimes as philosophical agent provocateurs. They have curated exhibitions, edited books, staged events, and collaborated with architects, computer programmers, writers, and theatre directors; and they have founded processes that have left deep impacts on contemporary culture in India.

English, Bengali and Urdu/Hindustani are the primary working languages of the three members of the Raqs Media Collective, and translation is their mother tongue.

The Translator's Silence incises three poem fragments—by Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Rabindranath Tagore, and Agha Shahid Ali—onto an embellished and folded take-away paper card. In a poem written upon returning to Pakistan after visiting Bangladesh (post-1971, when Bangladesh emerged from Pakistan) Faiz –writes,

> *we who have been rendered strangers, after so many travails*
>
> *how many meetings will it take for us to embrace each other again*

Rabindranath Tagore, in his lyrics to a well-loved Bengali song says,

> *what fear have I of strangers,*
>
> *the cup of life will fill by knowing the unknown*

Agha Shahid Ali, in a ghazal dedicated to Edward Said, shadows the sense of loss in Kashmir with an evocation of Palestine when he says,

> *Will you, Beloved Stranger, ever witness Shahid –*
>
> *two destinies at last reconciled by exiles?*



Following Agha Shahid Ali, this reading of the three fragments suggests that "stranger" may become the "beloved" when even adversarial destinies, such as are common across partitions, and "lines of control" are reconciled through the force of a willing encounter with all that is unknown in the other.

This encounter, across languages, memories, desires, and nightmares, may lead to a loss of words, at first. Perhaps the strangers who undertake to meet each other this way will need to translate each other's silences before they can listen to each other's words. This take-away that takes the form of a fold between utterances, embodies a gift of that silence.

Raqs Media Collective

The Translator's Silence, 2012

Jolene Rickard

The global authority of "nation-states" renders Indigenous "nations" as implausible governments in the 21st century. Yet, throughout North America, Indigenous or Native American peoples have taken up the strategy of using modern notions of nationhood as a mechanism to assert title at the borders of their ancestral lands. There have been successions of symbols that represent this assertion, including: the Two Row Wampum Belt, or *Guswentah*, treaties between the Onkwehonwe (Haudenosaunee, Iroquois) and the Dutch, British, and U.S. governments; the Haudenosaunee passport; and Indigenous signage. *Fight For The Line* is a visual testimony of the Onkwehonwe peoples' claim of ancestral homelands based on photographs marking these borders from 2000-2010.

The Onkwehonwe base this assertion on nation-to-nation negotiations that took place at contact, resulting in treaties with the United States and England. The Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794, Treaty of Ghent (1814), and the Jay Treaty (1794) are the primary treaties that acknowledge Onkwehonwe sovereignty by recognizing territorial borders. The Treaty of Canandaigua establishes U.S. recognition of the Onkwehonwe as "nations," and under the provisions of the Jay Treaty and Treaty of Ghent, Indians are granted free and unrestricted passage between Canada and the U.S. Referred to as the "medicine line," the border between Canada and the U.S. divides Onkwehonwe homelands. Today Indigenous borders are marked with signs indicating nation territories and the use of Indigenous languages have become another way of marking these spaces through cultural sovereignty.

Fight for the Line marks the Cayuga people's claim to their homeland around Cayuga Lake as confirmed by archeological findings that include, but are not limited to, Aurora, Canoga, Cayuga, Ithaca, Seneca Falls, and Union Springs. The Cayuga were dispossessed during the American Revolution and live throughout the Onkwehonwe communities, Six Nations at Brantford, ON, and Seneca Falls, NY. They refer to themselves as Gayogohó:nǫ', which means people of the pipe or great swamp. Gayogohó:nǫ' Odǫhwęjá:de' translates to Cayuga Nation or country and draws upon the work of Cayuga linguist, Reg Henry.

The language, like the Cayuga people, is in flux because of the contemporary Indigenous diaspora. For instance, the Cayuga at Six Nations in Brantford refer to their nation as "Hohnahstohgwadohwahnehs," which is indicative of the revitalization of their culture through language, but in absentia from their homelands.

An ethical schism exists in America as it relates to Indigenous or Native nations. The U.S. claims to be a beacon of justice globally, yet has not fully reconciled its ongoing colonial settler status in relationship to Indigenous peoples in North America. *Fight for the Line* stakes a conceptual claim on the very site of the exhibition yet deploys software that continuously and randomly recombines images of geographic and cultural boundaries marking Onkwehonwe space. Destabilizing and unpredictable, this piece responds to the duplicitous political and legal "lines" between these nations as un-settled. This work marks the Cayuga homeland but recognizes the people's absence in their own homeland as a condition of ongoing coloniality. Cayuga and other Onkwehonwe languages are set in constant motion in this installation as a "sign" of Indigenous renewal globally.

Jolene Rickard

Fight for the Line, 2012


Gayogohó:nǫ'
Odǫhwęjá:de'
CAYUGA TERRITORIES

HONOR
OUR
TREATIES

ATE
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ITY
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BREAK THE LA
Odǫhw
CAYUGA TE

hó:nǫ’
ęjá:de’

RRITORIES

Hrair Sarkissian

Hrair Sarkissian works in photography, in the vein of large-scale typological investigations, to highlight the part images play in the construction of personal and collective stories of history and identity. His interest in this subject is at least partly biographical. Born in Damascus to parents of Armenian origin, his work often addresses this aspect of his biography.

Construction (2010) is a series of images of architectural models made from children's wooden blocks that the artist fashioned to resemble buildings from his grandfather's village in present-day eastern Turkey, from where he was forced to migrate to Syria during the Armenian genocide in 1915. Sarkissian never met his grandfather, but grew up hearing stories about this village, and his project gives concrete form to imaginary constructs. These stories are granted collective voice in his most recent project, *Istory* (2011), a record of Sarkissian's two months' residency in Istanbul spent documenting the history sections of various libraries and archives in the city. Given his family background, the questioning of the official Turkish narrative of the treatment of Armenians in the final days of the Ottoman Empire takes on a personal urgency.

In an earlier series of works, *InBetween* (2006), Sarkissian highlights the discrepancy between the image of a proud Armenia constructed by the diaspora, and the reality of the country itself. He contrasts state monuments (a missile pointing towards Turkey) with views of barren landscapes, hotel complexes deserted after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and incomplete building shells that are too expensive to demolish but not economically feasible to complete.

The physical remains of this collapsed economy of desire aimed at the Armenian Diaspora is the subject of *City Fabric* (2010), printed as a giant banner stretched against the concrete south façade of the Herbert F. Johnson Museum of Art at Cornell University. The project comprises a series of images taken in the city centre of Yerevan, Armenia, that property developers optimistically attempted to transform for the purpose of creating a modern hub for the diaspora. Historic buildings were torn down and replaced with luxury developments, but most of these now lie empty, and many were never finished. The entrances to some of these buildings are covered with large canvas coverings or "fabrics" on which an image of the finished building itself is depicted. They thus function as what the artist has referred to as "ghost towns"—staged non-places that have failed as sites of crystallized desire, but stand as mausoleums to the promises of history.

Hammad Nasar

City Fabric (No.1), 2010

Photography: David O. Brown, Johnson Museum

Seher Shah

Seher Shah has created an evocative body of works on paper that overlay images of monumental Islamic, Baroque and Brutalist architecture, colonial spectacles, and historic photographs from the archives of the Royal Geographical Society (among others), recasting them in phantasmal constellations. Shah also layers hand-drawn ornament and modernist references on archival images of historic monuments to suggest a dreamscape of imbricated pasts of Muslim, British, and Sikh South Asia that persist as a sequence of uncanny afterimages.

Shah's complex collages are starkly rendered in monochrome and bring to the fore the persistent need for us to come to terms with the monumentality of power, as well as the need for commemoration of its costs. In works such as *Monumental Fantasies-Impermanence I* (2008), the spectacle of authority is palpable and dominant, and offered in the guise of shadowy military formations, portrait busts of unknown figures, and architectural monuments. Stark geometric polygonal constellations abstract the monolithic force of authority beyond any particular cultural formation. The sense of domination is multiplied by the symmetric doubling of monumental forms, but these are also rendered unstable by the sinuous ornamental vapors that appear to attend to, and emerge across the work. Reminiscent of Islamic patterns and wisps of smoke, the ornamental overlay volatilizes the forces of domination, in which the tension between stable formations and their miasmatic instability becomes activated. Shah's work suggests that no matter how entrenched power might appear, it is nevertheless also immersed in a contrary process of evaporation. But equally, her work also serves as a reminder that the afterimage of colonialism as a phantasm of power persists long after its actual disappearance.

Commemoration is the main focus of the large drawing, *Interior Courtyard I* (2006), in which an ornamental courtyard pavilion of scalloped arches is rendered in a dynamic perspectival architectural composition, with a cenotaph at its center. The artist notes that for her, the courtyard space constitutes "an archetypal threshold," which she deploys "to merge the discourse of the private and the public." She further states:

> Large-scale perspective drawing and digital constructions combine courtyard spaces with reductive geometric forms. I conceive of my drawings as theatre, where the elements are in a state of constant transformation and re-assembly. Ranging from cenotaphs and monuments to basic architectural forms, these elements are recycled and re-situated from one drawing, print or sculpture to the next. This theatre of movement and flux is a zero gravity zone where objects are free to roam, shatter, disintegrate, and transform.

Set within turbulent ornamental flames and vapors, lotus forms, angular planes, cubic shapes, and crossed geometric forms animate *Interior Courtyard I.* Shah offers this commemorative dynamic of stable and timeless forms riled by turbulence to evoke the psychic costs of partition on historical memory.

Iftikhar Dadi



Interior Courtyard I, 2006


Interior Courtyard I, 2006

Surekha

Line of Control, 2003

Any kind of governance is one that watches while the subjects are being watched.

Surekha is a visual and video artist from Bengaluru who, over the last decade, has been exploring how video as an art form negotiates contemporary public and private space. She uses photographs and video installations to interrelate the domains of archiving, documenting, and performing and reflects on how visuality can engage with socially engaged aesthetics. Her video installations from the last three years, such as *Communing with the Urban Heroines* (2007), *Unclaimed-urban f(r)ictions* (2010) and *Lake Tales* (2011) deal vigorously with these issues.

The broader context of her work investigates the theme of surveillance and its relation to boundaries—both real and metaphoric. In her work she also explores the wider cultural, political, and subjective connotations of surveillance in the context of art and its historicity. Altogether, this amounts to a specific artistic modality and art activism that she is deeply involved with, based in Bengaluru.

In *Line of Control,* a mere marker pen traces a random boundary. An ant is caught within this drawn frame, unable to get out because it imagines the drawn line as a boundary. It hesitates to cross the line but never stops walking towards it and away, in anticipation of the unpredictable. Finally, at the end of the video, by choice or chance, it comes out or crosses the boundary. In this spontaneous one-shot work, the artist contemplates a being's behavior when confronted with boundaries—real, imagined and metaphoric.

Boundaries are made by human conditions; they are often imposed, assumed, accepted, and acknowledged. Surekha's video addresses several implications of a "boundary," which acts as an agency of control, power and bifurcation—be it of geography, gender, color, or otherwise. The work plays on the ambiguity of our choice to be "in" or "out," our indecisiveness, and our euphoric awareness of, and against, something which we have been deeply conditioned into. Through the discourse and practice of art, one becomes aware that a boundary is a construct, like the pen line to the ant.

Surekha

Hajra Waheed

Hajra Waheed has a long-standing interest in archival processes—as a source for her artistic practice and also for providing the tools with which her projects are realized. Working mostly with collage, drawing, and painting, her works are often rich in reference but spare in form—a combination that makes them seem like secret notes or ciphers.

Elements of Waheed's biography hold clues for the decryption of these secret notes. Born in Canada to Indian parents, she was raised within the gated community of Saudi ARAMCO—home to a quarter of the world's oil exports and hence protected by American and Saudi air bases, strict regulation of access, and the prohibition of civilian use of photographic equipment. Waheed lived through the end of the Cold War and the first Gulf War in these conditions of secrecy and isolation, and she developed an obsession with identifying aircraft, tracking flight routes, and keeping a log of her observations in a secret visual language.

Untitled 1-10 (2011) continues Waheed's youthful obsession in a series of 10 drawings (charcoal and transfer on aged paper) of aerial drones. These aircraft have begun to dominate airspace since the September 11 attacks, with the Pentagon now reportedly having more than 7,000 of them. "Pilots" using joysticks and computer screens at remote military bases take off and land these unmanned airplanes for the dual purpose of surveillance and attack. The impact of the drones in patrolling, and indeed transgressing, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been a subject of acute tension in the last few years and has resulted in the death, according to London's Bureau of Investigative Journalism, of approximately 2,500 people—near the number who died in the atrocities of September 11 in the United States.

Waheed's simple drawings of what seem to be innocuous blimps are in fact the visual identification of these birds of prey, which, like mythical beasts, fly in defiance of any borders and lines of control, and constantly threaten to rain sudden violence from the sky.

Hammad Nasar

Untitled 1-10, 2011

Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries

Young-hae Chang and Marc Voge

In *Cunnilingus in North Korea* (2005), Seoul-based group Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries (YHCHI) pokes fun at South and North Korea's competition for legitimacy under the national division and (post–) Cold War politics. The work is ostensibly an address by the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-il (1941-2011) to the people of South Korea. Created in a text-based Adobe Flash animation that employs a black-and-white Monaco typeface highly synchronized to Nina Simone's song "See-Line Woman," it explores the imaginative possibility of overcoming the meta-narratives of the national division through the recovery of humanism, especially through sexual relationships.

The art group's name reflects South Koreans' adulation of the accelerated economic development and affluence that their nation has experienced during the last few decades, and on which the South Korean government bases its legitimacy. Subverting this connotation in *Cunnilingus in North Korea,* YHCHI trumpet North Korea's success on the battlefront of sexual freedom and equality, without revealing a political commitment to either South or North. YHCHI literally interprets North Korea's "communism" to mean horizontal and equal relationships among people, particularly between men and women—the basic unit of human relationships—and between the family and the larger community. According to YHCHI, these are values at the core of communism and universal humanism.

Nonetheless, North Korea's claims to superiority sharply expose the reality of its notorious human rights abuses. The work compares the intimate and open sexual companionship that North Korean men and women supposedly enjoy, with the alienating and inhibiting attitudes toward sex of their southern counterparts under South Korea's capitalist, materialist values. The "propaganda" reveals the erasure and suffocation of the individual under the volatile ideological and militaristic conflict between the two Koreas. Nina Simone's jazzy "See-Line Woman" seduces listeners into the fantasy of the sensuous and free-spirited woman in the lyrics. Because of the overwhelming pace of the text and the blinking screen, the song's lyrics pulsate with the poem-text, and the black-and-white letters erupt in intimate yet explosive bodily and emotional communication.

Global Kalea (2012) questions the feasibility of human bonding in, or in spite of, the "borderless" world of transnational technology, corporations, and Interpol. The work features text with a jazz soundtrack and sound effects, and consists of a phone conversation between a customer and a representative in the Adobe Service Center who is under 24-hour monitoring. They "speak" to each other, through real or assumed identities, and their comments to each other are visually distinguished by the slight difference between regular and italic Monaco typefaces. But it is the "indistinguishable," in the shape and connection of their conversations, which makes their already frustrating exchanges even more aggravating.

Korean-American Johnny (a.k.a. "Pablo," a name he prefers as much sexier than Johnny) calls the Adobe Support Center from Japan on New Year's Eve. During his consultation with "Kalea," Pablo tries to humanize the rationalized procedure and Kalea herself. However, in his insistence on her being Indian, and a practitioner of the *Kama Sutra*, his interaction turns out to be intrusive, stereotyping, and sexually harassing. However, because Pablo is the one who needs her "company" enough to conceptualize the service center as a community of people with problems, the hierarchical relationship between the two is not quite stable. In his second call, the two finally appear to find comfort in each other and to connect. At the climax of their "genuine" bonding however, the narrative takes an astonishingly unexpected twist. It turns out that Kalea is an Interpol agent who has been investigating the problem case, Pablo. Such a radical turn indicates that the immense possibility of crossing boundaries and creating alternate identities and communities today does not necessarily guarantee a more humane life under the logic and operation of neoliberal globalization.

Hyejong Yoo

Photography: David O. Brown, Johnson Museum

Cunnilingus in North Korea, 2005

WE SEE SEXUAL
PLEASURE AS
GETTING
SØMETHING
FØR NØTHING.

Cunnilingus in North Korea, 2005

0F C0URSE. AND D0 Y0U DAYDREAM?

Global Kalea, 2012

Muhammad Zeeshan

Muhammad Zeeshan studied at the National College of Arts, Lahore. Trained and technically proficient as a miniature painter, his intellectual curiosity leads him to challenge both formal and conceptual conventions, resulting in memorable artistic experiments. Burnishing sandpaper with graphite, he created the "anti-miniature"—massive drawings with polished surfaces, which, despite their scale, retain both the seductive aesthetic and refined discipline of the Persianate miniature (*Dying Miniature series*, 2008 onwards). His book of flags (*A Colligation (Isolated Facts),* 2008) unraveled the threads that bind national flags: It presents a selection of flags from nations that have been influenced by US foreign policy, painted as if woven from colored threads in tromp-l'oeil detail. On the reverse, each flag is unraveled in red, white, and blue threads.

The version of *Two Nation Theory* shown here is a recent iteration of an ongoing project. Zeeshan commissioned graphic artists to respond to a passage on the "Two Nation Theory" in secondary-school textbooks of *Pakistan Studies,* which became a compulsory course in the 1980s by a Pakistani government directive aimed at reinforcing the ideology of the state. The textbooks are the product of a neglected public educational system badly in need of funding and reform. The polemic of the two nations goes unchallenged and lessons are learned by rote, at best without any protest or critical response and at worst as blind consumption of nationalist propaganda.

The text in question relates to the demand for a separate state for the Muslim population of India (leading to the Partition of 1947).

Two Nation Theory II, 2011

Zeeshan, upset by lessons that alienated classmates from the minority Hindu community, wrote to the authorities to demand that the text be revised. Despite sending and resending letters, he never received a response from the textbook board. When invited to participate in *Lines of Control*, he approached commercial illustrators in Pakistan and asked them to respond to the school text of the "Two Nation Theory." While the illustrations vary in form, most of them present this originary myth of the nation as founded upon an irreconcilable, binary difference. Zeeshan also invited colleagues in India to create a visual response. In the commentary accompanying these images, the artist explains that these, too, never arrived, and the project remains incomplete.

Nada Raza



WORKS

Taghreed Elsanhouri, *Sudan in 2*

Bani Abidi
Born 1971 in Karachi, Pakistan
Lives and works in New Delhi, India

Security Barriers A-L, 2008
Twelve inkjet prints on paper, each 28 x 43.2 cm
Collection of Ayesha and Kamran Anwar

The Distance From Here, 2010
Single-channel video (color, sound)
12 min. (looped)
Courtesy of the artist and Green Cardamom, London

Two of Two, 2010
Six inkjet prints on paper, each 24.8 x 43 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Green Cardamom, London

Francis Alÿs
Born 1959 in Antwerp, Belgium
Lives and works in Mexico City, Mexico
The Loop, 1997
Inflatable globe, postcards, vinyl map, wall text
Dimensions variable
Courtesy of the artist and David Zwirner Gallery, New York

Sarnath Banerjee
Born 1972 in Calcutta, India
Lives and works in New Delhi, India
The Gama Nama (Story of Gama), 2011
Ink, pencil on paper, digital prints, silkscreened books
Dimensions variable
Courtesy of the artist

Farida Batool
Born 1970 in Lahore, Pakistan
Lives and works in Lahore, Pakistan
Line of Control, 2004
Lenticular print, 153.2 x 82 cm
Collection of Khurram Kasim, Karachi

Adam Broomberg
Born 1970 in Johannesburg, South Africa
Oliver Chanarin
Born 1971 in London, UK
Live and work in London, UK
Mini Israel, 2006
Single-channel video (color, sound)
10 min., 26 sec. (looped)
Courtesy of the artists

Muhanned Cader
Born 1966 in Colombo, Sri Lanka
Lives and works in Oxford, UK, and Colombo, Sri Lanka
Flag I (Unawatuna Beach, Sri Lanka), 2010
Flag II (North Uist, Outer Hebrides, Scotland), 2010
Oil on aluminum, each 91.5 x 152.4 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Green Cardamom, London

Duncan Campbell
Born 1972 in Dublin, Ireland
Lives and works in Glasgow, Scotland
Bernadette, 2008
Single-channel video (B&W, sound)
37 min., 10 sec. (looped)
Courtesy of the artist and Hotel Gallery, London

DAAR [Decolonizing Architecture/Art Residency]
Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, Eyal Weizman, and Nicola Perugini
Based in Beit Sahour, Palestine
The Red Castle and the Lawless Line, 2011
Multimedia installation
Dimensions variable
Courtesy of the artists

Iftikhar Dadi
Born 1961 in Karachi, Pakistan
Lives and works in Ithaca, NY, and Karachi, Pakistan
Muslims are meat-eaters, they prefer food containing salt. Hindus on the other hand prefer a sweet taste, 1997
I at least, have never seen or heard of such wonderful people, 1997
From the *Stereotypes* series
Duratrans prints, mounted in lightboxes, each 76.4 x 101.8 cm
Courtesy of the artist

Anita Dube
Born 1958 in Lucknow, India
Lives and works in New Delhi, India
River/Disease, 1999 (reconfigured 2009)
Ceramic eyes mounted directly on wall, overall height 305 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Nature Morte, New Delhi

Taghreed Elsanhouri
Born in Dongola, Sudan
Lives and works in Khartoum, North Sudan, and London, UK

Our Beloved Sudan, 2011
Single-channel video (color, sound)
92 min. (looped)
Arabic and English dialogue with English subtitles
Cinematographer: Yasar Seilf Al Deen Al Disouqi
Editor: Mohamad Mustapha
Courtesy of the artist

Sudan in 2, 2012
Single-channel video (color, sound)
15 min. (looped)
Arabic and English dialogue with English subtitles
Editor: Khaled Bella
Supported by a grant from The Arab Fund for Arts and Culture, Beirut
Courtesy of the artist

Sophie Ernst
Born 1972 in Munich, Germany, raised in the Netherlands
Lives and works in Berlin, Germany, and London, UK
HOME: Senan, Zarina, Sami, and Gulzar, 2008-11
Four single-channel video installations with architectural models composed of Corian and

MDF (color, sound)
Variable times (looped)
Courtesy of the artist and Green Cardamom, London
Supported by the Mondriaan Fund
Conversations:
Em Al Shouf – Sami Said and his father, Saeed Shana'a, recorded: Birzeit, 2008
Beit Michael, Bagdad – Sami Michael and Senan Abdelqader, recorded: Haifa, 2008
Aligarh – Zarina, recorded: Karachi, 2008
Massan Sharif – Gulzar Haider, recorded: Lahore, 2007
Camera: Issa Freij, Amir Hussain, Asif Khan, Ahmad Malki
Production assistance: Imran Ahmad, Patras, Kamran Rabbani and Ali Raza
Translation: Rana Shakaa, Lubna Takruri
Dubbing: Najah Musallam, Imran Mraish
Installations/project development: Andre Bockholdt, Masen Khattab, Karsten Kröger, Saana Lattimaki, Hamlyn Terry, Salla Vapaavuori, Game Over Productions (Karachi), Idioms Films (Ramallah)

Gauri Gill
Born 1970 in Chandigarh, India
Lives and works in New Delhi, India
What Remains, 2011
Gelatin silver prints, C-prints, and text, dimensions variable
Courtesy of the artist and Nature Morte, New Delhi

Shilpa Gupta
Born 1976 in Mumbai, India
Lives and works in Mumbai, India

100 Hand-drawn Maps of India, 2007–08
Single-channel video projection (B&W, silent)
Courtesy of the artist and Yvon Lambert, Paris

Untitled (There is No Border Here), 2005–06 (refabricated 2012)
Tape on wall, approximately 305 x 305 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Yvon Lambert, Paris

Zarina Hashmi
Born 1937 in Aligarh, India
Lives and works in New York, NY

Dividing Line, 2001
Woodcut printed on handmade Indian paper mounted on Arches Cover white paper; ed. 13/20, image 43.2 x 30.5 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York

Father's House 1898–1994, 1994
Etching printed in black on Arches Cover buff paper, chine collé on handmade Nepalese paper; ed. 14/25, image 57.2 x 39.4 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York

Letters from Home, 2004
Portfolio of eight woodblock and metalcut prints on handmade Kozo paper and mounted on Somerset paper; ed. 4/20, each image 30.5 x 22.9 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Luhring Augustine, New York

Travels with Rani, 2008
Intaglio on Arches Cover buff paper, H/C, image 36.8 x 33 cm.
Herbert F Johnson Museum of Art
Gift of Natvar and Janet Bhavsar

Emily Jacir
Born 1970 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Lives and works in Beirut, Lebanon
Sexy Semite, 2000–02
Personal ads placed in *Village Voice* and documentation of intervention
Dimensions variable
Courtesy of the artist and Alexander and Bonin, New York

Ahsan Jamal
Born 1975 in Jhang, Pakistan
Lives and works in Lahore, Pakistan
Kaho Na Pyar Hai, 2006
Mixed media on *wasli* paper, mounted on board, each (framed) 14.8 x 23 cm
Lent by the ASAL Collection

Nadia Kaabi-Linke
Born 1978 in Tunis, Tunisia
Lives and works in Berlin, Germany, and Tunis, Tunisia
All Along the Watchtower, 2012
Airbrushed paint on walls and floor, approximate height 550 cm
Courtesy of the artist

Amar Kanwar
Born 1964 in New Delhi, India
Lives and works in New Delhi, India

Trilogy: *A Season Outside*, 1997
Single-channel video (color, sound)
30 min. (looped)
Courtesy of the artist and Marian Goodman Gallery, New York and Paris

Trilogy: *To Remember,* 2003
Single-channel video (color, silent)
8 min. (looped)
Courtesy of the artist and Marian Goodman Gallery, New York and Paris

Trilogy: *A Night of Prophecy,* 2002
Single-channel video (color, sound)
77 min. (looped)
Courtesy of the artist and Marian Goodman Gallery, New York and Paris

Noa Lidor
Born 1977 in Petach-Tikiva, Israel
Lives and works in London, UK
Wailing Wall, 2005 (reconfigured 2012)
Salt bricks, bells, 188 x 191 x 22.7 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Green Cardamom, London

Mario Mabor
Born 1977 in Khartoum, Sudan
Lives and works in Juba, South Sudan
The Rabbaba Man (Sahib

al-Rabbaba), 2011
Producer: Sudan Film Factory and Goethe Institut Sudan
Single-channel video (color, sound)
15 min. (looped)
Courtesy of the artist

Nalini Malani
Born 1946 in Karachi, India (now Pakistan)
Lives and works in Mumbai, India
Iftikhar Dadi
Born 1961 in Karachi, Pakistan
Lives and works in Ithaca, NY, and Karachi, Pakistan
Bloodlines, 1997 (refabricated, 2011) by workshop of Abdul Khaliq, Saddar, Karachi
Sequins and thread on cloth
Two sections: 165 x 187 cm and 124.5 x 159 cm
Courtesy of the artists and Green Cardamom, London

Naeem Mohaiemen
Born 1969 in London, UK
Lives and works in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and New York, NY
Kazi in Nomansland, 2008
Digital prints, glued stamps, vinyl text
Dimensions variable
Courtesy of the artist and Green Cardamom, London

Tom Molloy
Born 1964 in Waterford, Ireland
Lives and works in western Ireland and northern France

Borderline, 2007
Enamel paint on mass-produced globe, diameter 9.6 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Rubicon Gallery, Dublin

Contact, 2010
Gelatin silver print, edition 3/10, 20.3 x 25.4 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Rubicon Gallery, Dublin

Rashid Rana
Born 1968 in Lahore, Pakistan
Lives and works in Lahore, Pakistan
All Eyes Skywards During the Annual Parade, 2004
C-print and Diasec; edition of 5, 250 x 610 cm
Lent by the ASAL Collection

Raqs Media Collective
Jeebesh Bagchi
Born 1965 in New Delhi, India
Monica Narula
Born 1969 in New Delhi, India
Shuddhabrata Sengupta
Born 1968 in New Delhi, India
Live and work in New Delhi, India
The Translator's Silence, 2012
Foldable take-away, perforated text on paper, 44.7 x 33 cm
Courtesy of the artists

Jolene Rickard
Born 1956 in Niagara Falls, NY
Tuscarora; Lives and works in the Tuscarora Nation and Ithaca, NY
Media Collaborator: Jason Baerg, Cree-Metis, Toronto, Canada
Cayuga Language Translation: Mia McKie, Tuscarora, Cornell University '13
Fight for the Line, 2012
Video installation and painted metal sign, dimensions variable
Courtesy of the artist

Hrair Sarkissian
Born 1973 in Damascus, Syria
Lives and works in London, UK
City Fabric (No. 1), 2010
Vinyl banner, 500 x 634 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Kalfayan Galleries, Athens and Thessaloniki

Seher Shah
Born 1975 in Karachi, Pakistan
Lives and works in New York, NY
Interior Courtyard I, 2006
Graphite on paper, 127 x 305 cm
Courtesy of the artist

Surekha
Born 1965 in Bengaluru, India
Lives and works in Bengaluru, India
Line of Control, 2003
Single-channel video (B&W, sound)
3 min. (looped)
Courtesy of the artist and Lakeeren Art Gallery, Mumbai

Hajra Waheed
Born 1980 in Calgary, Canada
Lives and works in Montreal, Canada
Untitled 1-10, 2011
Pencil and xylene transfer on paper, 20.6 x 21.1 cm
Courtesy of the artist and Green Cardamom, London

Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries
Young-hae Chang
Born in South Korea
Marc Voge
Born in US
Live and work in Seoul, South Korea

Cunnilingus in North Korea, 2005
Flash animation (color, sound)
6 min., 31 sec. (looped)
Courtesy of the artists

Global Kalea, 2012
Flash animation (color, sound)
18 min., 48 sec. (looped)
Courtesy of the artists

Muhammad Zeeshan
Born 1980 in Mirpurkhas, Pakistan
Lives and works in Lahore and Karachi, Pakistan
Two Nation Theory II, 2011
Single-channel video and textbooks (color, sound)
7min., 18 sec. (looped)
Courtesy of the artist and Green Cardamom, London

Photography: David O. Brown, Johnson Museum

Bani Abidi was born in Karachi, Pakistan, in 1971 and lives in New Delhi. She is currently an artist-in-residence with the DAAD Berliner Künstlerprogramme. Prior to recent solo shows at Grey Noise, Lahore (2011), Green Cardamom, London (2010), Project 88, Mumbai (2010), she participated in group exhibitions at MARCO Monterrey, Mexico, ZKM, Karlsruhe, Germany (both 2011), Whitechapel Gallery, London, Devi Art Foundation, Delhi (both 2010) and Asia Society, New York (2009). Abidi is one of three artists to be awarded the Sharjah Art Foundation Grant (2010).

Francis Alÿs was born in Antwerp, Belgium, in 1959 and lives and works in Mexico City. Alÿs has exhibited widely with recent solo exhibitions at The Museum of Modern Art, New York (2011), Wiels Centre d'Art Contemporain, Brussels (2010-11), and Tate Modern, London (2010). Recent group exhibitions include the Deutsche Guggenheim, Berlin, Haifa Museum of Art, Israel (both 2011), and 29th São Paulo Biennale (2010). His work will appear at documenta 13, Kassel, in 2012.

Sarnath Banerjee was born in Calcutta, India, in 1972 and lives and works in New Delhi. He works with the graphic form on projects that can be realized as published books, drawings exhibited in art galleries, or as videos that circulate in film festivals. His books include *Corridor* (2004), *The Barn Owl's Wondrous Capers* (2007), and *The Harappa Files* (2011). His drawings and videos have been exhibited at Centre Pompidou, Paris, Zacheta National Gallery of Art, Warsaw (both 2011), 28th São Paolo Biennial, Project 88, Mumbai, Mori Museum, Tokyo (all 2008), Fondazione Sandretto re Rebaudengo, Turin, Italy, IFA Gallery Stuttgart, Germany (all 2006), Institute of Contemporary Arts, London (2003). His films have won awards at the 1001 Digital Film Festival, Delhi (2004) and Mocha Film Award, Mumbai (2006).

Syeda Farida Batool was born in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1970, where she currently lives and works. Her first solo exhibition was staged at Rohtas 2, Lahore, in 2006. Since then she has participated in group exhibitions at Portimao Museum, Algarve (2009), Aicon Gallery, Palo Alto (2008), and a Web-based international exhibition called No Man's Land (2006). Batool is a recipient of the Senior Asian Artist Scholarship, COFA, UNSW, and Jang Talent Award, Lahore (2000–2002).

Adam Broomberg, born in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1970, and **Oliver Chanarin**, born in London, UK, in 1971, currently live and work in London, where they started their collaborative work over a decade ago. Recent exhibitions include solo presentations at The Goodman Gallery, Johannesburg (2011), Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam (2006), National Portrait Gallery, London (2005) and The Hassleblad Centre, Göteborg (2000) and group exhibitions at the KW Institute for Contemporary Art, Berlin (2011), Foam Photography Museum, Amsterdam (2011), La Virreina Centre de la Imatge, Barcelona (2010) and Dutch Photomuseum, Rotterdam (2009).

Muhanned Cader was born in 1966 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and lives and works between Oxford and Colombo. Recent exhibitions include solo or two-person shows at Green Cardamom, London (2011-12), Saskia Fernando Gallery, Colombo (2010), Barefoot Gallery, Colombo (2007), and group shows at Abbot Hall Art Gallery, Cumbria (2011), Lionel Wendt & Harold Pieris Gallery, Colombo (2010), APT 6 Queensland Art Gallery, Brisbane, Australia, Devi Art Foundation, New Delhi, University of Toronto Art Centre (all 2009), and the inaugural Singapore Biennale in 2005. He was awarded the Bunka Award for Excellence (2003) and the Kala Suri (2005) in Sri Lanka.

Duncan Campbell was born in Dublin, Ireland, in 1972 and currently lives and works in Glasgow. Recent exhibitions include solo shows at HOTEL, London (2011), Artists Space, New York (2010), MUMOK, Vienna, Kunstverein Munich, Tramway, Glasgow, and Chisenhale Gallery, London, and a solo presentation at Tate Britain (all 2009). Recent group shows have been at Suppertico Lopez, Berlin, Nottingham Contemporary and Hayward Gallery, London (all 2011), Centro de Arte 2 de Mayo, Madrid (2010), and Kunstmuseum Wolfsburg (2009). In 2009 Campbell won the Best International On Screen (Video) Award at the Images Festival in Toronto, the ARTE Prize for a European Short Film in Oberhausen, and the VPRO Tiger Award at the Rotterdam Film Festival.

DAAR (Decolonizing Architecture/Art Residency)—comprising Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, Eyal Weizman, and Nicola Perugini—is an art and architecture collective and residency program based in Beit Sahour, Palestine. DAAR's work combines discourse, spatial intervention, education, collective learning, public meetings, and legal challenges. DAAR projects have been shown in various biennials and museums, among the Venice Biennale, Bozar in Brussels, NGBK in Berlin, Istanbul Biennial, Architecture Biennale Rotterdam, Home Works in Beirut, Architekturforum Tirol in Innsbruck, Tate in London, Oslo Triennial, Centre Pompidou in Paris, and many other places. DAAR's members have taught,

lectured, and published internationally. DAAR was awarded the Prince Claus Prize for Architecture, received the Art Initiative Grant, and was shortlisted for the Chernikhov Prize (all 2010).

Iftikhar Dadi was born in Karachi, Pakistan, and lives and works in Ithaca, NY, and Karachi. He is associate professor in the Department of History of Art and chair of the Department of Art at Cornell University. As an artist he collaborates with Elizabeth Dadi, and they have participated in numerous exhibitions internationally.

Anita Dube was born in Lucknow, India, in 1958 and currently lives and works in New Delhi. Her work has been shown in solo exhibitions at Galerie Dominique Fiat, Paris (2011), Lakeeren Art Gallery, Mumbai (2010), Bose Pacia, New York (2008), Bombay Art Gallery, Mumbai, Gallery Almine Rech, Paris (both 2007) and in group shows at Lalit Kala Akademi, New Delhi, Bose Pacia, New York (both 2011), Lakeeren, Mumbai (2010), Galerie Christian Hosp, Berlin, Galerie Krinzinger, Vienna, Bose Pacia, Kolkata (all 2009), Devi Art Foundation, New Delhi, MuKHA, Antwerp (both 2008).

Taghreed Elsanhouri was born in Dongola, in northern Sudan, and lives and works between London and Khartoum. Her directorial debut, *All about Darfur,* won the Chairperson's Prize at the Zanzibar International Film Festival (2005) and was selected at numerous film festivals including the Toronto International Film Festival (2005). Television projects include *Orphans of Mygoma*, a short documentary commissioned by Aljazeera International for their 'Witness' documentary strand. *Our Beloved Sudan* her third independent documentary feature was awarded a European Union Grant and the film premiered at the Dubai Film Festival (2011). Her documentary short, *Sudan in 2*, received an award from the Arab Fund for Art and Culture.

Sophie Ernst was born in Munich, Germany, in 1972 and is currently based in Berlin. She has had solo or two person presentations at Museum de Lakenhal/Scheltema (with Taha Mehmood), Leiden, The Netherlands, (2011), Babusch Project Space and Humboldt University, Berlin (2009), Chatterjee & Lal, Mumbai (2007), and Abguss-Sammlung Antiker Plastik, Berlin (2005). Her work has shown in group shows at 401 Contemporary, Berlin, Dokfest, Kassel (2010), 9th Sharjah Biennial, Manor House, Ilkley, UK, Cartwright Hall, Bradford, UK (all 2009), Royal Geographical Society, London (2008) and the National Art Gallery, Islamabad (2007). Ernst received the Golden Cube for best installation at the Kassel Dokfest, Germany (2009). Her ongoing major project, *Home*, will be the subject of a solo exhibition at Yorkshire Sculpture Park, Wakefield, UK in 2012.

Gauri Gill was born in Chandigarh, India, in 1970 and lives and works in New Delhi. Her work has been exhibited widely across the world with recent group shows at Contemporary Art Centre, Vilnius, Kiran Nadar Museum of Art, New Delhi, Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, San Francisco (all 2011-12), Zacheta National Gallery of Art, Warsaw Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto (both 2011), and Whitechapel Gallery, London (2010). Recent solo exhibitions were at Green Cardamom, London, Nature Morte Gallery, New Delhi, Matthieu Foss Gallery, Mumbai, and the Mississauga Central Library, Mississauga, Canada (all 2010-11). She received the Grange Prize for contemporary photography (2011).

Shilpa Gupta was born in Mumbai, India, in 1976, where she currently lives and works. Her work has been exhibited widely, including solo shows at Darling Fonderie, Montreal (2011), Contemporary Arts Center, Cincinnati, Dvir Gallery, Tel Aviv, OK Center for Contemporary Art, Linz, Austria (all 2010), Yvon Lambert, Paris (2009), and group exhibitions at Musée d'art contemporain de Lyon, MAXXI, Rome, Helsinki Art Museum, Centre Pompidou, Paris (all 2011), Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York, Fukuoka Asian Art Museum, Fukuoka (both 2010). She received the Transmediale 2004 Award, Berlin.

Zarina Hashmi was born in 1937 in Aligarh, India, and lives and works in New York. She has participated in numerous exhibitions internationally, including those at San Jose Museum of Art, California (2011), Museum of Modern Art, New York (2010), Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York (2009), Vancouver Art Gallery (2008), and her recent solo shows were at Lakeeren Art Gallery, Mumbai, Gallery Espace, New Delhi, Gallerie Jaeger Bucher, Paris (all 2011), Luhring Augustine, New York (2009). She was one of four artists representing India at the 54th Venice Biennale (2011), and in 2012 her work will be the subject of a major retrospective at Hammer Museum, Los Angeles—covering her career from 1961 to present.

Emily Jacir was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1970 and lives and works in Beriut. She has had recent solo exhibitions at Alberto Peola Arte Contemporanea, Turin, Beirut Art Center (both 2010), Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York, Alexander and Bonin, New York (both 2009) and Kunstmuseum St.

Gallen, Switzerland (2007). Her work has been included in group shows at Mass MoCA, North Adams, MA (2011-12), the 54th Venice Biennale, 10th Sharjah Biennial, Apexart, New York (all 2011), The New Museum, New York, 29th São Paulo Biennale (both 2010). Jacir is the recipient of the Hugo Boss prize, Guggenheim Museum, New York (2009) and the Golden Lion for an artist under 40 at the 52nd Venice Biennale (2007).

Nadia Kaabi-Linke was born in Tunis, Tunisia, in 1978 and is currently based in Tunis and Berlin. Her work has been shown in group exhibitions at the 54th Venice Biennale, KW Institute for Contemporary Art, Berlin, Abbot Hall Art Gallery, Cumbria, Green Cardamom, London (all 2011), 25th Alexandria Biennial, Egypt, 9th Sharjah Biennial, UAE (2009), and solo exhibitions at Gallery Christian Hosp, Berlin (2010), Gallery El Marsa, Tunis (2009). Kaabi-Linke was awarded the Abraaj Capital Art Prize (2011), the First Prize of the joint art and urban architecture competition for rebuilding the square "Platz der Stadt Hof" in Berlin (2010—to be realized in 2012) and the Jury Prize at the 25th Alexandria Biennial (2009).

Amar Kanwar was born in 1964 in New Delhi, India, where he lives and works. Recent solo exhibitions have been at the Marian Goodman Gallery, New York (2010), Haus der Kunst, Munich, Stediljk Museum, Amsterdam (both 2008). He has participated in Documenta 11 and Documenta 12 in Kassel, Germany (2002 and 2007) and is also the recipient of the 1st Edvard Munch Award for Contemporary Art, Norway (2005) and an Honorary Doctorate in Fine Arts, Maine College of Art. His films are also shown at film festivals where he has received several awards like the Golden Gate Award, San Francisco International Film Festival, the Golden Conch, Mumbai International Film Festival (both 1998), and the Jury's Award, Film South Asia, Nepal (2001).

Noa Lidor was born in Petach Tikva, Israel, in 1977 and lives and works in London. Her work in recent years includes site-specific commissions for Abbot Hall Art Gallery in Cumbria (2011), Tate Modern's Members Room in London (2008-9) and Haifa Museum of Art (2007-8). Recent solo exhibitions include La Caja Blanca, Palma de Mallorca, and Green Cardamom, London (both 2010). In 2011 she received the Museo ABC and JustMad Art Fair Award for Contemporary Drawing, and she will have her first major institutional exhibition at the Museo ABC, Madrid, in 2012.

Mario Mabor (Delbeng) was born in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1977, where he has lived and worked. As a southern Sudanese, he is in the process of relocating to Juba, the capital of the newly independent Republic of South Sudan, in the wake of the recent partition of Sudan in January 2011. Mabor has worked as the director of a children theatre group (Synods Child Culture Group) associated with Camboni College, Khartoum. He has also organized several theatre workshops for displaced people in Khartoum. Mabor has participated in several film workshops at the Goethe Institute, Khartoum. *Rabbaba Man* was screened in several film festivals, including iRepresent (iREP) International Documentary Film Festival in Lagos, Nigeria (2011).

Nalini Malani was born in 1946 in Karachi (then part of undivided India, now in Pakistan). She lives and works in Mumbai. She has had numerous solo presentations internationally, including at Musée cantonal des Beaux-Arts, Lausanne, Switzerland (2010), Govett-Brewster Art Gallery, New Plymouth, New Zealand, Galerie Lelong, Paris (2009), Irish Museum Of Modern Art, Dublin (2007), Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, MA (2005-6). Her work has been included in many international group shows, including at Centre Pompidou, Paris (2011), Martin-Gropius-Bau, Berlin, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi/ Bombay/Bangalore (all 2009), Prospect 1, New Orleans, 16th Sydney Biennale, Australia, Serpentine Gallery, London, (all 2008), Kunstmuseum Bern, Switzerland, 52nd Venice Biennale (both 2007). Her work will appear at documenta 13, Kassel, in 2012.

Naeem Mohaiemen was born in London, UK, in 1969, and lives and works in Dhaka and New York. He has had recent solo exhibitions at Experimenter Gallery, Kolkata (2011), Cue Art Foundation, New York (2009), Gallery Chitrak, Dhaka (2008), and he has participated in numerous group exhibitions including shows at MUAC, Mexico City, the British Council, London, 10th Sharjah Biennial, (all 2011), ISEA, Dortmund, Shedhalle, Zurich (both 2010), Pavilion, Bucharest, Laboral, Gijon, Spain, The Third Line Gallery, Dubai (2009).

Tom Molloy was born in Waterford, Ireland, in 1964 and lives and works between studios in western Ireland and northern France. Recent solo exhibitions were presented at Rubicon Gallery, Dublin, and Lora Reynolds Gallery, Texas (both 2011), Aldrich Contemporary Art Museum, Connecticut (2010), Perugi Gallery, Padua, Italy (2009) and the Solstice Art Centre, Navan, Ireland (2008). Molloy's work featured in significant group exhibitions at the Al Ma'mal Foundation of Contemporary Art, Jerusalem, Darat al

Funun, Amman, 10th Sharjah Biennial, Flag Foundation, New York, Catherine Clark Gallery, San Francisco (all 2011), Austin Museum of Art, and FRAC, Piemonte, Italy (both 2008). In 2012 Molloy will show in *Newtopia*, curated by Katerina Gregos, at several major venues in Belgium.

Raqs Media Collective comprises Jeebesh Bagchi (b. 1965, New Delhi, India), Monica Narula (b. 1969, New Delhi) and Shuddhabrata Sengupta (b. 1968, New Delhi). The members of Raqs live and work in New Delhi. Raqs have been variously described as artists, media practitioners, curators, researchers, editors and catalysts of cultural processes. Recent exhibitions include solo shows at the Art Gallery of York University, Toronto (2011), Project 88, Mumbai, BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art, Gateshead, UK, (both 2010), Tate Britain, and Frith Street Gallery, London, Ikon Gallery, Birmingham, UK (all 2009). Their work has appeared in group shows at the Asian Art Biennial, Taipei, Centre Pompidou, Paris (both 2011), Hayward Gallery, London, 29th São Paolo Biennial, Brazil (2010), Serpentine Gallery, London (2008-09).

Rashid Rana was born in 1968 in Lahore, Pakistan, where he currently lives and works. Recent solo exhibitions of his work have taken place at Cornerhouse, Manchester, UK, Hong Kong Art Center, Lisson Gallery, London, (all 2011), Musee Guimet, Paris (2010), Art & Public, Geneva, Chemould Prescott Road, Mumbai, Chatterjee & Lal, Mumbai, Nature Morte, New Delhi, (2007). Group shows include Singapore Art Museum (2012), Queensland Art Gallery, Brisbane, Australia, Whitechapel Gallery, London, Saatchi Gallery, London (2010), Lower Belvedere, Vienna, Asia Society Museum, New York, National Fine Arts Museum, Taichung (2009), House of World Cultures, Berlin (2008), and National Art Gallery Islamabad (2007). He is an associate professor and one of the founding faculty members of the School of Visual Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore.

Jolene Rickard lives and works within the Tuscarora Nation territories and Ithaca, NY. She is associate professor in the Departments of Art, History of Art and director of the American Indian Program, at Cornell University. She is a scholar and artist interested in the intersection of indigeneity, the forces of globalization, and decolonization. Her work has been shown in numerous exhibitions internationally including those at the Denver Art Museum (2011), Everson Museum, Syracuse, NY (2010), The Ottawa Art Gallery (2008), Compton Verney Gallery, Warwickshire, UK (2005), Museum Der Weltkulturen, Frankfurt, Germany (2005), Albright Knox, Buffalo, NY (2004), Barbican Art Center, London (1998). She is a 2010-2011 recipient of a Cornell University Society of the Humanities Fellowship on the thematic topic of "Global Aesthetics."

Hrair Sarkissian was born in Damascus, Syria, in 1973 and lives and works in London. His work has been shown at SALT Beyoglu, Istanbul, Tate Modern, London, Darat al Funun-The Khalid Shoman Foundation, Amman, 10th Sharjah Biennial, 3rd Thessaloniki Biennale of Contemporary Art, Podbielski Contemporary, Berlin (all 2011), Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio de Modena (2010-2011), "Disorientation II," Abu Dhabi (2009-2010), 11th International Istanbul Biennial (2009) and Kalfayan Galleries, Athens (2010 & 2008), among others. In 2012, his work will be presented at Lyon Septembre de la Photographie and the 7th Asia Pacific Triennial of Contemporary Art, Brisbane, Australia.

Seher Shah was born in Karachi, Pakistan, in 1975 and lives and works in New York. Her work was recently shown in solo exhibitions at Scaramouche, New York (2011), Nature Morte, New Delhi (2009), Bose Pacia Gallery, New York (2008) Momenta Art, Brooklyn, New York (2007), and in group shows at Drawing Room, London, Queen's Museum of Art, New York (both 2011), Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin (2010), Victoria and Albert Museum, London, The Third Line Gallery, Dubai, Green Cardamom, London (all 2009), Brooklyn Museum, New York, and Exit Art, New York (both 2008). She was a finalist of the inaugural Jameel Prize offered by the Victoria & Albert Museum (2009).

Surekha was born in 1965 in Bangalore, India, where she lives and works. Her work has been included in group exhibitions at Centro Cultural Banco do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro (2011-12), Musee Guimet, Paris (2010-11), Fundació La Caixa, Barcelona (2010), Malmö Konsthall, Sweden, and Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin (2009), Cornerhouse, Manchester, and Devi Art Foundation, New Delhi (2008). She has had solo exhibitions at EAWAG, Dubendorf, Switzerland (2011), Samuha, Bangalore, 10 Chancery Lane Gallery, Hong Kong (2010), Chemould Prescott Road, Mumbai (2007), and Max Mueller Bhavan, Bangalore (2007). She has received awards from the Prince Claus Fund (2006/07) and the UK Arts Council (2006), and is the recipient of the UNESCO-Aschberg Award (2001).

Hajra Waheed was born in Calgary, Canada, in 1980, and now lives and works in Montréal. She was a recipient of the Anna Louise Raymond Fellowship. Her

work has been shown widely, including most recent exhibitions at the Tàpies Foundation, Barcelona (2011), Mercer Union: Center of Contemporary Art, Toronto (2011), Green Cardamom, London (2010), and the Manor House, Ilkley, UK (2009). Her first international solo exhibition, *The Scrapbook Project*, will be held at Green Cardamom, London (2012).

Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries is yhchang.com. Its principals, Young-hae Chang (South Korea) and Marc Voge (U.S.), are based in Seoul. YHCHI has written and animated text works set to their own music in 18 languages and has presented much of it at major art institutions around the world, including commissioned works for Tate, London, Centre Pompidou, Paris, and New Museum, New York. YHCHI recently participated in the Mercosul Biennial, Porto Alegre, Brazil (2011). They are 2012 Rockefeller Bellagio Fellows.

Muhammad Zeeshan was born in 1980 in Mirpurkhas, Pakistan, and lives and works in Lahore. His work was recently shown in solo exhibitions at Aicon Gallery, New York (2011), Canvas Art Gallery, Karachi (2010), Rohtas Gallery, Lahore, Green Cardamom, London (both 2009), KoCA (Kiosk of Contemporary Art), Weimar, Jahangir Nicholsen Art Gallery, Mumbai (2008), and group shows at Abbot Hall Art Gallery, Cumbria, UK, (2011), Pacific Asia Museum, Pasadena, CA, Cais Gallery, Hong Kong (both 2010), The British Museum, London, Art Gallery of Mississagua, Canada, ACC Galerie, Weimar, Germany (2009), Gemak/ Gemeentemuseum, The Hague, The Netherlands (2008) and Fukouka Asian Art Museum, Japan (2004). He received the ACC Weimar Galerie Scholarship (2008), the Charles Wallace Scholarship (2007) and the Bhatti Fashion Show Scholarship (2003).

Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries
Cunnilingus in North Korea

CONTRIBUTORS

Nadia Kaabi-Linke & Gaby Wolodarski realizing Shilpa Gupta's *Untitled (There is No Border Here)*

Photography: Bernard Yenelouis

Ellen Avril is chief curator and curator of Asian Art at the Herbert F. Johnson Museum of Art, Cornell University. Since joining the staff of the Johnson Museum in 1998, she has curated 37 exhibitions on a wide range of topics in traditional and contemporary Asian art. She has authored, co-authored, or edited numerous exhibition catalogs, including *Nature Observed and Imagined: Five Hundred Years of Chinese Paintings* (2010), *Ancient Artistry: Pre-Chinese Ceramics and Jades from the Shatzman Collection* (2006), and *Heavenly Earth: Early Chinese Ceramics from the Shatzman Collection* (2004). She served as project director for the recent renovation and re-installation of the Asian art galleries in conjunction with the Johnson Museum's 2011 building expansion.

Iftikhar Dadi is associate professor in the Department of History of Art and chair of the Department of Art at Cornell University. He has published numerous scholarly works, including the recent book *Modernism and the Art of Muslim South Asia* (University of North Carolina Press, 2010). Recent projects he has curated or co-curated include: *Tarjama/Translation* at the Queens Art Museum (2009) and the Herbert F. Johnson Museum of Art (2010); *Anwar Jalal Shemza-Take 1: Calligraphic Abstraction* (2009) at Green Cardamom, London; and *Unpacking Europe* (2001), at Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen, Rotterdam. A working artist, he collaborates with Elizabeth Dadi and has shown widely internationally.

Salah Hassan is the Goldwin Smith Professor in the Africana Studies and Research Center and in the Department of History of Art at Cornell University. He is editor of *Nka: Journal of Contemporary African Art*. He authored, edited, and co-edited several books, including *Diaspora, Memory, Place* (2008); *Unpacking Europe* (2001); *Authentic/Ex-Centric* (2001). Most recently he published *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance: A Critical Reader* (2009), and guest-edited a special issue of (SAQ) South Atlantic Quarterly, entitled *African Modernism* (2010). He has curated several international exhibitions, such as Authentic/Ex-Centric (49th Venice Biennale, 2001), Unpacking Europe (Rotterdam, 2001-02), and 3x3: Three Artists/Three Projects: David Hammons, Maria Magdalena Campos-Pons, Pamela Z (Dak'Art, 2004).

Naeem Mohaiemen explores histories of the international Left and global security panic through essays, photography, and film. Publications include *Between Ashes and Hope: Chittagong Hill Tracts in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism* (editor), "Fear of a Muslim Planet: Islamic Roots of HipHop" (*Sound Unbound*, MIT Press), "Asterix and the Big Fight" (*Playing by the Rules*, Apex Art), "Beirut, Silver Porsche Illusion" (*Men of the Global South*, Zed Books), and "Why Mahmud Can't Be a Pilot" (*Nobody Passes*, Seal Press). Projects have shown at the Whitney Biennial of American Art (in *Wrong Gallery*), Sharjah Biennial (UAE), Experimenter (Kolkata), and Gallery Chitrak (Dhaka).

Aamir Mufti is associate professor in the Department of Comparative Literature at UCLA. He pursued his doctoral studies in literature at Columbia University under the supervision of Edward Said. Recent publications include *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture* (Princeton University Press). Current work includes two book projects—one concerning exile and criticism, and the other, the colonial reinvention of Islamic traditions. He edited "Critical Secularism," a special issue of the journal *boundary 2,* and he has also co-edited *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives* (University of Minnesota Press). His work has appeared in such periodicals as *Social Text*, *Critical Inquiry*, *Subaltern Studies*, *boundary 2*, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *Theory and Event*, and *The Village Voice*.

Hammad Nasar is a curator and co-founder of the London-based arts organization Green Cardamom. He has lectured at, curated exhibitions for, and contributed to public programs at museums and universities around the world, including the British Museum, Tate, Whitechapel Gallery, UCLA, and Yale University. Recent projects he has curated/co-curated include: *Drawn from Life* (2011) at Abbot Hall Gallery, Kendal, UK; *Where Three Dreams Cross: 150 Years of Photography from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (2010) at the Whitechapel Gallery, London, and Fotomuseum Winterthur, Switzerland; *Safavids Revisited* (2009) at the British Museum, London; *Beyond the Page: The Miniature as Attitude in Contemporary Art from Pakistan* at the Pacific Asia Museum, Pasadena, CA (2010) and Manchester Art Gallery, UK (2006); and *Karkhana: A Contemporary Collaboration* (2005) at the Aldrich Contemporary Art Museum, Ridgefield, CT, and the Asian Art Museum, San Francisco (2006).

Jolene Rickard is a visual historian, artist, and curator interested in the issues of Indigeneity within a global context. She is the director for the American Indian Program at Cornell University and associate professor in the Departments of History of Art and Art. Recent essays include "Visualizing Sovereignty in the Time of Biometric Sensors," *South Atlantic Quarterly* (2011);

"Skin Seven Spans Thick" in *Hide: Skin as Material and Metaphor* (NMAI: DC, 2010), and *Rebecca Belmore: Fountain* by Jolene Rickard and Jessica Bradley (2005). Recent projects include: consultant to the National Gallery of Canadian Art in Ottawa in preparation for an international survey of Indigenous art in 2013, also identified as the first Quinquennial. Rickard was a co-curator for the inaugural exhibition for the Smithsonian's National Museum of the American Indian (Washington, D.C.) in 2004. Jolene is from the Tuscarora Nation territories in western New York.

Irit Rogoff is a theorist, curator and organizer who writes at the intersections of the critical, the political, and contemporary arts practices. Rogoff is professor in the Department of Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, a department she founded in 2002. Publications include: *Museum Culture* (1997), *Terra Infirma - Geography's Visual Culture* (2001), *A.C.A.D.E.M.Y* (2006), *Unbounded - Limits Possibilities* (2008), and forthcoming *Looking Away - Participating Singularities, Ontological Communities* (2010). Curatorial work includes: De-Regulation - with the work of Kutlug Ataman (2005-8), ACADEMY (2006), "Education Actualised," special issue of *e-flux online journal* 14.

Raqs Media Collective comprises Jeebesh Bagchi, Monica Narula, and Shuddhabrata Sengupta. Their widely exhibited work locates them in the intersections of contemporary art, historical enquiry, philosophical speculation, research, and theory—often taking the form of installations, online and offline media objects, performances, and encounters. They are members of the editorial collective of the Sarai Reader series, and were co-curators for Manifesta 7, Trentino, Italy (2008). Their recent exhibitions include Baltic Centre, Gateshead, UK (2010); 29th São Paolo Biennial, Brazil (2010); 8th Shanghai Biennale, China (2010); Hayward Gallery, London (2010); Tate Britain, London (2009); and Ikon, Birmingham, UK (2009).

Sumathi Ramaswamy is professor in the Department of History at Duke University, and a cultural historian of South Asia and the British empire. Her research over the last few years has been largely in the areas of visual studies, the history of cartography, and gender. Recent publications include *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India*, published in 2010 by Duke University Press, and an edited volume from Routledge, also published in 2010, titled *Barefoot across the Nation: Maqbool Fida Husain and the Idea of India*. Her work in popular visual history has also led her to co-establish *Tasveerghar: A Digital Network of South Asian Popular Visual Culture* at http://www.tasveerghar.net/. She is now pursuing a new research agenda on the cultures of learning in colonial and postcolonial India.

Nada Raza has worked with and curated exhibitions for Green Cardamom since 2005. She currently works at Iniva (Institute for International Visual Arts) in London, where she coordinated and contributed to the exhibition *Social Fabric* (2012), and also helps deliver a regular program of talks and events aimed at engaging local audiences with diverse critical practices in the fields of art, culture, and politics. As assistant curator, she has been involved with research on the *Lines of Control* project since 2007. Nada has an MA in critical writing and curatorial practice from the Chelsea College of Art (2010) and travels as often as possible between London and Karachi.

Nicole Wolf researches, curates, and teaches moving-image cinema, gallery, and activist spaces. Since 1997 she has been specifically interested in the South Asian region and has mainly spent her time between India, Germany and London. Currently she is working on a book, *Make it Real: Documentary and Other Cinematic Experiments by Women Filmmakers in India*. Wolf is presently lecturer in the Visual Cultures department at Goldsmiths, University of London.

Hyejong Yoo received her PhD in the Department of History of Art at Cornell University in 2011. Her dissertation, *Democracy as the Legitimate "Form" and "Content": Reimagining Art into* Minjung Misul *in South Korea*, locates the dissident nationalism of the *minjung* artists in the context of the 1980s democratization movement and its legacies. Publications include "The Playground of the Candlelight Girls: Nationalism as Art of Dialogy, The 2008 Candlelight Vigil Protest" *Invisible Culture* e-journal (2010).

Murtaza Vali is an independent critic and curator. A contributing editor for *Ibraaz.org* and *ArtAsiaPacific*, he was co-editor of the 2007 and 2008 *ArtAsiaPacific Almanac* issue. Writings have appeared in *Artforum.com*, *ArtReview*, *Art India*, *Bidoun*, *Harper's Bazaar Arabia Art*, *Modern Painters* and *NuktaArt*. He has penned monographic essays on Siah Armajani, Shilpa Gupta, Emily Jacir, Reena Saini Kallat, Laleh Khorramian, and Naeem Mohaiemen, and he recently edited *Manual for Treason*, a multilingual publication commissioned by Sharjah Biennial X (2011). His

curatorial projects include *Accented* (2010) at BRIC Rotunda Gallery, Brooklyn, and *Brute Ornament* (2012) at Green Art Gallery, Dubai. A visiting instructor at Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, NY, he is a recipient of a 2011 Creative Capital | Warhol Foundation Arts Writers Grant for Short-Form Writing. He lives and works between Brooklyn and Sharjah, UAE.



Mickey Harris painting Nadia Kaabi-Linke's *All Along the Watchtower*

Photography: Bernard Yenelouis

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And most of all, the artists, for their support, participation, enthusiasm and inspiration.

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Photography: Bernard Yenelouis

Baseera Khan preparing Noa Lidor's *Wailing Wall*



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